Levine, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court. Eldridge, J., dissents and filed a dissenting opinion at page 189 infra.
The sole issue presented in this case is whether an order for probation without judgment, entered pursuant to Maryland Code (1957,1976 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 292 (b), is a disposition from which an appeal may be taken by the defendant. The Circuit Court for Worcester County (Prettyman, J.) held that such an appeal would not lie. We [181]*181then granted certiorari and for reasons that follow, we affirm.
Appellants, Bob Joe Warren and Michael T. Doyle, were tried in the District Court of Maryland, Worcester County, on charges of petty larceny and possession of marihuana. The court found them not guilty of larceny, but guilty of possession. Pursuant to § 292 (b),1 which provides that the court “may, with the consent of [the defendant] stay the entering of the judgment of guilt, defer further proceedings, [182]*182and place [the defendant] on probation,” the District Court withheld the entry of judgment and signed identical orders placing each appellant on supervised probation for one year. Both appellants consented in writing to the entry of the orders, but then noted a timely appeal to the circuit court. The State promptly moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that “a probation before sentence verdict, voluntarily consented to, results in no conviction or judgment and that no appeal will lie.” In dismissing the appeal, the court apparently took the view that a sentence must be imposed if a disposition is to constitute an appealable “final judgment.” In the view which we take of this case, it is unnecessary to rest our decision on this ground.
(1)
Our analysis begins with the observation that appellate jurisdiction in both civil and criminal causes is dependent upon a statutory grant of power. Lohss and Sprenkle v. State, 272 Md. 113, 116, 321 A. 2d 534 (1974). The provision with which we are concerned here is Code (1974, 1976 Cum. Supp.), § 12-401 (a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which governs appeals from the District Court and provides:
“A party in a civil case or the defendant in a criminal case may appeal from a final judgment entered in the District Court.... In a criminal case, the defendant may appeal even though imposition or execution of sentence has been suspended.”
The issue, then, is whether an order for probation without entry of judgment is a “final judgment” within the contemplation of the statute.
At the outset, we note that § 12-101 (f) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article defines “final judgment” to mean:
“... a judgment, decree, sentence, order, determination, decision, or other action by a court, [183]*183including an orphans’ court, from which an appeal, application for leave to appeal, or petition for certiorari may be taken.”
This section, however, does not attempt to specify what is an appealable final judgment or order, and leaves that determination to the case law. Wright v. Nugent, 23 Md. App. 337, 356, 328 A. 2d 362 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 275 Md. 290, 338 A. 2d 898 (1975).
From our prior decisions, it is evident that the rule in Maryland has traditionally prohibited piecemeal disposition of litigation and, subject to exceptions not relevant here, has permitted appeals only from final judgments. As early as 1835, this Court referred to the “well established rule” that no appeal can be prosecuted “until a decision has been had in the Court below, which is so far final, as to settle, and conclude the rights of the party involved in the action, or denying to the party the means of further prosecuting or defending the suit.” Boteler & Belt v. State, 7 G. & J. 109, 112-13 (1835); accord, United States Fire Ins. v. Schwartz, 280 Md. 518, 521, 374 A. 2d 896 (1977); In re Buckler Trusts, 144 Md. 424, 427, 125 A. 177 (1924). Otherwise stated, to be final a judgment must actually settle the rights of the parties, Collins v. Cambridge Hospital, 158 Md. 112, 116, 148 A. 114 (1930), or it must finally settle some disputed right or interest of the parties, Harlan v. Lee, 177 Md. 437, 439, 9 A. 2d 839 (1939).
In addition to arguing that they met these standards, appellants draw upon a test enunciated for the Supreme Court by Mr. Justice Black in Korematsu v. United States, 319 U. S. 432, 435, 63 S. Ct. 1124, 87 L. Ed. 1497 (1943). There, the Court stated that a judgment is final when it terminates the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. Applying this test, the Court held that an order of the District Court suspending the imposition of sentence and placing the defendant on probation after he had been found guilty was an appealable final judgment.
Appellants contend that here the orders of the District Court constituted final judgments within the traditional [184]*184meaning of. the rule. Thus, they had a full trial on the merits in the District Court, in which they presented and exhausted all of their defenses, and then they were found guilty. Consequently, their right to be free from a finding of guilt has been finally settled. Nor, they argue, will an appeal afford them an opportunity to delay the trial by protracting the litigation. In their view, all that remains to be done is to enforce the probation order, for should the court ever determine that they violated probation, its entry of judgment at that time will be a mere formality.
