Opinion
GEORGE, C. J.
In this proceeding, plaintiff Lew Warden, an attorney and member of the State Bar of California (State Bar or Bar), challenges the constitutional validity of this state’s mandatory (or minimum) continuing legal education (MCLE) program, established pursuant to statute and court rule and administered by the State Bar. Among other claims, plaintiff contends that the current MCLE program violates his right to the equal protection of the laws, because a number of categories of currently licensed attorneys—retired judges, officers and elected officials of the State of California, and full-time law professors at accredited law schools—are exempt from the MCLE requirements.
The trial court rejected plaintiff’s constitutional claims and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants (the State Bar and a number of its employees). On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, concluding that the challenged exemptions from the MCLE program are arbitrary and irrational and thus invalid even under the “rational relationship” equal protection standard that the Court of Appeal found applicable in this setting. Further, the majority opinion in the Court of Appeal, expressing the view of two justices, went on to conclude that the proper remedy for the equal protection violation it had found was the invalidation of the MCLE program in its entirety. The third Court of Appeal justice, while agreeing with the majority that the exemptions were constitutionally flawed, concluded that the appropriate remedy for the equal protection violation was to eliminate only the invalidated exemptions, thereby preserving the MCLE program and extending its requirements to the formerly exempt categories of attorneys as well as to all nonexempt attorneys.
We granted the State Bar’s petition for review to consider whether (1) the MCLE program violates federal or state equal protection principles by exempting the specified categories of attorneys from the MCLE requirements, and (2) if so, what the appropriate remedy should be.
[634]*634As explained hereafter, we conclude that, although the wisdom of some or all of the exemptions from the MCLE program may be questioned as a matter of policy, the challenged exemptions may not be found unconstitutional under a proper understanding of the applicable equal protection standard as established by the governing decisions of both the United States Supreme Court and this court. In light of this determination, there is no need to reach the question of the appropriate remedy were the exemptions to be unconstitutional.
I
The MCLE program in California—a consumer protection measure “intended to enhance the competency of attorneys practicing law in this state” (People v. Ngo (1996) 14 Cal.4th 30, 36 [57 Cal.Rptr.2d 456, 924 P.2d 97])—is a product of legislative action, court rule, and State Bar regulations.1 In 1989, the Legislature enacted Business and Professions Code section 6070, which required the State Bar to request this court to adopt a rule of court authorizing the Bar to establish and administer an MCLE program. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6070, subd. (a).)2 The statute specified a number of details concerning the rule that the State Bar was to request, including a provision that a member of the Bar who failed to satisfy the MCLE requirements would be enrolled as an inactive member and thus be unauthorized to practice law in this state until these requirements were met. (Ibid.)
Section 6070 also includes a separate subdivision—subdivision (c)—that exempts certain categories of attorneys from the reach of the statute, providing that “retired judges, officers and elected officials of the State of California, . . . full-time professors at law schools accredited by the State Bar of California, the American Bar Association, or both, [and] . . . [f]ull-time [635]*635employees of the State of California, acting within the scope of their employment, shall be exempt from the provisions of this section.”3
Following the passage of section 6070, the State Bar requested this court to adopt an MCLE rule. After considering public comment, this court adopted rule 958 of the California Rules of Court, effective December 6, 1990. That rule requires the State Bar to establish and administer an MCLE program, beginning January 1, 1991, “under rules adopted by the Board of Governors of the State Bar.” Rule 958, like section 6070, specifies a number of details relating to the MCLE program, and exempts some attorneys from the MCLE requirements. Under rule 958, (1) attorneys exempt under section 6070, (2) full-time federal employees, acting within the scope of their employment, and (3) attorneys “exempt under rules adopted by the Board of Governors of the State Bar” are not subject to the MCLE requirements mandated by the rule.4
