WARREN D. SUGGS v. JEANIE M. KRAMER, DR. JAMES MURPHY, and RANDALL HEPP

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedDecember 1, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-01427
StatusUnknown

This text of WARREN D. SUGGS v. JEANIE M. KRAMER, DR. JAMES MURPHY, and RANDALL HEPP (WARREN D. SUGGS v. JEANIE M. KRAMER, DR. JAMES MURPHY, and RANDALL HEPP) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
WARREN D. SUGGS v. JEANIE M. KRAMER, DR. JAMES MURPHY, and RANDALL HEPP, (E.D. Wis. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

WARREN D. SUGGS,

Plaintiff, Case No. 24-CV-1427-JPS-JPS v.

JEANIE M. KRAMER, DR. JAMES ORDER MURPHY, and RANDALL HEPP,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Warren D. Suggs, an inmate confined at Oshkosh Correctional Institution (“OCI”), filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to provide him adequate medical treatment. ECF No. 1. On March 19, 2025, the Court screened the amended complaint and allowed Plaintiff to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Jeanie M. Kramer (“Kramer”), Dr. James Murphy (“Murphy”), and Randall Hepp (“Hepp”) for their deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. ECF No. 14 at 4. On May 2, 2025, Defendants Kramer and Hepp (collectively the “State Defendants”) filed a motion for summary judgment based on the failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff filed motions for an extension of time, ECF Nos. 26, 31, and later filed a response brief, ECF Nos. 28. The Court grants Plaintiff’s motions for an extension of time and finds his opposition materials were timely filed. The State Defendants filed a reply on June 2, 2025. ECF No. 34. On June 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend/correct response, ECF No. 40, along with an amended response brief, ECF No. 44. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion to amend/correct the response and considers Plaintiff’s amended filing. On July 7, 2025, the State Defendants filed a motion to file a surreply in light of Plaintiff’s amended filing. ECF No. 46. Although surreplies are typically disfavored, see Tirnanich v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 17-CV-1142-PP, 2018 WL 1247399, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 9, 2018), the Court finds a surreply appropriate here in light of Plaintiff’s supplemental brief. The Court will therefore grant the State Defendants’ motion and will consider the surreply in its analysis below. Finally, on July 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to present evidence. ECF No. 47. The State Defendants filed a response on July 28, 2025. ECF No. 48. The Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion as the newly presented evidence was both untimely and unnecessary to the Court’s decision. On June 16, 2025, Defendant Murphy filed a motion for summary judgment based on the failure to exhaust administrative remedies. ECF No. 36. On June 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss all claims as to Murphy. ECF No. 41. On July 30, 2025, Murphy filed a reply brief. ECF No. 51. The Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are now fully briefed and ready for disposition. For the reasons explained below, the Court will deny the State Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on the failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Prior to addressing the summary judgments, however, the Court first addresses Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Murphy. Plaintiff seeks dismissal of all claims against Murphy because he belatedly realized that Murphy was improperly named as a Defendant. ECF No. 41. Plaintiff explains that his poor eyesight caused him to misunderstand the identity of his medical provider. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41(a)(2) provides, in relevant part, that “[e]xcept as provided in Rule 41(a)(1), an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Here, the Court finds dismissal of the claim against Murphy to be proper. Plaintiff has recognized his mistake and seeks to remedy it. Murphy does not oppose Plaintiff’s motion. As such, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Murphy and will dismiss the claims against him with prejudice. The Court will accordingly deny Murphy’s motion for summary judgment based on exhaustion as moot. The Court now turns to the issue of the State Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 1. STANDARD OF REVIEW 1.1 Summary Judgment Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that the Court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2016). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit” under the applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute of fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. The Court construes all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc., 815 F.3d 356, 360 (7th Cir. 2016). 1.2 Exhaustion of Prisoner Administrative Remedies The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) establishes that, prior to filing a lawsuit complaining about prison conditions, a prisoner must exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). To do so, the prisoner must “file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). He must do so precisely in accordance with those rules; substantial compliance does not satisfy the PLRA. Id.; Burrell v. Powers, 431 F.3d 282, 284–85 (7th Cir. 2005). A suit must be dismissed if it was filed before exhaustion was complete, even if exhaustion is achieved before judgment is entered. Perez v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999). The exhaustion requirement furthers several purposes, including restricting frivolous claims, giving prison officials the opportunity to address situations internally, giving the parties the opportunity to develop the factual record, and reducing the scope of litigation. Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 450–51 (7th Cir. 2001). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense to be proven by a defendant. Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 577 (7th Cir. 2005). 1.2.1 Inmate Complaint Review System The Wisconsin Department of Corrections (the “DOC”) maintains an inmate complaint review system (“ICRS”) to provide a forum for administrative complaints. Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 310.04. The ICRS “allow[s] inmates to raise in an orderly fashion issues regarding department policies, rules, living conditions, and employee actions that personally affect the inmate or institution environment, including civil rights claims.” Id. § DOC 310.01(2)(a).

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Bluebook (online)
WARREN D. SUGGS v. JEANIE M. KRAMER, DR. JAMES MURPHY, and RANDALL HEPP, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/warren-d-suggs-v-jeanie-m-kramer-dr-james-murphy-and-randall-hepp-wied-2025.