Warner v. SSA

2010 DNH 095

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: June 3, 2010
• Docket: CV-09-324-JL
• Status: Published

Opinion

Warner v. SSA CV-09-324-JL 6/3/10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Devona Warner

v. Civil No. 09-CV-324-JL Opinion No. 2010 DNH 095 Michael Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security Administration

SUMMARY ORDER

After receiving a partially favorable decision from the

Social Security Administration ("SSA") on her claim for

disability benefits, plaintiff Devona Warner brought suit against

the SSA's Commissioner under the Social Security Act, see 42

U.S.C. § 405(g), challenging the only unfavorable part of that

decision: the onset date of her disability. Warner claims that

she became disabled in April 2006, but the administrative law

judge found a June 2007 onset date, and the SSA denied Warner's

reguest for an administrative appeal. This court has subject-

matter jurisdiction to review the SSA's decision under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331 (federal guestion) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Social

Security).

The Commissioner, conceding that the administrative law

judge offered an "inadeguate rationale" for denying benefits

before June 2007, has moved for an entry of judgment reversing

and remanding this case to the SSA for reconsideration. Warner agrees that such a remand is appropriate under sentence four of

42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which provides that the district court "shall

have power to enter . . . a judgment . . . reversing the decision

of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding

the cause for a rehearing." See also Seavey v. Barnhart, 276

F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2001) (explaining that a sentence four

remand may be ordered where the SSA's decision is not supported

by "substantial evidence").

The only issue on which the parties disagree is the scope of

the remand. The Commissioner argues that the scope should be

"unrestricted" in light of SSA regulations, which provide that

"[w]hen a Federal court remands a case to the Commissioner for

further consideration," the Commissioner may in turn remand it to

the administrative law judge, and "[a]ny issues relating to your

claim may be considered by the administrative law judge whether

or not they were raised in the administrative proceedings leading

to the final decision in your case." 20 C.F.R. § 404.983; see

also Thompson v. Astrue, 583 F. Supp. 2d 472, 475-76 (S.D.N.Y.

2008) (deeming this regulation applicable where a district court

remands without any limiting instructions) .

Warner argues, in response, that this court should limit the

remand to the particular issue being litigated in this case:

whether she is entitled to disability benefits for the period

2 before June 2007. As she notes, it is well established that

"district courts have the power to limit the scope of remand" in

this kind of case and that the SSA--notwithstanding its

regulations--must abide by the court's limiting instructions.

Id. at 475 (citing Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 885 (1989));

see also Jameson v. Astrue, No. 09-cv-237-JD, 2010 WL 1568474

(D.N.H. Mar. 15, 2010) (Muirhead, M.J.) (limiting sentence four

remand to the issue of whether the onset date of the plaintiff's

disability should have been earlier).1

After hearing oral argument, this court agrees with Warner

that the remand should be limited in scope. Our court of appeals

has made clear that "the decision as to what remedy to apply

under sentence four of § 405(g) is largely dictated by the type

of error made by the ALJ." Seavey, 276 F.3d at 9; see also id.

at 10 ("what instructions should accompany a remand order will

turn on the nature of the error at the ALJ proceedings"). Here,

the parties have stipulated that the administrative law judge's

error relates to the denial of benefits for the period before

June 2007.2 They have not identified any errors relating to the

1The court commends Attorney Plourde for providing notice of the recent Jameson case, even though it is adverse to the Commissioner's position. See N.H. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a) (2) .

2Document no. 9.

3 grant of benefits from June 2007 onward. Accordingly, there is

no reason for the SSA to expend further resources on that issue,

or for Warner to face the risk (however remote) of losing the

benefits that she has already been granted.

For the reasons set forth above, the Commissioner's motion

for an entry of judgment reversing and remanding the case to the

SSA3 is GRANTED. On remand, the scope of review shall be limited

to determining whether Warner is entitled to disability benefits

for the period before June 2007. The clerk shall enter judgment

accordingly and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 3, 2010

cc: Raymond J. Kelly, Esq. T. David Plourde, AUSA

3Document no. 4.