[636]*636Contemporaneously with the adoption of California Rules of Court, rule 958, the Board of Governors of the State Bar adopted a detailed set of rules and regulations to govern the operation of the MCLE program. (See State Bar Min. Cont. Legal Ed. Rules & Regs., §§ 1.0-17.0, adopted by the Bd. of Governors of the State Bar on Dec. 8, 1990, and amended Sept. 1, 1995 (hereafter State Bar MCLE Rules and Regulations).) The regulations set out the five prescribed categories exempted from the MCLE requirements pursuant to section 6070 and rule 958—(1) retired judges, (2) officers and elected officials of the State of California, (3) full-time professors at accredited law schools, (4) full-time employees of the State of California, and (5) full-time federal employees—and provide that the last two categories refer to public employees “who do not practice law in California except as employees of the State of California . . . [or] of the United States Government . . . .” (State Bar MCLE Rules & Regs., §§ 6.1.4, 6.1.5.) In addition, the regulations include a provision—entitled “Good Cause Exemption From or Modification of Requirement”—that authorizes any member of the State Bar to “submit an application setting forth good cause for an exemption from compliance with or modification of any of the [MCLE] requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance with a procedure to be established by the Committee on Minimum Continuing Legal Education.” (State Bar MCLE Rules & Regs., § 6.3.)5
[637]*637II
Under the provisions of rule 958, California Rules of Court, plaintiff, an actively enrolled member of the State Bar, was obligated to comply with the MCLE program. He acknowledges, however, that he did not do so. On April 23, 1993, the Bar, pursuant to its regulations (State Bar MCLE Rules & Regs., § 13.2), sent plaintiff a “Non-Compliance Notice,” advising plaintiff of what he was required to do to comply with the MCLE requirements and informing him that he had 60 days from the date of the notification to comply with the requirements; the notice informed plaintiff that he would be enrolled as an inactive member if he did not submit proof of compliance by June 22, 1993. On June 29, the Bar sent plaintiff a final notice, advising him that his name would be submitted to the Board of Governors on July 17, 1993, with a recommendation that, effective July 19, 1993, he be enrolled as an inactive member of the Bar until he complied with the MCLE requirements.
On July 9, 1993, plaintiff wrote to the MCLE compliance coordinator of the State Bar, asserting that the MCLE program was unconstitutional and that he could not be prohibited from practicing law for refusing to comply with its requirements. On July 23, a senior administrative assistant of the Bar’s legal unit acknowledged receipt of plaintiff’s letter, which had been forwarded by the Bar’s Office of General Counsel for response. On July 30, the Bar sent plaintiff a notice of enrollment on administrative inactive status, informing him that effective July 19, 1993, he was ineligible to practice law in California until the Bar received proof of his compliance with the applicable MCLE requirements.
[638]*638On September 23, 1993, plaintiff responded to the notice that he had been enrolled as an inactive member by a letter to the State Bar, expressing his “profound disagreement” with the MCLE program and threatening to sue the Bar and its employees for damages if it did not “forthwith recall [its] suspension order.” On October 7, 1993, plaintiff filed with the State Bar a “Claim of Damage,” in which he asserted that, as a result of its enrollment of him as an inactive member for noncompliance with the MCLE requirements, the State Bar was liable to him in the amount of $6,000 per month for lost income and an unspecified amount for “emotional distress.” On October 27, the Bar’s Assistant General Counsel responded to plaintiff’s correspondence in a letter that explained the manner in which the MCLE program had been developed and that indicated that plaintiff’s October 7 claim of damage had been forwarded to the Board of Governors for review.
After the Board of Governors denied his claim for damages, plaintiff filed the complaint in the present action, naming the State Bar and various employees as defendants, and seeking compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory relief, an injunction, and a writ of mandate. In his complaint, plaintiff maintained that the MCLE program was unconstitutional in numerous respects, asserting that the program denied him procedural and substantive due process of law and equal protection of the laws. Among other claims, plaintiff contended that the MCLE program violated his right to equal protection by exempting certain categories of attorneys from its requirements.
The State Bar moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for summary adjudication of issues. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c.) After a hearing, the trial court granted summary adjudication in favor of the Bar on all issues submitted by the Bar, thus effectively disposing of all aspects of plaintiff’s constitutional challenge. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, and, after the court filed a formal order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants, plaintiff filed a motion for new trial. The trial court denied both motions, and plaintiff appealed.
