RUTLEDGE, Associate Justice.
The parties seek respectively to set aside and to secure enforcement of the Board’s order directing McKesson & Robbins, Inc. (McKesson),1 to desist from unfair labor practices. These consisted in giving effect to a closed-shop agreement, the validity of which is in question. That depends, in turn, upon the effect to he given to a so-called truce agreement, made five months previously in settlement of a controversy between two unions.
The controversy began late in 1936 as a jurisdictional dispute over membership between unions affiliated with the A. F. [86]*86of L., Teamsters2 and Longshoremen.3 It closed the employer’s plants from early January, 1937, untií June 14 following. At that time they reopened under the truce agreement which was reached at the instance of a citizens’ committee. Shortly, the agreement provided that the men would return to work retaining their then existing union affiliations, and that the dispute would be submitted for settlement to the annual convention of the A. F. of L., to be held in the following October. Both unions agreed to be bound by the convention’s decision. When the agreement was made both organizations were affiliated with the A. F. of L., but in August, 1937, pursuant to a referendum previously taken, the Longshoremen withdrew from the A. F. of L.4 and affiliated with the C. I. O. In September Longshoremen notified the employer that they represented a majority of the employees affected and wished to enter into bargaining negotiations. In October the A. F. of L. convention decided the dispute in favor of Teamsters. Shortly thereafter the employees were notified concerning the decision and informed that they would be expected to comply with it. Late in October Longshoremen filed with the Board a petition stating it had been selected as the collective bargaining representative of a majority of the employees in the two plants involved and asking the Board to certify it as their exclusive representative. On November 15, 1937, McKesson executed the closed-shop contract with Teamr sters and put it into effect immediately. It appears to have regarded itself as obligated to take this action by the terms of the truce agreement. Employees who refused to transfer their union affiliations to Teamsters were discharged. One of the plants was closed as a result of picketing by Teamsters in an effort to enforce the closed-shop agreement. Some of its employees who transferred to Teamsters were given employment at the other plant. Employees who refused to transfer were denied such employment. On November 23, the C. I. O. local filed charges of unfair labor practices against McKesson, upon which the Board issued its complaint in July, 1938, and held hearings before a trial examiner in the following September.
In February, 1938, the Board ordered and held an election in the representation proceeding to determine whether Teamsters or the Longshoremen represented a majority of the employees. Only employees who were on the payroll in the week of October 28, 1937, prior to the closed-shop contract, were made eligible to vote. The election resulted in favor of Teamsters by a vote of 32 to 27. The Board took no action upon the regional director’s recommendation that Teamsters be certified as exclusive bargaining agent, withholding this pending the outcome of the unfair practice proceeding. This resulted in the decision and order in question here; made in January, 1940.
In brief, the Board found that on November 15, 1937, when the closed-shop contract was made, Teamsters did not represent a majority of the employees. Therefore the contract was invalid and the action taken by the company to give it effect constituted unfair labor practices. It held that the truce agreement was ineffective to create and maintain until November 15 the majority representation which the statute 149 Stat. 452, 29 U.S.C.(Supp. V) § 158 (3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(3)] requires to validate a closed-shop contract, and it declined to certify Teamsters as bargaining agent on the strength of the election held in the previous February.
It may be added that the employer is a Maryland corporation, having a large number of wholesale houses in different states, [87]*87each, of which is a division having its own warehouse. Two Seattle plants are involved in this case, McKesson-Stewart and McKesson-Blumauer. The company purchased the latter October 1, 1937, and operated it until November 16 following, when it was closed following the' putting into effect of the closed-shop contract. Thereafter it conducted its combined Seattle business through the McKesson-Stewart plant, under the name of McKesson & Robbins, Inc., Stewart Holmes and Blumauer Frank Division. The truce agreement applied also to other companies affected by the same controversy between the unions, and McKesson entered into closed-shop contracts with A. F. of L. affiliates with reference to other plants not affected by the truce agreement at about the same time it made the contract with Teamsters involved here.
