Ward v. State

Alabama Court of Appeals

Ward v. State

170 So. 2d 500, 42 Ala. App. 529, 1964 Ala. App. LEXIS 220

CourtAlabama Court of Appeals

DecidedNovember 24, 1964

Docket6 Div. 989

StatusPublished

Cited by14 cases

This text of 170 So. 2d 500 (Ward v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Alabama Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ward v. State, 170 So. 2d 500, 42 Ala. App. 529, 1964 Ala. App. LEXIS 220 (Ala. Ct. App. 1964).

Pincite

Opinions

CATES, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment that appellant is the father of an illegitimate child. He was also ordered to pay six dollars to the mother each week for the infant’s support.

The sole question is what effect is to be given Act 295 of September 15, 1961, p. 2353,¹ which enlarged the duties of adjudicated fathers and lengthened the time before limitation.

We have here the following timetable;

1. The child was born October 9, 1960.

2. The Governor signed Act No. 295 September 15, 1961.

3. October 9, 1961, period of limitations under Code 1940, T. 6, § 7, could ² have run [but Act No. 295 has repealed' T. 6 in toto].

4. May 23, 1963, mother filed complaint in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Jefferson County.

United States Constitution, Art. I, § 10, cl. 1, denying the states power to make ex post facto laws, applies to penal and criminal laws not to civil laws which affect private rights adversely.³

In Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U.S. 140, 152, 31 S.Ct. 171, 177, 55 L.Ed. 131, Day, J., said:

“ * * * But an ex post facto law and a retroactive law are entirely different things

“Laws of a retroactive nature, imposing taxes or providing remedies for their assessment and collection, and not impairing vested rights, are not forbidden by the Federal Constitution. League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156, 46 L.Ed. 478, 22 Sup.Ct.Rep. 475. This court had occasion in a very early case to consider the meaning of an ex post facto law as the term is used in the Federal Constitution, prohibiting the states from passing any law of that character. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386-390, 1 L.Ed. 648-650. In that case it held that such laws, within the meaning of the Federal Constitution, had reference to criminal punishments, and did not include retrospective laws of a different character. * * * ”

[532]*532Unlike the Kiplingesque ⁴ ballad, Act No. 295 euphonizes by dropping the harsh and much abused noun “bastard” in favor of the more pleasant sounding polysyllabic “illegitimate.” And as trespass was the fertile mother of actions so we now have another jural foundling on the court’s doorstep.

I.

The salient differences in the “new” law as contrasted with repealed Title 6 .are:

1) Justices of the peace are ousted of jurisdiction.

2) The $100 per year for ten years limit of liability is done away with. The obligation now is in degree and extent as if the child were legitimate.

3) After judgment, the reputed father cannot be imprisoned to force payment; nor is bond for payment required.

4) The money may be ordered to be paid ■directly to the mother or another.

5) The period of limitation is raised from one to two years, the new law, § 9, retaining the provision "unless in the meantime, the reputed father * * * has supported said child.”

We conclude that Act No. 295 is no ex post facto law within the meaning of cither the State or Federal Constitutions. We arrive at this mainly because the former bastardy and the now “illegitimate” law are both civil. The new law seems wholly so.

Under Constitution 1901, § 95, we find: " * * * the legislature shall have no power to revive any right or remedy which may have become barred by lapse of time, or by any statute of this state.

Briefly, this cannot apply here because the one year statute [at its shortest span] had not run on this case when the new law was put on the books. Moreover, there was some testimony, inarticulate and imprecise though it may have been as to when, that the defendant had paid the mother for the child’s support. Also he had, after it was born, referred to it as his in the presence of third persons.

In view of the repealer of Title 6 being placed in the same act imposing more onerous terms, we find no intent to confer amnesty on the reputed father. Indeed, the intent to have an unbroken transition is inescapable.

The prohibition against impairing the obligation of contract is not pertinent. Had the defendant been under judgment and bond under the “old” law is a circumstance not before us.