In resolving the appeal, the Court of Appeal focused almost entirely on plaintiff’s equal protection claim, and in particular the claim that the MCLE program denied plaintiff equal protection of the laws because the program unjustifiably exempted certain categories of attorneys from the MCLE requirements that applied to plaintiff and all other nonexempt attorneys. After concluding that plaintiff had standing to raise this claim, the Court of Appeal first rejected plaintiff’s contention that his equal protection challenge to the classifications drawn by the MCLE program properly should be evaluated under the “strict judicial scrutiny” test, and instead agreed with the State [639]*639Bar’s position that the ordinary “rational basis” standard of review is applicable in this context. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal ultimately concluded that whereas the exemptions for full-time state and federal employees who do not represent individual clients satisfy the rational relationship test, the exemptions for (1) retired judges, (2) officers and elected officials of the State of California, and (3) full-time professors at accredited law schools do not. Observing that “[t]he fact that a lawyer wins an election or is appointed to a state office does not mean that the lawyer is necessarily current in recent legal developments, well versed in legal ethics, or an expert in law office management,” and that “[i]f a state officer or elected official, a retired judge, or a law professor represents individual clients in private practice, the same legitimate interests of the public protection of such clients apply,” the Court of Appeal concluded that no rational basis exists for these three exemptions.
As noted above, although all three Court of Appeal justices agreed that the three identified exemptions could not be sustained under the “rational relationship” equal protection standard, the justices parted company on the question of the appropriate remedy for the equal protection violation they had identified. Two justices, explaining that they could not find with confidence that the Legislature would have adopted section 6070 without the challenged exemptions, concluded that the appropriate remedy was to invalidate the MCLE program as a whole, leaving the Legislature “to start anew and initiate comprehensive legislative reform of [MjCLE, rather than to accept a judicial reformation of section 6070 mandatorily expanding the burden of [MjCLE training to those the Legislature specifically exempted therefrom.” The remaining justice, dissenting from this aspect of the majority opinion, concluded that there was no need to “throw[j the baby out with the proverbial bathwater” and suggested that the better and more appropriate solution was to excise the offending exemptions (which the justice observed apparently applied to only a few hundred attorneys) rather than to invalidate the MCLE program as a whole.
Both plaintiff and the State Bar filed separate petitions for review in this court. We granted only the State Bar’s petition for review, which presented two principal issues: (1) whether the Court of Appeal properly found that the exemptions for retired judges, state officers and elected officials, and full-time professors at accredited law schools denied plaintiff the equal protection of the laws, and (2) if so, whether the Court of Appeal correctly concluded that the appropriate remedy is to invalidate the [640]*640MCLE program as a whole, rather than to extend the MCLE requirements to the previously exempted attorneys.6
HI
We begin with the question whether the state’s exemption of (1) retired judges, (2) officers and elected officials of the State of California, and (3) full-time professors at accredited law schools from a generally applicable MCLE program denies plaintiff the equal protection of the laws. As we shall explain, we agree with the Court of Appeal that the applicable equal protection standard of review in this context is the “rational relationship,” rather than the “strict scrutiny,” standard, but we further conclude that the Court of Appeal erred in determining that the exemptions in question can be found unconstitutional under a proper understanding and application of the rational relationship standard.
A
In D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1 [112 Cal.Rptr. 786, 520 P.2d 10], we described the two principal standards or tests that generally have been applied by the courts of this state and the [641]*641United States Supreme Court in reviewing classifications that are challenged under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution or article I, section 7, of the California Constitution. As the court in D’Amico explained: “The first is the basic and conventional standard for reviewing economic and social welfare legislation in which there is a ‘discrimination’ or differentiation of treatment between classes or individuals. It manifests restraint by the judiciary in relation to the discretionary act of a co-equal branch of government; in so doing it invests legislation involving such differentiated treatment with a presumption of constitutionality and ‘requires] merely that distinctions drawn by a challenged statute bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose.’ [Citation.] . . . Moreover, the burden of demonstrating the invalidity of a classification under this standard rests squarely upon the party who assails it.” (11 Cal.3d at pp. 16-17, italics in original.)