It is but fair to say that until August, 1937, McKesson stood in the cross fire of battle between contending unions, victim of the struggle rather than combatant. As far as the record shows, it maintained a hands-off policy as long as the fight was confined to the ranks of the A. F. of L., both in the Seattle plants and elsewhere. But late in July, 1937, the Longshoremen’s referendum resulted in favor of withdrawing from the A. F. of L. and joining the C. I. O. Almost immediately, in August, McKesson made a general working agreement with the A. F. of L., applicable in its plants throughout the country wherever it could be put into effect without violating the law. It provided for recognition of A. F. of L. affiliates as bargaining representatives and for closed-shop agreements with them wherever they might have a majority of the company’s employees. But there was no similar agreement with the C. I. O. applicable in circumstances where its affiliates might have majorities. This, combined with the fact that the agreement with A. F. of L. came so quickly after the Longshoremen’s referendum, might be taken to indicate the company’s preference as between the two organizations. However this may be, the validity of the closed-shop contract depended not upon the delicacy or even the danger of the company’s position nor upon the risks which it ran in signing or refusing to sign it, but upon the existence of the conditions prescribed by the statute for giving such an agreement effect.
The underlying issue is whether the closed-shop contract of November 15, 1937, was valid. The unfair practices which the Board found the company had committed consisted in acts by which the contract was put into effect. If the contract stands, these acts were legal. If it falls, they fall with it — outside the law. Whether the contract was valid depends in turn upon whether the circumstances of its execution complied with the conditions prescribed in Section 8(3) of the Wagner Act.5 They are that the labor organization with which the agreement is made shall be one which is (1) “not established, maintained, or assisted” by any unfair labor practice; and (2) is the representative of a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit covered by the agreement “when made” International Ass’n of Machinists v. N. L. R. B., 1940, 311 U.S. 72, 61 S.Ct. 83, 85 L. Ed. 50, affirming 1939, 71 App.D.C. 175, 110 F.2d 29, 33.
No question is presented concerning the appropriateness of the unit. Nor is there any as to the freedom of the union from domination by the employer. The only issue is whether Teamsters represented a majority of the employees at the date the contract was made. The Board’s finding to the contrary is in question.
Teamsters and McKesson attack it on two grounds. The first finds the existence of the required majority in the effects of the truce agreement. The second, disregarding that agreement, is that the election held by the Board in February, 1938, disclosed that a majority of the employees [88]*88were represented by Teamsters' as of the preceding November 15, and that the Board and Longshoremen are bound by the results of that election.
I. Effect of the Truce Agreement
As the .case has been presented, the issue relating to the truce agreement is one concerning its. interpretation rather than its validity or the meaning of Section 8 (3). All agree that November 15, 1937, was the date on which were required to exist the statutory conditions for validating the closed-shop contract.6 Teamsters and Mc-Kesson urge that, since all of the employees affected assented to and “agreed to be bound by” the truce agreement, their consent, though given in June, remained legally effective in November, so that Teamsters was then their bargaining representative, regardless of the fact that a majority in the meantime had changed their affiliation to the C. I. O. and had done all they could to designate it as their representative. This, it is said, fulfilled the requirements of Section 8 (3) and validated the closed-shop contract. The argument assumes that it is sufficient to satisfy the section’s requirements that -there be on the date of the closed-shop agreement a majority consenting to the representation only by virtue of an antecedent contract.7 But, if we assume this to be so, the broad contention of Teamsters and McKesson implies: (1) that the truce agreement was a representation agreement; (2) that, it designated Teamsters as representative; (3) that in both respects it was in full force and effect on November 15, 1937. It is implicit in this view that the agreement obligated the majority not to change their representative prior to that date.
The.Board found, on the contrary, that the agreement contemplated only the settlement of a jurisdictional dispute between two unions affiliated with the A. F. of L., not one between such a union and another affiliated with the C. I. O. As applied to the facts of this case, this view of the agreement places a limitation upon it which renders it ineffective upon withdrawal by one of the contracting unions and consequent affiliation of a majority of the employees with a C. I. O. organization, followed by designation of it as their representative. In effect, it construes the agreement as not binding the employees not to change their representative prior to November 15.
Consideration of the agreement’s specific terms, and of the circumstances in which it was executed, is required. It is set forth in full in the margin.8 Teamsters’ and Mc-[89]*89Kesson’s view of it is based primarily upon the idea that it was intended to bring about a final and binding settlement of the controversy. They argue that the contract would give little, if any, assurance of this, if the assenting employees were free to designate another representative at any time upon withdrawal of a majority from affiliation with the A. F. of L. The argument is that> not only the contracting unions, but each assenting employee bound himself irrevocably to accept the representative selected by the convention and, therefore, that his consent remained effective on November IS, 1937. The' agreement between the unions as such is immaterial, except as it may indicate what was the contract, if any, undertaken by the individual employees. Even upon Teamsters’ and McKesson’s hypotheses concerning the statute and the truce agreement, the essential condition for validation is the existence on November IS of legally effective consent to the representa-
tion by Teamsters, given by a majority of the individual employees, not by the contending unions. To sustain their position, therefore, they must contend, as they do, that each employee by signing the memorandum which was attached to the contract bound himself not to change the representative prior to November 15. The issue is, therefore, whether the individual employees intended to bind themselves not to designate a representative other than that named by the convention. In effect, under the facts and the specific terms of the agreement, it is whether they intended to contract that they would not change their A. F. of L. affiliation.9
Consideration of the truce agreement’s terms in light of the circumstances in which it was signed requires that the Board’s conclusion be sustained.