To support their contention, appellants also rely heavily on an English case, Oaten v. Auty, [1919] 2 K. B. 278, which we discussed in Skinker v. State, 239 Md. 234, 239 n.2, 210 A. 2d 716 (1965). There the defendant failed to appear for military service, apparently under claim of exemption as a minister of a religious denomination. The trial court was of the opinion that the offense was proved, but believed it inexpedient to inflict any punishment, and therefore dismissed the information. On appeal, five justices, each writing separately, believed the lower court’s action to have been an appealable “determination” within the meaning of the applicable statute. The logic which seemed to persuade the justices to hold the determination appealable was perhaps best expressed by Justice Darling:
“If this appellant cannot appeal a grave injustice might be done. ... As far as we know he is a man of high character and position in [the Spiritualists], and it is found against him that he is a man who will not do his duty by his country. . .. [I]t is said [the trial justices] have taken a course which prevents the appellant appealing and getting rid of the stigma put upon him. If the stigma has been unjustly put upon him it is not surprising that he desires to come here to get the finding altered . ...” 2K. B. at 282-83.
Thus, appellants argue here that a grave injustice may be done if they cannot appeal at this time, since their only remaining option to secure review would be to violate [185]*185probation in the expectation that the court would enter judgment and impose sentence, thereby ensuring finality.
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Levine, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court. Eldridge, J., dissents and filed a dissenting opinion at page 189 infra.
The sole issue presented in this case is whether an order for probation without judgment, entered pursuant to Maryland Code (1957,1976 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 292 (b), is a disposition from which an appeal may be taken by the defendant. The Circuit Court for Worcester County (Prettyman, J.) held that such an appeal would not lie. We [181]*181then granted certiorari and for reasons that follow, we affirm.
Appellants, Bob Joe Warren and Michael T. Doyle, were tried in the District Court of Maryland, Worcester County, on charges of petty larceny and possession of marihuana. The court found them not guilty of larceny, but guilty of possession. Pursuant to § 292 (b),1 which provides that the court “may, with the consent of [the defendant] stay the entering of the judgment of guilt, defer further proceedings, [182]*182and place [the defendant] on probation,” the District Court withheld the entry of judgment and signed identical orders placing each appellant on supervised probation for one year. Both appellants consented in writing to the entry of the orders, but then noted a timely appeal to the circuit court. The State promptly moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that “a probation before sentence verdict, voluntarily consented to, results in no conviction or judgment and that no appeal will lie.” In dismissing the appeal, the court apparently took the view that a sentence must be imposed if a disposition is to constitute an appealable “final judgment.” In the view which we take of this case, it is unnecessary to rest our decision on this ground.
(1)
Our analysis begins with the observation that appellate jurisdiction in both civil and criminal causes is dependent upon a statutory grant of power. Lohss and Sprenkle v. State, 272 Md. 113, 116, 321 A. 2d 534 (1974). The provision with which we are concerned here is Code (1974, 1976 Cum. Supp.), § 12-401 (a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which governs appeals from the District Court and provides:
“A party in a civil case or the defendant in a criminal case may appeal from a final judgment entered in the District Court.... In a criminal case, the defendant may appeal even though imposition or execution of sentence has been suspended.”
The issue, then, is whether an order for probation without entry of judgment is a “final judgment” within the contemplation of the statute.
At the outset, we note that § 12-101 (f) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article defines “final judgment” to mean:
“... a judgment, decree, sentence, order, determination, decision, or other action by a court, [183]*183including an orphans’ court, from which an appeal, application for leave to appeal, or petition for certiorari may be taken.”
This section, however, does not attempt to specify what is an appealable final judgment or order, and leaves that determination to the case law. Wright v. Nugent, 23 Md. App. 337, 356, 328 A. 2d 362 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 275 Md. 290, 338 A. 2d 898 (1975).