The court in D’Amico further explained that “[a] more stringent test is applied ... in cases involving ‘suspect classifications’ or touching on ‘fundamental interests.’ Here the courts adopt ‘an attitude of active and critical analysis, subjecting the classifications to strict scrutiny. [Citations.] Under the strict standard applied in such cases, the state bears the burden of establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law but that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose.’ [Citation.]” (11 Cal.3d at p. 17.)7
In arguing that heightened “strict scrutiny,” as contrasted with the ordinary “rational relationship” standard, should be applied in determining whether the exemptions within the MCLE program violate the equal protection guarantee, plaintiff relies primarily on a series of decisions of the United States Supreme Court and this court that describe the right to “engage in any of the common occupations of life” as a “fundamental” right or liberty for purposes of the due process clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. (E.g., Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) 262 U.S. 390, 399 [43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 [642]*642L.Ed. 1042, 29 A.L.R. 1446]; Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners (1968) 68 Cal.2d 67, 75 [64 Cal.Rptr. 785, 435 P.2d 553]; Conway v. State Bar (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1107,1113 [255 Cal.Rptr. 390, 767 P.2d 657, 80 A.L.R.4th 101].) Plaintiff reasons from these decisions that legislation or court rules that draw distinctions or create classifications relating to the practice of law impinge upon a “fundamental right” for equal protection purposes and are therefore subject to strict scrutiny.
In Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 30 Cal.3d 70 [177 Cal.Rptr. 566, 634 P.2d 917], we explained the fallacy in this reasoning in addressing a somewhat related contention. As we noted in Hernandez'. “Plaintiff’s reliance on this line of procedural due process cases appears to rest upon an assumption that whenever a ‘property’ or ‘liberty’ interest is accorded the protections of procedural due process, that interest becomes a ‘fundamental constitutional right’ so that legislative measures regulating such an interest are necessarily subject to strict scrutiny. This assumption is totally unfounded. Recent decisions have established that the whole panoply of ordinary property rights are generally protected from summary termination or deprivation by procedural due process [citations] but no case has even remotely suggested that the constitutionality of substantive legislative measures regulating or restricting such ‘protected property’ rights are to be judged under a ‘strict scrutiny standard.’ ” (30 Cal.3d at p. 81, fn. omitted; see also Hughes v. Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, 789 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 952 P.2d 641].)
In Bib’le v. Committee of Bar Examiners (1980) 26 Cal.3d 548 [162 Cal.Rptr. 426, 606 P.2d 733], addressing an equal protection challenge to a State Bar rule that accorded differential treatment to Bar applicants on the basis of whether they attended accredited or unaccredited law schools, we rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the challenged classification “must be subject to strict scrutiny and supported by a compelling state interest.” (26 Cal.3d at p. 554.) We explained: “This court has articulated the appropriate test in examining claims of discrimination in occupational and professional licensing. ‘The conventional “rational relationship” test is traditionally applied in cases involving occupational licensing . . . .’ [Citation.] . . . Accordingly, the rules here under attack have a presumption of constitutionality and require only that the distinctions drawn bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 555.)
Plaintiff claims that the holding in Bib’le on this point should not be applied to the classifications here at issue, because the classifications in Bib’le affected only persons who were not yet members of the Bar, whereas the classifications challenged in the present case apply to individuals who [643]*643already have been admitted to the Bar. But past authorities make it clear that the rational relationship standard applies to classifications involving those persons who already have obtained professional or occupational licenses, as well as to those applying for such licenses. (See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. (1955) 348 U.S. 483, 488-489 [75 S.Ct. 461, 464-465, 99 L.Ed. 563]; Semler v. Dental Examiners (1935) 294 U.S. 608, 610-611 [55 S.Ct. 570, 571-572, 79 L.Ed. 1086]; Ramirez v. Oregon State Bar (9th Cir. 1989) 887 F.2d 1089; Wachs v. Curry (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 616, 624 [16 Cal.Rptr.2d 496] ,)8
Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeal that plaintiffs equal protection challenge to the exemptions to the MCLE program properly must be evaluated under the traditional “rational relationship” standard. (See also Verner v. State of Colo. (D.Colo. 1982) 533 F.Supp. 1109, 1118, affd. (10th Cir. 1983) 716 F.2d 1352 [applying rational relationship standard in determining validity of exemption from state MCLE program].)9
[644]*644B
As noted, although we agree with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the rational relationship standard applies here, we disagree with the appellate court’s further conclusion that, under this standard, the exemptions to the MCLE program at issue are unconstitutional. As we shall explain, we believe the determination reached by the Court of Appeal rests upon a misapplication of the rational relationship standard.
