WARREN EDUCATION ASSN. v. Adams
This text of 226 N.W.2d 536 (WARREN EDUCATION ASSN. v. Adams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
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On August 15, 1973 the 1971-1973 contract for the teachers in the Warren Consolidated School District expired by its own terms and was not renewed. In spite of the absence of a contract, the teachers returned to work at the beginning of the fall semester, the school board having refused to extend the old contract past its expiration date. There being no written contract, the school board imposed "interim operating regulations” pursuant to and under the authority of MCLA 340.614; MSA 15.3614. These regulations eliminated a great many of the provisions and protections of the expired contract.
On September 4, 1973, the Warren Education Association authorized a strike to commence October 8, 1973. On October 7, 1973 a strike vote was taken. The ballot was prepared and structured to indicate that the sole purpose of the strike was to seek reinstatement of the provisions of the previous expired contract which had been deleted or modified by the "interim operating regulations”. By a vote of 1201 to 37 the members of the association resolved to withhold their services and on the following day the teachers did not appear for work.
When the school board did not take any action with respect to this work stoppage, the association filed an action for declaratory judgment on October 12, 1973. The school board counterclaimed against plaintiff association and, with permission of the trial court, filed a third-party complaint against the teachers individually for injunctive [499]*499relief and damages. After two days of hearings, the trial court entered an opinion and injunctive order on October 24, 1973 which held that the teachers were engaged in an illegal strike in violation of the public employment relations act as amended, commonly known as the "Hutchinson Act”, the same being MCLA 423.201 et seq.; MSA 17.455(1) et seq. The trial court ordered that the teachers were "therefore ordered back to school forthwith, and shall report for duty at the regular hour on Thursday, October 25, 1973, and will serve pursuant to the terms of the 1971-73 Collective Bargaining Agreement” subject to the court’s continuing supervision of the negotiations between the parties. This injunctive order was made final on November 19, 1973 and plaintiff association appealed.
The focal question on appeal, as below, is whether the withholding of services by the teachers in an effort to cause the school board to reinstate the provisions of the expired contract is a "strike” within the meaning of the aforementioned act.
MCLA 423.201; MSA 17.455(1) provides, in part, that:
"As used in this act a 'strike’ means the concerted failure to report for duty, the wilful absence from one’s position, the stoppage of work, or the abstinence in whole or in part from the full, faithful and proper performance of the duties of employment, for the purpose of inducing, inñúencing or coercing a change in the conditions, or compensation, or the rights, privileges or obligations of employment. ” (Emphasis supplied.)
See also MCLA 423.206; MSA 17.455(6).
Plaintiff association argues here, as they did below, that the work stoppage by the teachers was not a "strike” within the meaning of the act, since it was not for the purpose of coercing "a change in [500]*500the conditions” but rather to seek a return to the conditions as they existed under the expired contract. As appealing as the argument may be, the error in the logic of the argument is patent. Since the prior contract expired by its own terms on August 15,1973, the status quo is not the situation as it existed under the expired contract, but rather the situation in which no contract exists and the interim operating regulations do exist. Since the teachers were seeking a change from the situation as it existed under the interim operating regulations, they were seeking a "change in the conditions” within the meaning of the above quoted statute.
We would hasten to add that the school board may not promulgate unconscionable regulations and seek the solace of an injunction to terminate a teacher strike. Not only does MCLA 340.614, supra, mandate that the regulations be reasonable, but also, since injunctive relief is equitable in nature, a court may not decree relief which would create an inequitable result.
The withholding of services by the teachers being a strike within the meaning of MCLA 423.201, supra, and strikes by said public employees being contrary to statutory mandate, MCLA 423.202; MSA 17.455(2), the circuit court could issue, upon a showing of violence, irreparable injury or breach of the peace, an injunction restraining the teachers from continuing their strike. Holland School District v Holland Education Association, 380 Mich 314; 157 NW2d 206 (1968). Plaintiff association stipulated, and the trial court found, that there would be irreparable injury. While this Court hears appeals from actions in equity de novo, we give great weight to the findings of the trial court. Upon review of the [501]*501record herein, we hold that the relief granted by the trial court was proper.
Affirmed as to the injunctive relief granted, but remanded for consideration of the remaining issues raised in the counter and cross complaints. No costs, a public question being involved.
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226 N.W.2d 536, 57 Mich. App. 496, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3251, 1975 Mich. App. LEXIS 1619, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/warren-education-assn-v-adams-michctapp-1975.