Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. One Parcel of Land in Prince George's County

197 F. Supp. 2d 339, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6191, 2002 WL 538948
CourtDistrict Court, D. Maryland
DecidedJanuary 30, 2002
DocketCIV.A.WMN-00-3486
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 197 F. Supp. 2d 339 (Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. One Parcel of Land in Prince George's County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. One Parcel of Land in Prince George's County, 197 F. Supp. 2d 339, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6191, 2002 WL 538948 (D. Md. 2002).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

NICKERSON, District Judge.

Before the Court is Plaintiffs Motion to Determine Entitlement to Just Compensation (Paper No. 41). This condemnation action was brought by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”), for the taking of approximately 0.8550 acres of land in Prince George’s County. 1 WMATA has *342 taken title to the land pursuant to the federal Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.C. § 258a, 2 and has deposited in the Court’s registry the estimated value of just compensation for the parcel, in the amount of $93,500.00. Because there are multiple defendants asserting claims to the just compensation, WMATA now moves the Court to determine which defendants have valid claims, and the relative priority of those claims. 3 The Court finds that no hearing is necessary, 4 and that the defendants with valid claims against the award of just compensation are as follows.

1. LEGAL STANDARD

It is well-established that federal courts sitting in condemnation cases are authorized to determine who among competing claimants held title to land prior to its condemnation. See, Fed.R.Civ.P. 71A(h); United States v. Atomic Fuel Co., 383 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir.1967); United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 19-20, 90 S.Ct. 803, 25 L.Ed.2d 12 (1970). Indeed, courts should resolve the issue of competing claims as a preliminary matter, prior to granting just compensation. Atomic Fuel Co., 383 F.2d at 3. Each claimant bears the burden of establishing his or her right to the property in question. See, United States v. Lee, 360 F.2d 449, 452 (5th Cir.1966); United States v. Certain Land in the Village of Highgate Springs, 413 F.2d 128 (2nd Cir.1969). Federal courts look to the substantive law of the state in which the property is located to determine a party’s interest in the land. See, United States ex. rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 279, 63 S.Ct. 1047, 87 L.Ed. 1390 (1943).

The fee owners of property are entitled to receive whatever amount of the just compensation that remains after all taxes and proper claims against the property have been paid. See, 40 U.S.C. § 258a (“The court shall have power to make such orders in respect of encumbrances, liens, rents, taxes, assessments, insurance, and other charges, if any, as shall be just and equitable.”). A claimant with a valid deed of trust against the property is deemed to be a secured creditor of the land for the amount of the debt remaining at the time of condemnation. Under Maryland law, however, where the subject property is held by tenants in the entirety, parties with liens against the property which name only one of the property owners may not recover against the property. See, Bruce v. Dyer, 309 Md. 421, 428-29, 524 A.2d 777 (1987). Likewise, when an income tax lien is filed against only one of the tenants by the entirety, the traditional rule is that the hen *343 does not attach to the property. See, Brown v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 24 T.C. 256, 269, 1955 WL 565 (1955) (applying the rule laid out in Schwarz v. United States, 191 F.2d 618, 621 (4th Cir.1951)). 5

II. PARTIES WITH VALID CLAIMS TO JUST COMPENSATION

At the time of condemnation, the subject property was owned by Wilson and Elze-nia Wright, as tenants by the entirety. Pl.’s Exhibit 2 (Deed). 6 A title search revealed three outstanding deeds of trust against the property, held by defendants Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (“Countrywide”), the Estate of Edward W. Sellman (“Sellman estate”), and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). For the following reasons, the Court determines that these defendants are entitled to receive just compensation in this case.

In support of its claim, Defendant Countrywide has submitted evidence that on or about April 29, 1988, Manufacturers Hanover Mortgage Corporation loaned the sum of $70,800.00 to Edward and Marion Sellman, the owners of the property prior to the Wrights. The loan was secured by a deed of trust in the same amount. Countrywide Brief, Ex. 1. Manufacturers Hanover has since assigned its interest in the deed of trust to Countrywide. Id. at Ex. 2. Countrywide has provided accounting statements that reflect (1) unpaid balance and interest due and owing on the deed of trust, (2) money paid by Countrywide to Prince George’s County to satisfy a Clean Lot Lien, and (3) money paid by Countrywide to Prince George’s county for 2001-02 real estate taxes. Id. at Ex. 3 & 4; Countrywide Statement of Account (Paper No. 40). The title search reflects no prior liens on the property. Pl.’s Exhibit 3. Therefore, the Court finds that Countrywide has established its claim of entitlement as first lien holder.

The Sellman estate has established that a second deed of trust was recorded on the property on June 26,1985. See, Sellman Brief at Ex. 1. The deed reflects a lien against the property retained by the Sellmans when they conveyed the property to the Wrights. In 1989, the Sellmans filed suit against the Wrights to recover the debt, and a monetary judgment was entered against the Wrights on December 5, 1990 in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. See, PL’s Ex. 9. The Sellman estate has submitted evidence showing that the judgment has not been satisfied. See, Sellman Brief at Ex. 2. Although the Sellman estate sought and obtained a monetary judgment against the Wrights, Maryland law permits a mortgagee to pursue all of its remedies to collect an outstanding debt. See, Parks v. Skipper, 164 Md. 388, 165 A. 319 (1933).

The third deed of trust was recorded on the property by HUD on January 25, 1999. Pl.’s Ex. 8. The relevant document, a Subordinate Deed of Trust, *344 names Wilson and Elzenia Wright as grantors. Id.

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197 F. Supp. 2d 339, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6191, 2002 WL 538948, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/washington-metropolitan-area-transit-authority-v-one-parcel-of-land-in-mdd-2002.