As both the United States Supreme Court and this court have explained on many occasions, “[i]n areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. [Citations.] Where there are ‘plausible reasons’ for [the classification] ‘our inquiry is at an end.’ ” (FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc. (1993) 508 U.S. 307, 313 [113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101, 124 L.Ed.2d 211], italics added, quoting U. S. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz (1980) 449 U.S. 166, 179 [101 S.Ct. 453, 461-462, 66 L.Ed.2d 368]; see, e.g., Central State Univ. v. American Assn. of Univ. Professors, Central State Univ. Chapter (1999) 526 U.S. 124, 126-127 [119 S.Ct. 1162, 1163, 143 L.Ed.2d 227]; Werner v. Southern Cal. etc. Newspapers (1950) 35 Cal.2d 121, 130-132 [216 P.2d 825,13 A.L.R.2d 252].) Past decisions also establish that, under the rational relationship test, the state may recognize that different categories or classes of persons within a larger classification may pose varying degrees of risk of harm, and properly may limit a regulation to those classes of persons as to whom the need for regulation is thought to be more crucial or imperative. (See, e.g., American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community [645]*645Hospital (1984) 36 Cal.3d 359, 371 [204 Cal.Rptr. 671, 683.P.2d 670, 41 A.L.R.4th 233]; Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., supra, 348 U.S. 483, 489 [75 S.Ct. 461, 465] [“Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. [Citation.] Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.”].) As the United States Supreme Court has observed: “Defining the class of persons subject to a regulatory requirement . . . ‘inevitably requires that some persons who have an almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different sides of the line, and the fact [that] the line might have been drawn differently at some points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial consideration.’ ” (FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., supra, 508 U.S. 307, 315-316 [113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101.)
In this case, the constitutional question is whether an MCLE program that generally requires attorneys licensed by the state to complete a specified number of continuing education courses violates the federal or state equal protection clause by exempting retired judges, state officers and elected officials, and full-time professors at accredited law schools from the reach of the continuing education requirement. Although it may be that the wisdom of some or all of these exemptions is debatable as a matter of policy,10 we conclude that the Court of Appeal erred in finding that these three exemptions fail the traditional rational relationship test that applies in this context, because we do not believe it fairly can be said that there is no “reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” (FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., supra, 508 U.S. 307, 313 [113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101].)
As we shall explain, there are at least two “plausible reasons” that rationally support each of the exemptions in question. First, it would not [646]*646have been irrational to conclude that the attorneys in each of the exempted categories, as a general matter, are less likely than other attorneys to represent clients on a full-time basis, thus rendering the need for a continuing education requirement less vital, as a matter of consumer protection, for these classes than for other attorneys. Second, it would not have been irrational to conclude that, in view of their particular professional roles and experience, the attorneys in each of the exempt classes (again, as a general matter) are less likely than lawyers in general to need continuing education courses in order to be familiar with recent legal developments or to remain competent practitioners.
Thus, with respect to the category of retired judges, it would not be irrational to conclude that such individuals, as a class, are less likely than other attorneys to represent clients on a full-time basis after their retirement from the bench, both because, after retirement, such judges may be likely to scale back the overall time spent on legal work, and because, when they do engage in professional endeavors, they are more likely to serve as assigned judges, mediators, or arbitrators (or in similar roles) than to represent individual clients. Furthermore, because of the high level of legal skills and qualifications that generally are required to obtain a position as a judge, and because the daily work of a judge involves constant exposure to and analysis of ongoing developments in the law, it would not be irrational to conclude that it is less necessary, for the protection of the public, to extend the MCLE requirement to this small category of attorneys than to other attorneys.