Act No. 295 as applied here creates no new obligation. It increases the damages payable for the breach by doing away with the $100 a year, ten year maximum. We can see no vested right in penury.

The judgment below is

Affirmed.

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CATES, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment that appellant is the father of an illegitimate child. He was also ordered to pay six dollars to the mother each week for the infant’s support.

The sole question is what effect is to be given Act 295 of September 15, 1961, p. 2353,¹ which enlarged the duties of adjudicated fathers and lengthened the time before limitation.

We have here the following timetable;

1. The child was born October 9, 1960.

2. The Governor signed Act No. 295 September 15, 1961.

3. October 9, 1961, period of limitations under Code 1940, T. 6, § 7, could ² have run [but Act No. 295 has repealed' T. 6 in toto].

4. May 23, 1963, mother filed complaint in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Jefferson County.

United States Constitution, Art. I, § 10, cl. 1, denying the states power to make ex post facto laws, applies to penal and criminal laws not to civil laws which affect private rights adversely.³

In Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U.S. 140, 152, 31 S.Ct. 171, 177, 55 L.Ed. 131, Day, J., said:

“ * * * But an ex post facto law and a retroactive law are entirely different things

“Laws of a retroactive nature, imposing taxes or providing remedies for their assessment and collection, and not impairing vested rights, are not forbidden by the Federal Constitution. League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156, 46 L.Ed. 478, 22 Sup.Ct.Rep. 475. This court had occasion in a very early case to consider the meaning of an ex post facto law as the term is used in the Federal Constitution, prohibiting the states from passing any law of that character. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386-390, 1 L.Ed. 648-650. In that case it held that such laws, within the meaning of the Federal Constitution, had reference to criminal punishments, and did not include retrospective laws of a different character. * * * ”

[532]*532Unlike the Kiplingesque ⁴ ballad, Act No. 295 euphonizes by dropping the harsh and much abused noun “bastard” in favor of the more pleasant sounding polysyllabic “illegitimate.” And as trespass was the fertile mother of actions so we now have another jural foundling on the court’s doorstep.

I.

The salient differences in the “new” law as contrasted with repealed Title 6 .are:

1) Justices of the peace are ousted of jurisdiction.

2) The $100 per year for ten years limit of liability is done away with. The obligation now is in degree and extent as if the child were legitimate.

3) After judgment, the reputed father cannot be imprisoned to force payment; nor is bond for payment required.

4) The money may be ordered to be paid ■directly to the mother or another.

5) The period of limitation is raised from one to two years, the new law, § 9, retaining the provision "unless in the meantime, the reputed father * * * has supported said child.”

We conclude that Act No. 295 is no ex post facto law within the meaning of cither the State or Federal Constitutions. We arrive at this mainly because the former bastardy and the now “illegitimate” law are both civil. The new law seems wholly so.

Under Constitution 1901, § 95, we find: " * * * the legislature shall have no power to revive any right or remedy which may have become barred by lapse of time, or by any statute of this state.

Briefly, this cannot apply here because the one year statute [at its shortest span] had not run on this case when the new law was put on the books. Moreover, there was some testimony, inarticulate and imprecise though it may have been as to when, that the defendant had paid the mother for the child’s support. Also he had, after it was born, referred to it as his in the presence of third persons.

In view of the repealer of Title 6 being placed in the same act imposing more onerous terms, we find no intent to confer amnesty on the reputed father. Indeed, the intent to have an unbroken transition is inescapable.

The prohibition against impairing the obligation of contract is not pertinent. Had the defendant been under judgment and bond under the “old” law is a circumstance not before us.

Act No. 295 as applied here creates no new obligation. It increases the damages payable for the breach by doing away with the $100 a year, ten year maximum. We can see no vested right in penury.

The judgment below is

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

170 So. 2d 500, 42 Ala. App. 529, 1964 Ala. App. LEXIS 220, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ward-v-state-alactapp-1964.

Opinions

1. The child was born October 9, 1960.

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