'The' agreement was made between unions affiliated with A. F. of L. It was intended to settle a typical A. F. of L. “j-urisdiction[90]*90al dispute.” All of the employees were affiliated with A. F. of L. through one union or the other. There had been talk about the Longshoremen’s withdrawing to join C. I. O., but no action had been taken officially toward this end. Nevertheless the possibility that it might occur was not so remote as to be absent from the parties’ minds when the agreement was made.
To give the contract the effect for which Teamsters and McKesson contend would produce extraordinary results. First, it would violate all principles of fair arbitration. It would make A. F. of L. judge in its own cause, arbitrator not merely in an internal matter but in a controversy with its strongest rival. Labor unions and their members usually do not submit their disputes to their opponent’s arbitrary judgment and decision.
Again, and perhaps with greater significance, such an interpretation would bring the contract squarely into- conflict ‘with long-established A. F. of L. policy, both in function and in procedure, if not also with the powers conferred upon it by its constitution. We have had occasion recently to consider and decide important questions concerning the power of A. F. of L. to determine jurisdictional disputes over membership arising between two of its affiliated organizations.10 We held that it has the power under its constitution and by-laws not only to act as mediator but to settle and determine such questions when mediation fails. One of the convincing reasons we found for this view was the long-settled policy and practice of the parent organization in exercising the power with the acquiescence of its affiliates. Furthermore, the procedure which governs action in such cases is clearly established by the constitution and by-laws and long has been embodied in the organization’s practice. Disputes of this character between affiliates are decided between annual conventions by the executive council. Appeal from its decision lies to the convention, which is the final authority. If no appeal is taken, the council’s decision is final. There is no provision for appeal by a nonaffiliated body. Neither in this record nor otherwise have we been informed of any case, other than the present one, in which A. F. of L. has undertaken to determine a dispute over membership between one of its affiliates and a union not affiliated with it. Its constitution and by-laws make no provision for its doing so. The procedure which they prescribe is inappropriate for application to such a controversy. The entire structure of its regulations, both as to function and as to procedure, is framed for the reconciliation and determination of disputes between affiliated bodies, not for performing similar functions for outsiders. The reason for these things is clear. It is that in such cases A. F. of L. would be a partisan, not an impartial arbitrator within its own house. Internally its policy is reconciliation, mediation and, if necessary, decision. Externally it is warfare upon opposing bodies.
Taking account of these facts, the language of the agreement shows clearly that it was intended to apply only to a jurisdictional dispute within the normal and appropriate functioning of A. F. of L. This appears both from its affirmative provisions and from its omissions.
The agreement specifies that its purpose is to settle the “unfortunate jurisdictional dispute between your respective organizations.” This is accepted 'and well-understood parlance of A. F. of L.’s organizational structure and conflict. The jurisdictional dispute is an incident of the craft structure of its unionism. It is not characteristic of other types of organization. The contract provides that each employee shall “return to work under his or her present union affiliations.” This is the only reference to individual affiliation. Nothing in the contract specifically requires the employee to retain his existing -affiliation or to do so for any definite length of time, though the affiliated unions agree to be bound by the final decision of the convention or of the executive council if no appeal is taken.11 It is provided that “ILA [Long[91]*91shoremen] will appeal from the decision of the Executive Council * * * to the October convention.” This clearly contemplates the existence of a right to appeal, which nonaffiliated unions do not have.
These provisions clearly contemplate a dispute between unions affiliated with A. F. of L. The normal procedure for settlement of such disputes is agreed upon. Throughout the contract its affirmative provisions show that it was drawn in detail, as well as in major function, to end a fight strictly within the ranks of A. F. of L. They were entirely inappropriate for settlement of an external conflict.