Similarly, with respect to the category of officers and elected officials of the State of California, it would not be irrational to conclude that because of the considerable amount of time required for the performance of their public duties, such individuals, as a class, are less likely than attorneys as a whole to represent clients on a full-time basis, and that when such individuals do represent clients in the limited time available, they are likely to do so in areas in which they have some particular current expertise or familiarity. Furthermore, because the work of legislators and state officers is devoted, in substantial part, to the review of the current state of the law and the consideration of proposals to modify the law, or to the implementation of recent changes in the law, it would not be irrational to conclude that this group of attorneys, as a whole, may be less in need of MCLE courses than other attorneys, in order to remain abreast of recent developments in the law.
Finally, with respect to the category of full-time professors at accredited law schools, it again would not be irrational to conclude that because of the amount of time such professors devote to their teaching and other academic pursuits, this category of attorneys is less likely than attorneys as a whole to [647]*647represent clients on a full-time basis, and, when they do represent clients, less likely that they will engage in legal work outside their area of particular expertise. Moreover, because of the outstanding academic qualifications generally required to obtain a position as a full-time professor at an accredited law school, because the work of a full-time law professor requires the intensive study, analysis, and teaching of the current state of the law, and because full-time professors at accredited law schools function in an academic setting in which lectures, publications, and frequent faculty discussions typically encompass recent developments in all areas of the law, here too it would not be irrational to conclude that it is less necessary, for the protection of the public, to extend the MCLE requirements to this category of attorneys than to other attorneys.
We emphasize that in assessing the rationality of each of the exemptions in question, we appropriately must evaluate the classifications as a whole. Although some individuals within each of these classes may be as much in need of MCLE courses as other attorneys, in view of the wide berth the state traditionally is given when a suspect classification or fundamental right is not at issue, the exemptions in question cannot properly be found to be irrational or arbitrary under the traditional, deferential, rational relationship standard. (See, e.g., Williams v. Kapilow & Sons, Inc. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 156, 162-163 [164 Cal.Rptr. 176].)11
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeal relied in part upon language from this court’s opinion in Cooper v. Bray (1978) 21 Cal.3d 841 [148 Cal.Rptr. 148, 582 P.2d 604], a decision that struck down, on equal protection grounds, a statutory provision that barred a passenger/owner of an automobile from recovering personal injury damages against the driver of the vehicle unless the passenger/owner established that the injury proximately resulted from the intoxication or willful misconduct of the driver. In the course of the decision in Cooper, the court stated that, in applying what it referred to as the “ ‘restrained’ equal protection standard of review” (21 Cal.3d at p. 847), a court is required “ ‘to conduct “a serious and genuine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the classification and the legislative goals.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 848, quoting Newland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d 705, 711 [139 Cal.Rptr. 620, 566 P.2d 254].)
The Court of Appeal in the present case appears to have interpreted this language from Cooper as calling for a somewhat heightened, rather than a [648]*648restrained, standard of review. This court, however, explained in Fein v. Permanente Medical Group (1985) 38 Cal.3d 137 [211 Cal.Rptr. 368, 695 P.2d 665] (Fein)—a decision rejecting an equal protection challenge to the validity of a provision of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA)—that the Cooper formulation has “never been interpreted to mean that we may properly strike down a statute simply because we disagree with the wisdom of the law or because we believe that there is a fairer method for dealing with the problem.” (38 Cal.3d at p. 163.) The court in Fein explained that in that case, as well as in the court’s earlier MICRA decisions, our court had conducted the “serious and genuine judicial inquiry” referred to in Cooper by (1) finding that “the statutory classifications are rationally related to the ‘realistically conceivable legislative purpose[s]’ (Cooper, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 851) of MICRA,” and (2) by declining to “invent[] fictitious purposes that could not have been within the contemplation of the Legislature . . . .” (Fein, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 163, italics omitted.)12
