Washington v. Oklahoma City City of

W.D. Oklahoma

Washington v. Oklahoma City City of

District Court, W.D. Oklahoma·Decided March 16, 2022·No. 5:20-cv-00266·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

MICHAEL C. WASHINGTON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. CIV-20-266-D ) CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) )

ORDER Before the Court is Defendant Mitchell McCoy’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Supplemental Petition and Brief in Support [Doc. No. 130]. Plaintiff filed a response [Doc. No. 135], to which Defendant replied [Doc. No. 137]. BACKGROUND This case centers around two separate incidents. Relevant here is an incident that occurred on Oklahoma City Public School (“OKCPS”) grounds in August 2019. Plaintiff was cited on August 23, 2019, for violating an order not to appear on school property. The events that led up to that date are not entirely clear, but it appears that Plaintiff was protesting outside of an Oklahoma City school on August 12, 2019. While protesting, Plaintiff was approached by a security guard who informed Plaintiff that he was banned from all OKCPS campuses and Board of Education meetings for six months. That same evening, Plaintiff attempted to attend a school board meeting, and he was escorted out by a security officer. Plaintiff subsequently notified the Superintendent, Sean McDaniel, of his intent to appeal the suspensions. McDaniel, along with OKCPS General Counsel Jessica Sherrill,

held a hearing with Plaintiff, and they ultimately decided to uphold both suspensions. Plaintiff was notified by letter on August 20, 2019 of their decision, and just three days later, Plaintiff received a citation for trespassing on school property. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mitchell McCoy, an Oklahoma City Police Department officer, wrote the August 23, 2019 trespass citation. Although Plaintiff was charged with trespassing on school property, the charges

were eventually dismissed. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in state court on March 2, 2020. The suit was removed to federal court on March 23, 2020. On May 11, 2020, Plaintiff sought leave to file an amended complaint, which the Court granted. See Order [Doc. No. 36]. On June 12, 2020, the Court allowed Plaintiff to file a supplemental complaint to include an additional cause of action and information as to damages. See Order [Doc. No. 59].

In his sixth cause of action, Plaintiff seeks to hold McCoy liable for malicious prosecution, libel, slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, public humiliation, a violation of due process, and conspiracy to file false criminal charges. McCoy filed a motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 130] for failure to state claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). STANDARD OF DECISION

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The statement must be sufficient to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The court will accept as true all well-pled factual allegations and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Peterson v. Grisham, 594 F.3d 723, 727 (10th Cir. 2010).

A complaint “attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations,” but it does need “more than labels and conclusions.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). A complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. See also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (“[O]n a motion to dismiss, courts ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’”) (citation omitted). Courts may “disregard conclusory statements and look only to whether the remaining, factual allegations plausibly suggest the defendant is liable.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012). In § 1983 cases, it is particularly important “that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair

notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her.” See Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1249–50 (emphasis in original); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1104 (10th Cir. 2009). DISCUSSION All of Plaintiff’s claims against McCoy are based on the trespass citation McCoy

issued Plaintiff. McCoy argues the claims should be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims a. Official Capacity Claims Although individual capacity suits seek to impose personal liability on a government actor for actions taken under color of law, official capacity suits “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (citation and quotations omitted). “[A]n official capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the

entity.” Id. at 166; see also Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 695 (10th Cir. 1988) (“A suit against a municipality and a suit against a municipal official acting in his or her official capacity are the same.”). Where a plaintiff sues both a person in his official capacity and the entity, courts have dismissed the official capacity claims as redundant. See French v. City of Cortez, 361

F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1042 (D. Colo. Jan. 9, 2019) (dismissing official capacity claims against police officers because they were “duplicative” of the claims against the city); Cutter v. Metro Fugitive Squad, Case No. CIV-06-115-GKF, 2008 WL 4068188, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 29, 2008) (dismissing official capacity claims as “simply redundant” because the plaintiffs had sued the government entities); Doe v. Douglas Cnty. School Dist. RE-1, 775 F. Supp. 1414, 1416 (D. Colo. Oct. 17, 1991) (dismissing the “redundant” official capacity claims as a matter of “judicial economy and efficiency”).

The City of Oklahoma City is a named defendant and has filed its own motions [Doc. Nos. 65 and 140] to dismiss. Suing McCoy in his official capacity is redundant, and the official capacity claims against him are dismissed. b. Individual Capacity Claims: Conspiracy and Malicious Prosecution When a plaintiff names an official in his individual capacity, the plaintiff is seeking “to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985).

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