The omissions are equally significant. There is not one word concerning the contingency of withdrawal either by one of the unions or by individual members and affiliation with C. I. O. or any other non-affiliated body. This stands out like a sore thumb when it is recalled that there had been considerable discussion that Longshoremen and its members might secede and join C. I. O. In these circumstances if it had been intended to guard against this contingency that purpose could have been made clear beyond quibble by simple addition to the agreement. A matter so vital, whether to the contracting unions or to their members, should not be left to inference or implication in such circumstances. In fact Teamsters did not intend that it should be left to inference. It seems clear that the discussion concerning the possibility of Longshoremen’s secession prompted Dave Beck, vice president of Teamsters, in attempting to have inserted a further and supplemental agreement providing that in event of withdrawal by Longshoremen the employees nonetheless would be bound by the convention’s decision and would apply for membership in Teamsters if it should be designated.12 This strikes at the very heart of the issue. It is said that the proposed addition was nothing more than a clarifying amendment. But we think it was more than that. As has been pointed out, the only provision of the contract itself concerning individual affiliation was that the men would go back to work under their then existing union affiliations. It said nothing about retaining them. By the memorandum which they signed the individual employees approved and agreed to be bound by “the within agreement.” Even if that obligated them to change their affiliations from one A. F. of L. union to another, should the convention require this, it presupposed their being members of A. F. of L. at the time of the decision. It nowhere purported to bind them not to join the C. I. O. in the meantime or after the decision. The introductory language of the proposed addition is, “Supplementing the foregoing [92]*92agreement.” (Italics supplied) It refers specifically to the possible contingency that Longshoremen might secede. It provides that in this event the individual employees will remain with A. F. of L. and affiliate with Teamsters if the council’s decision should not be reversed. This was addition, not merely clarification. It “supplemented” the “foregoing agreement,” as it was intended to do. Beck insisted upon having the addition made, tie made this a condition of his signature. He saw to it also that the addition was made in other similar agreements, affecting plants of other employers, entered into at the same time. His view evidently, and therefore Teamsters', was that the truce agreement with the men was not intended to and did not bind the individual employees to remain with A. F. of L. or not to change their affiliations or their representative. It may be noted also that an earlier proposal which made a similar provision for transfer of members was flatly rejected. 5 N.L.R.B.(1938) 70, 76, n. 3.
Finally, the agreement fails to provide how long it is to be effective, if it is regarded as applicable outside the structure of A. F. of L. It specifies no definite term, whether in months or in years. If it was intended to be applicable only to disputes within A. F. of L. there was no need for a time limitation. As among its affiliates and their members, the convention’s decision would settle the matter once and for all. But as between an affiliate and an outside organization, and their members, since no time limit was prescribed for giving effect to the representation following the convention’s decision, the question would arise whether the agreement was effective indefinitely, or for a reasonable period of time, or was terminable at will. It is not necessary to determine which of these possibilities might be applicable. We refer to the omission because it supports the view that the contract was intended to apply only when A. F. of L. affiliates were in conflict. Had the intention been otherwise, the chance would not have been taken that the contract might be terminated at will and the fruit of victory lost immediately after the convention’s decision.
In view of these considerations, we think the Board’s construction of the agreement must stand. It is one thing to contract to be bound by the decisions of the final authority in an organization as long as one remains affiliated with it. It -is another to agree to remain in affiliation, whether for an indefinite or a limited time. The employees here made no such agreement as the latter. They' consented to- the terms of the contract made by the contending unions. It did not purport to bind the unions as such not to change affiliation. But even if it had done this, that would be very different from binding the individual members likewise to retain affiliation. In the facts of this case affiliation and .representation went hand in hand. Nothing in the agreement bound the individual employees not to change their representative in case they should change their affiliation to a union outside the jurisdiction of A. F. of L. We find therefore that the truce agreement was not legally effective to make Teamsters the representative of the majority of the employees on November 15, 1937.
II. The Representation Proceeding and Election
Teamsters and McKesson say that, regardless of the truce agreement, the election which the Board held in February, 1938, showed conclusively that Teamsters .represented a majority of the employees on the preceding November 15; and that the circumstances and manner of holding the election constituted a bar to further proceedings on the unfair practice charges.