We conclude that the exemptions at issue in the present case, like the classifications at issue in Fein, cannot be found unconstitutional under a proper application of the rational relationship test. The explanations or justifications for the exemptions that we have noted above—that the attorneys who fall within each category may be less likely than other attorneys to represent a significant number of clients on a full-time basis, or may be less likely than other attorneys to need to attend continuing education classes in order to be aware of recent developments in the law or remain competent [649]*649practitioners—are “ ‘realistically conceivable legislative purpose[s],’ ” rather than “fictitious purposes that could not have been within the contemplation of the Legislature.” (Fein, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 163, italics added.) And the exemptions are “rationally related” to the consumer-protection purpose of the MCLE program insofar as they identify categories of attorneys who, as compared to other categories of attorneys, may not pose as serious a risk to consumers even if these attorneys are not subject to a continuing legal education requirement. As we have explained, “[cjountless constitutional precedents establish . . . that the equal protection clause does not prohibit [the state] from implementing a reform measure ‘one step at a time’ [citar tion], or prevent it ‘from striking the evil where it is felt most.’ [Citation.]” (American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, supra, 36 Cal.3d 359, 371.) These authorities teach that the equal protection guarantee neither requires nor authorizes a court to invalidate a consumer protection measure like the MCLE program simply because the program, as adopted, does not go as far as it might have in protecting consumers. (See, e.g., Railway Express v. New York (1949) 336 U.S. 106, 110 [69 S.Ct. 463, 466, 93 L.Ed. 533] [“It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all.”]; McDonald v. Board of Election (1969) 394 U.S. 802, 809 [89 S.Ct. 1404, 1409, 22 L.Ed.2d 739] [“[A] legislature need not run the risk of losing an entire remedial scheme simply because it failed, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked.”].)13
In declining to accept these justifications for the challenged exemptions, the Court of Appeal relied upon the circumstance that there was “no [650]*650support” in the legislative history of section 6070 to indicate that these were the actual explanations of the rationale or motivation for the adoption of the exemptions, and that “no member of the Bar or other person involved in the design of the [M]CLE program was willing to declare under penalty of perjury that the exemptions were based upon this theory . . . .” The Court of Appeal suggested, instead, that the legislative history of section 6070 “indicates the exempted groups were added in piecemeal fashion, benefiting certain lawyers who were serving in the Legislature or otherwise and did not wish to be ‘ “dragged into a classroom.” ’ ”
In relying, as a basis for its constitutional ruling, upon the absence of evidence in either the legislative history or in the court record to indicate that the proffered justifications for the exemptions were the actual motivation for the adoption of the exemptions, and upon its view that other, less lofty considerations constituted the actual motivation for the enactment of such exemptions, the Court of Appeal failed to adhere to several fundamental tenets of the rational relationship standard of review. As the United States Supreme Court has explained: “[T]he absence of ' “legislative facts” ’ explaining the distinction ‘[o]n the record’ [citation] has no significance in rational-basis analysis. [Citations.] In other words, a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” (FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., supra, 508 U.S. 307, 315 [113 S.Ct. 2096, 2102], italics added; see also Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 320 [113 S.Ct. 2637, 2643, 125 L.Ed.2d 257] [“A State . . . has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification.”].) Furthermore, the high court has explained that when there is a reasonably conceivable justification for a classification, “[i]t is . . . ‘constitutionally irrelevant whether [the] reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision’ ” (U. S. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, supra, 449 U.S. 166, 179 [101 S.Ct. 453, 461], quoting Flemming v. Nestor (1960) 363 U.S. 603, 612 [80 S.Ct. 1367, 1373, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435]), or whether the “conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature.” (FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., supra, 508 U.S. 307, 315 [113 S.Ct. 2096, 2102].) Thus, in instances in which the rational relationship standard is applicable, a classification that, in fact, is rationally related to a reasonably conceivable legitimate public purpose may not be set aside as denying the equal protection of the laws on the ground that the Legislature or other policy maker that fashioned the classification may have acted out of what is perceived as self-interest or may have had some other asserted “politically motivated” purpose for supporting the measure. (Accord, County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 721, 727 [119 Cal.Rptr. 631, 532 P.2d 495] [“[T]he validity of a legislative act does not depend on the subjective motivations of its draftsmen but rests instead on the objective effect of the legislative terms.”].)
[651]*651Accordingly, we conclude that under a proper understanding and application of the “rational relationship” equal protection standard, the exemptions to the MCLE program here at issue cannot be found unconstitutional. The Court of Appeal erred in reaching a contrary conclusion.14
IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the Court of Appeal with directions to affirm the summary judgment in favor of defendants.
Mosk, J., Baxter, J., Werdegar, J., and Chin, J., concurred.