Washington-Steele v. Perez

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 10, 2019
Docket1:18-cv-06894
StatusUnknown

This text of Washington-Steele v. Perez (Washington-Steele v. Perez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Washington-Steele v. Perez, (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ZAHMEIL D. WASHINGTON-STEELE, Plaintiff, -against- OFFICER PEREZ # 18670; DEPARTMENT 18-CV-6894 (CM) OF CORRECTIONS/MENTAL HEALTH AND ORDER TO AMEND HYGIENE; JOHN DOE, CORRECTION OFFICER, AMKC; JOHN DOE, DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, AMKC, Defendants. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently detained in the George R. Vierno Center (G.R.V.C.) on Rikers Island, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants are violating his constitutional rights. By order dated May 1, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). BACKGROUND Plaintiff, who identifies himself as an individual with several mental illnesses who has been taking mental health medication since 1998, alleges that during his current detention on Rikers Island, Defendants have violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff alleges that he has been assaulted by other inmates because he is gay. He also alleges that Defendants are tampering with his outgoing and incoming mail. He asserts that it takes months for his mail to go out and for him to receive incoming mail. He also asserts that his mail never goes out and it is never returned to him. Plaintiff also alleges that the Department of Mental Health and Hygiene has been refusing to give him the proper medication and that he was “verbally sexual[ly] harass[ed]” by Officer

Perez. (Compl. at ¶ V.) He states that Defendant Perez said to him “you walking around with those tight ass thermos on looking like you wanna get fucked.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. DISCUSSION To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). A. Department of Corrections/Mental Health and Hygiene Plaintiff’s claims against the Department of Corrections/Mental Health and Hygiene must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any

agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status and clear intention to assert claims against the City of New York, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims against the City of New York and directs the Clerk of Court to amend the caption of this action to replace the Department of Corrections/Mental Health and Hygiene with the City of New York. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. This amendment is without prejudice to any defenses the City of New York may wish to assert. B. Deliberate Indifference The Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations that (1) he was assaulted by other inmates

because he is gay, and (2) he has not been given the proper medication as asserting that Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution by being deliberately indifferent to a risk of harm to Plaintiff and to his serious medical needs.2

2 If Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee during the events that are the basis of his claims, his condition-of-confinement claims arise under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; if he was a convicted prisoner, such claims arise under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n.16 (1979); Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1996). Plaintiff’s status is unclear – he identifies himself as a “regular detainee.” The failure to protect a prisoner constitutes cruel and unusual punishment when prison officials exhibit “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Morales v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr., 842 F.2d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 1988). To state such a claim, a plaintiff must allege that a correction official was

deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to the Plaintiff. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828; Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017).Where that harm results from medical treatment or lack thereof, the Plaintiff must show that he had a “serious medical need.” Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 2000). A convicted prisoner must show that a correction official “kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both [have been] aware of facts from which the inference could [have been] drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must [have] also draw[n] the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Bell v. Wolfish
441 U.S. 520 (Supreme Court, 1979)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Helling v. McKinney
509 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Lewis v. Casey
518 U.S. 343 (Supreme Court, 1996)
Christopher v. Harbury
536 U.S. 403 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Jermosen v. Coughlin
877 F. Supp. 864 (S.D. New York, 1995)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Aziz Zarif Shabazz v. Pico
994 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. New York, 1998)
Collins v. Goord
581 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. New York, 2008)
Emerson v. City of New York
740 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D. New York, 2010)
Jones v. Harris
665 F. Supp. 2d 384 (S.D. New York, 2009)
Darnell v. City of New York
849 F.3d 17 (Second Circuit, 2017)
Weyant v. Okst
101 F.3d 845 (Second Circuit, 1996)
Harrison v. Barkley
219 F.3d 132 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Davis v. Goord
320 F.3d 346 (Second Circuit, 2003)
Jenkins v. City of New York
478 F.3d 76 (Second Circuit, 2007)

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Bluebook (online)
Washington-Steele v. Perez, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/washington-steele-v-perez-nysd-2019.