Ware v. Prudential Ins. Co.

531 A.2d 757, 220 N.J. Super. 135, 1987 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1303
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedSeptember 21, 1987
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 531 A.2d 757 (Ware v. Prudential Ins. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ware v. Prudential Ins. Co., 531 A.2d 757, 220 N.J. Super. 135, 1987 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1303 (N.J. Ct. App. 1987).

Opinion

220 N.J. Super. 135 (1987)
531 A.2d 757

CHARLES WARE, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v.
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued March 24, 1987.
Decided September 21, 1987.

*136 Before Judges O'BRIEN, SKILLMAN and LANDAU.

Vincent J. Apruzzese argued the cause for appellant (Apruzzese, McDermott, Mastro & Murphy, attorneys; Vincent J. Apruzzese, on the brief).

Arnold Feldman argued the cause for respondent (Ballen, Keiser & Gertel, attorneys; Arnold Feldman, of counsel; Sheldon A. Weiss, Linda P. Torres and Arnold Feldman, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by SKILLMAN, J.A.D.

Plaintiff was employed by defendant as the district manager of its Haddon Heights office. On February 2, 1983, he was discharged.

*137 Plaintiff filed suit claiming that his discharge constituted (1) a breach of his employment contract and (2) a violation of public policy. The case was bifurcated and tried first on liability only.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant on plaintiff's claim that his discharge violated public policy. However, the jury found that defendant had breached its employment contract with plaintiff by failing to follow the procedures applicable to the termination of managers. The case was subsequently tried on damages before another jury which returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $1,250,000.

On appeal defendant argues that the trial court erred in the liability trial in not granting judgment in its favor either at the close of plaintiff's case or after the presentation of all evidence, in granting partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, in failing to grant defendant's motion for a new trial and in failing to properly instruct the jury as to the applicable law. With respect to the damages trial, defendant argues that the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial after the opening statement of plaintiff's counsel, in not permitting defendant to show that plaintiff would have been terminated even if a probationary period had been utilized and in refusing to permit defendant to argue to the jury that plaintiff failed to mitigate damages. Defendant also argues that the jury's verdict on damages was against the weight of the evidence and that it was procured through the use of fraud, misrepresentation and misconduct on the part of plaintiff. We conclude that the trial court erred in not granting a judgment in defendant's favor at the close of plaintiff's case. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the entry of judgment in favor of defendant. In view of this disposition, we find it unnecessary to reach the other points raised by defendant.

Defendant's insurance sales force is divided into geographic areas, which are called districts. Within a district, the sales force consists of agents, sales managers and a district manager. Agents call on and service insureds. Sales managers have *138 some supervisory responsibility with respect to agents and also deal directly with insureds. The district manager is at the next and highest level in the district hierarchy. The district manager has general supervisory responsibility over all employees in the district. As district manager for the Haddon Heights district, plaintiff supervised 5 sales managers, 48 agents and 9 clerical employees.

When plaintiff was promoted to the position of district manager, he signed a written employment agreement. Section 5 of this agreement states that "[t]he Manager's appointment and this Agreement may be terminated by either party at any time" and section 3(e) states that "[t]he Manager agrees that the company ... [s]hall not be bound by any alteration of the terms and conditions of this Agreement unless such alteration is made in writing by one of its officers." It is further noted that section 6 states that "[t]his Agreement supersedes any previous agreement the Manager may have had with the Company."

Plaintiff concedes that on its face this agreement established an at will employment relationship under which defendant was free to discharge him without cause and without following any prescribed procedures. However, plaintiff contends that this written employment agreement was modified by various contemporaneous and subsequent oral and written statements by defendant's representatives, pursuant to which defendant made a commitment to plaintiff and other employees not to discharge or to take other negative employment action except in accordance with prescribed procedures.

In support of his claim, plaintiff relies primarily upon Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284 (1985), mod., 101 N.J. 10 (1985), which was decided several months after the liability trial in this case. In Woolley, the Court held that "... absent a clear and prominent disclaimer, an implied promise contained in an employment manual that an employee will be fired only for cause may be enforceable against an employer *139 even when the employment is for an indefinite term and would otherwise be terminable at will." 99 N.J. at 285-286.

Plaintiff's claim that he was entitled to job security in his position with defendant rests upon a document entitled, "Guide for Vice Presidents, Regional Marketing" (hereinafter referred to as "the Guide"). This document, a 1981 revision of an earlier similar document, was sent to each Vice President for Regional Marketing, which was the next higher position in defendant's management hierarchy above the position of district manager formerly held by plaintiff. A memorandum by Martin Leeds, Vice President for District Agencies, forwarding the Guide to the Vice Presidents for Regional Marketing, stated that "[t]he new Guide has been up-dated to reflect current District agencies policy and will serve as a valuable reference for you and your regional staff." The Guide was not sent to plaintiff or to any other person at his level in the company.

The Guide contains three parts relied upon by plaintiff: (1) "Position Description and Responsibility, Vice President, Regional Marketing, District Agencies Department," (2) "Setting Objectives and Performance Evaluation" and (3) "Procedure to be Followed for Managerial Changes Involving Demotion, Early Retirement or Transfer."[1] The first section contains a general description of the management responsibilities of a Vice President, Regional Marketing. The second section requires the Vice President, Regional Marketing, to establish standards of performance for each district manager and to evaluate the performance of each manager in relation to the job standards established during the planning process. Where performance does not meet the standards, a district manager can be placed on probation. If probation is required due to the failure of a district to satisfy performance standards, the Vice President is advised to follow the steps outlined in the third section of the Guide relied upon by plaintiff. This section states that "[o]ur *140 efforts should be directed toward helping each sales manager do a better management job" but where a certain manager "is not measuring up to expectations" the Vice President, Regional Marketing, may have to consider placing the manager on probation.

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Bluebook (online)
531 A.2d 757, 220 N.J. Super. 135, 1987 N.J. Super. LEXIS 1303, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ware-v-prudential-ins-co-njsuperctappdiv-1987.