Warkoczewski v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedFebruary 12, 2019
Docket17-284
StatusUnpublished

This text of Warkoczewski v. Secretary of Health and Human Services (Warkoczewski v. Secretary of Health and Human Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Warkoczewski v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, (uscfc 2019).

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 17-284V Filed: December 17, 2018

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * JENNIFER M. WARKOCZEWSKI, * * UNPUBLISHED Petitioner, * * v. * Attorneys’ Fees and Costs * SECRETARY OF HEALTH * AND HUMAN SERVICES, * * Respondent. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Amy Senerth, Esq., Muller Brazil, LLP, Dresher, PA, for Petitioner. Claudia Gangi, Esq., United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

DECISION ON ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS1

Roth, Special Master:

On February 28, 2017, Jennifer Warkoczewski (“Petitioner”) filed a petition pursuant to the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program.2 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -34 (2012). Petitioner alleged that the tetanus-diphtheria-acellular pertussis (“Tdap”) vaccine she received on August 21, 2015 caused her to develop shingles and post-herpetic neuralgia. Pet. at 1. On September 19, 2018, Petitioner filed a Motion voluntarily dismissing her petition. ECF No. 24. The undersigned issued her Decision dismissing the petition on September 20, 2018. ECF No. 25.

1 The undersigned intends to post this Ruling on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website. This means the ruling will be available to anyone with access to the Internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, the undersigned agrees that the identified material fits within this definition, the undersigned will redact such material from public access. Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, undersigned is required to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). 2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. On October 12, 2018, Petitioner filed an application for attorneys’ fees and costs. ECF No. 28 (“Fees App.”). Petitioner requested total attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $18,175.82 (representing $15,151.70 in attorneys’ fees and $3,024.12 in costs). Fees App at 2. Pursuant to General Order No. 9, Petitioner has indicated that she has not personally incurred any costs in pursuit of this litigation. Id. Respondent responded to the motion on October 18, 2018, stating “Respondent is satisfied the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs are met in this case” and requesting that the undersigned “exercise her discretion and determine a reasonable award for attorneys’ fees and costs.” Resp’t’s Resp. at 2-3 (ECF No. 30). Petitioner did not file a reply thereafter.

This matter is now ripe for consideration.

I. Legal Framework

The Vaccine Act permits an award of “reasonable attorneys' fees” and “other costs.” § 15(e)(1). If a petitioner succeeds on the merits of his or her claim, the award of attorneys' fees is automatic. Id.; see Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1891 (2013). However, a petitioner need not prevail on entitlement to receive a fee award as long as the petition was brought in “good faith” and there was a “reasonable basis” for the claim to proceed. § 15(e)(1). Here, although Petitioner was not successful in pursuing her claim, the undersigned finds that both elements have been met. First, the undersigned does not doubt that Petitioner brought her claim in a good-faith belief that her vaccination played a causal role in her injury. Additionally, the claim possessed sufficient objective support to meet the second half of the reasonable basis test, and Respondent has not challenged the reasonable basis of the claim.3 Accordingly, a final award of attorneys’ fees and costs is deemed appropriate.

The Federal Circuit has endorsed the use of the lodestar approach to determine what constitutes “reasonable attorneys' fees” and “other costs” under the Vaccine Act. Avera v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Under this approach, “an initial estimate of a reasonable attorneys' fees” is calculated by “multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. at 1347–48 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). That product is then adjusted upward or downward based on other specific findings. Id.

Special masters have substantial discretion in awarding fees and may adjust a fee request sua sponte, apart from objections raised by respondent and without providing petitioners with notice and opportunity to respond. See Sabella v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 86 Fed. Cl. 201, 209 (2009). Special masters need not engage in a line-by-line analysis of petitioner's fee

3 The undersigned notes that on the matter of possessing sufficient objective support, Petitioner’s claim meets this criteria by the thinnest of margins. Indeed, the records from Holly Tree Family Practice, which the billing records show were received and reviewed by Petitioner’s counsel over one month before filing the petition, Petitioner’s treating physician noted “Discussed findings with pt who is concerned about possible neuritis related to the Tdap. Explained that at present this does not appear to be the case.” PX 2 at 51. 2 application when reducing fees. See Broekelschen v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 102 Fed. Cl. 719, 729 (2011).

II. Discussion

a. Reasonable Hourly Rate

A “reasonable hourly rate” is defined as the rate “prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348 (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11). In general, this rate is based on “the forum rate for the District of Columbia” rather than “the rate in the geographic area of the practice of petitioner's attorney.” Rodriguez v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 632 F.3d 1381, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Avera, 515 F. 3d at 1349). There is a “limited exception” that provides for attorney's fees to be awarded at local hourly rates when “the bulk of the attorney's work is done outside the forum jurisdiction” and “there is a very significant difference” between the local hourly rate and forum hourly rate. Id. This is known as the Davis County exception. See Hall v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 640 F.3d 1351, 1353 (2011) (citing Davis Cty. Solid Waste Mgmt. & Energy Recovery Special Serv. Dist. v. U.S. EPA, 169 F.3d 755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).

For cases in which forum rates apply, McCulloch provides the framework for determining the appropriate hourly rate range for attorneys' fees based upon the attorneys' experience. See McCulloch v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 09–293V, 2015 WL 5634323 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 1, 2015).

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