The argument in effect asserts that ordering and holding the election in the representation proceeding concluded all issues relating to unfair practices, notwithstanding the fact that the Board suspended action on certification pending outcome of the unfair practice proceeding. In effect, though not so denominated, it sets up a plea of res judicata against the hearing on the unfair practices charges. It is based on the view that the Board had before it, when it ordered and held the election, the same issue and substantially the same evidence as were presented in the unfair practice proceeding. To support this it is pointed out that the Board held that the closed-shop contract and the circumstances under which it was put into effect constituted no bar to an election, and further that it restricted the voting to employees who were on the pay roll during the week of October 28, prior to the making of the contract. It is also noted that the unfair practice charges had been filed,during the preceding November, though in this connection it should be recalled that complaint [93]*93was not issued on them until the following July.
The argument derives color from the fact that the basic question in both the representation and the unfair practice proceedings was identical, namely, whether Teamsters was the representative of a majority of the employees on November 15. But it is only colorable; it misconceives the effect of the Board’s action in ordering and holding the election and its powers in relation to both proceedings. It also ignores important facts. It assumes that the Board was bound conclusively by the result of the election, in other words that this obligated it to certify Teamsters.13 This assumes either that the unfair practices, if they existed, could not have affected the election and that it reflected the free choice of the employees on November 15, though it was not held until three months later; or, in the alternative, that no unfair practices existed. These are the very questions at issue. But the argument goes further and also assumes that the order for the election decided the very issue which the election was to decide. The contention that the order conclusively determined that there had been no unfair practices is but another way of saying that it determined that Teamsters was the representative of the majority on November 15. If this was the effect of the order, holding the election was a useless rigmarole.
A less logistic answer is that both the fact and the manner of ordering the election indicate that the Board suspected that unfair practices existed. In holding that the closed-shop contract and its execution were not a bar to an election, the Board was not finding either that unfair practices had existed or that they had not existed. In other words, it was not determining the validity of the agreement or, therefore, the fact that Teamsters was or was not the majority’s representative on November 15. It was providing a method by which these interdependent questions could be determined. The order for the election therefore had none of the effect.of res judicata or, what amounts to the same thing, of estoppel against the Board on the question of unfair practices.
Nor did the fact that the election was held and resulted in favor of Teamsters. Normally the result of an election would be certification, but that is not always true. An election is merely one of of the methods by which the Board may determine the question of representation. It may, in representation proceedings, as it did in this case on the same issue in the unfair practice proceeding, resort to other methods to determine that question. 29 U.S.C. (Supp.V) § 159, 29 U.S.C.A. § 159; N. L. R. B. v. Falk Corp., 1940, 308 U.S. 453, 60 S.Ct. 307, 84 L.Ed. 396. Furthermore, and of greater importance, the result of an election is not always conclusive on the Board as to certification. It may disregard the results of an election, at any rate prior to certification if not also afterward, as it may those of any other method of ascertaining the majority, when it appears in proper proceedings that it has been affected by unfair practices.14 Teamsters points out that it is an accepted procedure of the Board to postpone elections until charges of unfair practice are decided. It does not contend that, generally speaking, the Board has no power to do this. But it complains of the alleged departure from that practice in this case, not because the Board had no power to make it, but because before the representation proceeding was concluded the Board, on discovering that charges of unfair practice had been made, decided to revert to its normal practice. In other words, the position is that once an election is ordered and held, but before certification in accordance with its result is made, nothing which can occur between the two events can justify withholding certification.
Teamsters and McKesson, however, claim that the Board had full knowledge concerning the closed-shop agreement and the unfair practices when it ordered and held the election. They argue from this that nothing new came to the attention of [94]*94the Board after the election in either the representation or the unfair practice proceeding. The Board asserts, on the contrary, that it had not been informed when it directed an election that charges of unfair practice had been filed. Unless in its quasi-judicial capacity it is to be charged with judicial notice of the contents of all charges which are in its files awaiting decision as to whether a complaint shall be issued, this statement must be accepted as true. Again it may be recalled that though the charges of unfair practice were filed in November complaint upon them was not issued until the following July. It would be going a long way to hold that application of the principles of judicial notice in such circumstances, combined with the holding of an election in a representation proceeding, should bar the Board from going forward with the unfair practice charges or, what would amount to the same thing in this case, should require it to certify as representative the union which is successful in the election regardless of the pendency of the charges. It is true that the Board knew of the existence of the closed-shop agreement and that it had been put into effect, but that is not the same thing as having knowledge of the pendency of the unfair practice charges. It may be that the Board’s failure to discover this prior to the election was inadvertent, but we do not think that is sufficient reason for making the election conclusive and a bar to consideration of the unfair practice charges.
