Ware v. Centurion Health Care

District Court, E.D. Missouri·Decided November 12, 2024·No. 4:24-cv-01008·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION SUPASTAR WARE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) No. 4:24-cv-01008-SEP ) CENTURION HEALTH CARE, ) ) Defendant. ) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs, Doc. [2], and Motion to Appoint Counsel, Doc. [4]. On review of the application and financial information provided therein, the application is granted. Plaintiff shall pay an initial filing fee of $42.33 and file an amended complaint on a Court-provided form. INITIAL PARTIAL FILING FEE Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20% of the greater of (1) “the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s account,” or (2) “the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six-month period.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to his account. See id. The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward the monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id. Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit and a prison account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the submission of his complaint. A review of Plaintiff’s account indicates an average monthly deposit of $211.65. Plaintiff has insufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee. Thus, the Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $42.33, which is 20% of Plaintiff’s average monthly deposit. LEGAL STANDARD ON INITIAL REVIEW Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact.” Neitzke v.Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). To state a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. The court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or ‘threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.’” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678); see also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (court must accept factual allegations in the complaint as true, but is not required to “accept as true any ‘legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation’”). When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal construction” means that, “if the essence of an allegation is discernible . . . then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). Still, even pro se complaints must “allege facts, which if true, state a claim as a matter of law.” Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15 (federal courts not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”). And “procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation” need not be “interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.” McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). THE COMPLAINT Plaintiff is an inmate at the Eastern Reception Diagnostic and Correctional Center (ERDCC). He filed the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Centurion Health Care. See Doc. [1]. Plaintiff states Defendant “[f]ailed to provide standard medical care regarding sexual assault, rape, physical assault, back pain, [hemorrhoids], HIV test.” Id. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant showed deliberate indifference by (1) disregarding Plaintiff’s health service request form and requests for care, and (2) overlooking the “sexual assault [that] occurred 11-11-22, rape 2-18-23, [and] physical assault 4-19-23, 5-15-23.” Id. Finally, Plaintiff states he suffers back pain from being “placed on [a] steel or me[t]al frame bunkbed [and] hard floor while on suicide watch [in 2023].” Id. According to Plaintiff, he suffers from mental and physical trauma arising out of those events. Id. Other injuries include bleeding, swollen fingers, extraordinary pain, back pain, hemorrhoids from a physical assault, and back pain. Id. at 4. Plaintiff also suffers from severe anxiety, severe depression, mood swings, severe PTSD, nightmares, manic episodes, and mental, emotional, and physical trauma. Id. For relief, he seeks $900 million and the firing of the Missouri Department of Corrections Medical Coordinator. Id. at 5. DISCUSSION Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Centurion Health Care (Centurion), the company that contracts with MDOC to provide health care to inmates at ERDCC. To support a claim against such a corporation under § 1983, the plaintiff “must show that there was a policy, custom, or official action that inflicted an actionable injury.” Johnson v. Hamilton, 452 F.3d 967, 973 (8th Cir. 2006); see also Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 984 F.2d 972, 976 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that a corporation acting under color of state law will only be held liable where “there is a policy, custom or action by those who represent official policy that inflicts injury actionable under § 1983”).

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Related

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