From our prior decisions, it is evident that the rule in Maryland has traditionally prohibited piecemeal disposition of litigation and, subject to exceptions not relevant here, has permitted appeals only from final judgments. As early as 1835, this Court referred to the “well established rule” that no appeal can be prosecuted “until a decision has been had in the Court below, which is so far final, as to settle, and conclude the rights of the party involved in the action, or denying to the party the means of further prosecuting or defending the suit.” Boteler & Belt v. State, 7 G. & J. 109, 112-13 (1835); accord, United States Fire Ins. v. Schwartz, 280 Md. 518, 521, 374 A. 2d 896 (1977); In re Buckler Trusts, 144 Md. 424, 427, 125 A. 177 (1924). Otherwise stated, to be final a judgment must actually settle the rights of the parties, Collins v. Cambridge Hospital, 158 Md. 112, 116, 148 A. 114 (1930), or it must finally settle some disputed right or interest of the parties, Harlan v. Lee, 177 Md. 437, 439, 9 A. 2d 839 (1939).
In addition to arguing that they met these standards, appellants draw upon a test enunciated for the Supreme Court by Mr. Justice Black in Korematsu v. United States, 319 U. S. 432, 435, 63 S. Ct. 1124, 87 L. Ed. 1497 (1943). There, the Court stated that a judgment is final when it terminates the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. Applying this test, the Court held that an order of the District Court suspending the imposition of sentence and placing the defendant on probation after he had been found guilty was an appealable final judgment.
Appellants contend that here the orders of the District Court constituted final judgments within the traditional [184]*184meaning of. the rule. Thus, they had a full trial on the merits in the District Court, in which they presented and exhausted all of their defenses, and then they were found guilty. Consequently, their right to be free from a finding of guilt has been finally settled. Nor, they argue, will an appeal afford them an opportunity to delay the trial by protracting the litigation. In their view, all that remains to be done is to enforce the probation order, for should the court ever determine that they violated probation, its entry of judgment at that time will be a mere formality.
To support their contention, appellants also rely heavily on an English case, Oaten v. Auty, [1919] 2 K. B. 278, which we discussed in Skinker v. State, 239 Md. 234, 239 n.2, 210 A. 2d 716 (1965). There the defendant failed to appear for military service, apparently under claim of exemption as a minister of a religious denomination. The trial court was of the opinion that the offense was proved, but believed it inexpedient to inflict any punishment, and therefore dismissed the information. On appeal, five justices, each writing separately, believed the lower court’s action to have been an appealable “determination” within the meaning of the applicable statute. The logic which seemed to persuade the justices to hold the determination appealable was perhaps best expressed by Justice Darling:
“If this appellant cannot appeal a grave injustice might be done. ... As far as we know he is a man of high character and position in [the Spiritualists], and it is found against him that he is a man who will not do his duty by his country. . .. [I]t is said [the trial justices] have taken a course which prevents the appellant appealing and getting rid of the stigma put upon him. If the stigma has been unjustly put upon him it is not surprising that he desires to come here to get the finding altered . ...” 2K. B. at 282-83.
Thus, appellants argue here that a grave injustice may be done if they cannot appeal at this time, since their only remaining option to secure review would be to violate [185]*185probation in the expectation that the court would enter judgment and impose sentence, thereby ensuring finality.
Although these arguments have great force, they ignore the legislative intention, which we find clear from the controlling statutes, that § 292 (b) orders for probation without judgment are not to be final judgments within the meaning of the traditional rule. First, § 12-401 (a) expressly provides that appeal lies only from final judgments “entered" by the District Court. Section 292 (b), however, by its very terms, stays the entry of judgment upon the finding of guilt. As a consequence, even assuming arguendo that the determination of guilt is a “final judgment” for purposes of § 12-401, that judgment is not entered in a § 292 (b) disposition and is thus not appealable.
Moreover, in our view it is not the finding of guilt, but rather a subsequent event — either the successful completion of the probationary period or the revocation of probation — which actually settles the rights of the parties. If, on the one hand, appellants serve their probationary period and are discharged, the proceedings against them will be dismissed without a judgment of conviction — a disposition which they cannot appeal. Cf. Lohss and Sprenkle v. State, 272 Md. at 119 (State may not appeal dismissal which it sought or to which it consented). Thereafter, all public criminal records are expunged automatically, and the arrest and conviction may not be so regarded “for purposes of employment, civil rights, or any statute or regulation or license or questionnaire or any other public or private purpose.” 2 Nor is discharge under § 292 (b) deemed a conviction for purposes of the disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of a crime. In short, successful completion of probation erases the stigma [186]*186of criminal conviction, except for those who later violate the law again. See also State v. Jacob, 234 Md. 452, 455, 199 A. 2d 803 (1964).