Generally representation and unfair practice proceedings are distinct, both in issues and dn the relief sought.15 Procedure and evidence also differ. But they may and often do overlap. Representation may be involved and determined in unfair practice proceedings [29 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 159(c), § 9(c) of the Wagner Act] and unfair practices may affect representation. Rarely does a single issue, as here, underlie and conclude both proceedings. When it does the very identity of the issue makes especially appropriate application of the Board’s discretion, conferred by Section 9(c), to conjoin the representation and the unfair practice proceedings. Nothing in the section specifies the time at which the conjunction must take place or limits the Board’s power to making it prior to an order for an election or any other step short of final decision in the representation proceeding. Ordering and holding an election are but steps in the investigation. They merely furnish one of the methods by which the Board may determine the issue of representation. In a sense, therefore, they are only evidentiary, not conclusive final acts of decision. Withholding certification pending final action on the charges of unfair practice is in effect, if not in form, a conjunction of the proceedings as authorized by Section 9(c). It affords opportunity to dispose of the entire controversy in all its phases and with respect to all of the forms of relief authorized by the statute. We think it clear that the Board had full power to withhold its decision on certification pending the outcome of the unfair practice proceeding. It follows that it was not bound to give effect to the result of the election and that its action in ordering and holding it was not a bar to going forward on the charges of unfair practice.16 It may be added in support of this conclusion that even if the evidence, as well as the ultimate issue, in the two proceedings turned out to be substantially identical, that fact could not be known in advance of the hearing on unfair practices.
III.
It remains to consider whether there was substantial evidence to sustain the Board’s findings concerning the existence of unfair practices or, to state it in another form, whether there was such evidence to sustain its finding that Teamsters was not the representative of a majority of the employees on November 15, 1937.
Teamsters and McKesson say that the February election concluded this question, particularly since the voting list was confined to employees as of the week of October 28. The argument assumes that the election was not affected by the unfair practices, that it therefore represented the free choice of the employees as of November 15, though it was held more than three months iater when the closed-shop [95]*95contract had been put into effect by the combined efforts of Teamsters and the employer. It assumes that antedating the election was sufficient to overcome the effects of putting the contract into force. That may be true so far as the eligible voting list included employees who had been discharged and were not reemployed prior to the election. But it does not follow that the employees who retained their positions by transferring affiliation from Longshoremen to Teamsters after the closed-shop agreement went into effect were not influenced by it in their voting. The record shows that although a majority refused to join Teamsters upon the opening of the plant after the closed-shop agreement was made many did so within a few days afterward. It seems clear that these changes were not or may not have been the result of a free choice, but were made in order to comply with a condition of employment.17 At any rate, it was clearly open to the Board in these circumstances to find that the results of the compulsion from putting the contract into force had not been dissipated when the election was held.
Furthermore, on the basis of membership lists which showed that at least 44 of the 59 warehouse employees of McKesson were members of Longshoremen as of November 15, substantiated by evidence that the list contained only names of members in good standing as of that date and evidence, which was hardly disputed, that the majority of the employees refused to affiliate immediately with Teamsters when the plant was opened after the contract was put into effect, the Board found that Teamsters did not represent a majority as of that date. The evidence is clearly sufficient to sustain the finding and it is therefore conclusive upon us.
In one respect the order of the Board should be modified. Paragraph 1(d) requires McKesson to “cease and desist from * * * in any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights * * * guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.” In the circumstances of this case we think this paragraph should be stricken. The only unfair practices here resulted from the making and enforcement of the closed-shop agreement. In view of the doubtful effect of the truce agreement regarded as of November 15, and the evident difficulties under which the employer was laboring in the struggle with the contending unions, we think a provision like Paragraph 1(d) inappropriate for application in this case. The record does not clearly show that the employer consciously entered into the closed-shop contract with knowledge of its invalidity, and all of the unfair practices resulted from this single act. Had the contract been valid they would have been legal acts. We think therefore that elimination of the provision will be in accord with the spirit of the decision in N. L. R. B. v. Express Publishing Co., March 3, 1941, 61 S.Ct. 693, 85 L.Ed. -. Paragraph 2(b) also must be modified, in view of Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 1940, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77, 85 L.Ed. 6, by striking the language: “and pay over the amount so deducted to the appropriate fiscal agency of the Federal, State, county, municipal, or other government or governments which supplied the funds for said work-relief projects.”
Paragraph 1(d) must be stricken and Paragraph 2(b) modified as we have indicated. As thus modified, the Board’s order must be enforced.
It is so ordered.