On the other hand, § 292 (b) expressly provides that when the defendant violates a condition of probation, the court then “may enter a judgment of conviction and proceed as otherwise provided.” Since such a disposition finally settles the defendant’s guilt, as in an ordinary proceeding, he would then be entitled to appeal. At that time, of course, the defendant would be permitted to challenge any determination made at the original District Court trial, since he would have been afforded no prior opportunity to do so. Cf. Burch v. State, 278 Md. 426, 431, 365 A. 2d 577 (1976) (where final judgment is entered upon conviction at original trial, any challenge to that determination must be brought at that time, not when appeal is taken from subsequent revocation of probation).
The result we reach here accords with decisions of the Supreme Courts of Delaware and Wisconsin. Rash v. State, 318 A. 2d 603, 605 (Del. 1974); State v. Ryback, 64 Wis. 2d 574, 219 N.W.2d 263, 267 (1974). In each instance, the court was confronted with the identical question presented here in the context of a statute which, like § 292 (b), was derived from § 407 of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. We hold, therefore, that an order for probation without entry of judgment pursuant to Art. 27, § 292 (b) is not a “final judgment entered” in the district court.
(2).
Appellants advance an alternative contention based on a statutory modification of the traditional final judgment rule. The essence of their argument is that an order for probation under § 292 (b), even if not a final judgment, is nonetheless appealable pursuant to § 12-401 (a), which provides that “[i]n a criminal case, the defendant may appeal even though imposition or execution of sentence has been suspended.” We do not find this argument persuasive because, in our view, probation under § 292 (b) is quite different from a suspension of sentence.
[187]*187The General Assembly first enacted the provision permitting appeal where imposition or execution of sentence has been suspended to overturn our holding in Symington III v. State, 133 Md. 452, 105 A. 541 (1919), that no appealable final judgment existed where the court suspended sentence. Burch v. State, 278 Md. at 430; Hite v. State, 198 Md. 602, 606-07, 84 A. 2d 899 (1951). Appellants reason that since a suspended sentence is appealable, even though it is not a final judgment, the Legislature has manifested an intention that determinations of guilt also should be reviewable immediately where entry of judgment is stayed pursuant to § 292 (b). This policy applies, according to appellants, whether a final judgment is lacking because sentence was suspended or because probation without entry of judgment was ordered pursuant to § 292 (b).
To bolster their argument, appellants contend that the Legislature could not have intended the consequences which would follow from a holding that § 292 (b) orders for probation are not appealable. As we indicated earlier, the corollary to such a holding — and the State conceded this at oral argument — is that the defendant may appeal the determination of guilt only when the court revokes probation and enters judgment. Since the probationary period may extend as long as five years, see Art. 27, § 641A, an appeal may be delayed until long after witnesses become unavailable or their memories of the events have faded; the problem may be particularly acute where, as here, appeal is by trial de novo.
As before, appellants’ argument is not without force, but is advanced in the wrong forum. The statutory exception carved out from the final judgment rule for appeal following suspension of sentence is specific, and is limited solely to those situations where the sentence in the traditional sense of a fine or prison term is lacking. Missing here is an additional element, the entry of a judgment upon the finding of guilt. Nor is this merely a technical distinction, for though a suspended sentence avoids a fine or prison term, it is also the judgment upon the finding of guilt and the collateral effects of that judgment which the defendant [188]*188seeks to avoid.3 Moreover, the General Assembly specifically required that the court obtain the defendant’s consent to the staying of the entry of judgment, whereas it need not obtain his consent merely to suspend sentence. Compare Art. 27 § 641A with § § 292 and 641.
These distinctions, we are confident, were apparent to the General Assembly when it considered this legislation.4 Had it intended to authorize immediate appellate review of the dispositions imposed here, it could readily have amended § 12-401 (a) to permit appeals even though entry of judgment was stayed. The Legislature having rejected that course, our role is limited to effectuating its manifest intention. Consequently, we hold that an order for probation without entry of judgment does not fall within the suspended sentence exception to the final judgment rule.5
Order of the Circuit Court for Worcester County affirmed.