1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ANJALI WARD, Case No. 21-cv-00530-JST Plaintiff, 8 ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 9 v. DISMISS 10 RENEE PALMER, et al., Re: ECF Nos. 43, 45, 48, 51, 54, 79, 87, 105 Defendants. 11 12 13 Before the Court are seven motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Carla Gorum, Leigh 14 Mueller, Margaret Mary Moore; Helene Walters and Jodee Noll; Renee Palmer; Krystle Stringer, 15 Sophia Webb, Chelsea Abreau, Kellie Case, Toni Nestore, Abryan Seabron, Roxanna Alavi, and 16 Patricia Lowe (collectively, “Contra Costa County Defendants”); Janet Santoyo; Araceli Ramirez; 17 and Nina Bhutani. The Court will grant the motions. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 This case stems from state court proceedings involving Plaintiff Anjali Ward’s loss of 20 custody of her infant, WW, due to suspected drug use shortly after his birth in January 2019. 21 Ward has sued the doctors that delivered WW and suspected drug use (Defendants Gorum, 22 Mueller, Moore); the nurses that reported suspected child endangerment to the authorities (Walters 23 and Noll); the Santa Cruz County social worker who questioned Ward while at the hospital about 24 Ward’s past drug use (Palmer); the Contra Costa County social workers, lawyers, and other staff 25 involved in the juvenile dependency investigation and action (the Contra Costa County 26 Defendants); the police officer who detained Ward and executed an arrest warrant after she failed 27 to appear for the court-ordered juvenile dependency hearing (Santoyo); and the court-appointed 1 Bhutani). Ward seeks monetary damages, a restraining order against Defendants, and the return of 2 her sons WW and CW.1 Defendants now move to dismiss. 3 II. JURISDICTION 4 This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 5 III. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 6 Courts may take judicial notice of a fact “not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is 7 either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of 8 accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 9 questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Courts may take judicial notice of matters of public record 10 without converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a summary judgment motion. Mack v. S. Bay 11 Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). Public records are appropriate subjects for 12 judicial notice. United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 13 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (approving taking notice of records “in other courts, both within and 14 without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue”). 15 Defendants seek judicial notice of numerous documents. See ECF Nos. 43-2, 46, 49, 52, 16 55, 56, 80. Except for the court records showing a pending appeal of the juvenile dependency 17 proceeding involving WW before the First Appellate District, ECF No. 46-1 at 2, ECF No. 80 at 5, 18 the other documents do not bear on the Court’s analysis of the motions to dismiss, and 19 Defendants’ requests are therefore denied as moot. The court records from the First Appellate 20 District are public court records whose authenticity cannot be reasonably questioned, so the Court 21 judicially notices them. 22 IV. MOTIONS TO DISMISS 23 A. Legal Standard 24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While a complaint need not 26 1 CW is Ward’s older son. Like WW, Ward lost custody of CW due to drug-related child abuse. 27 Although the complaint seeks CW’s return, it draws no connection between Defendants and the 1 contain detailed factual allegations, facts pleaded by a plaintiff must be “enough to raise a right to 2 relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To 3 survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to, 4 when accepted as true, state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 5 678 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 6 the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 7 Id. While this standard is not a probability requirement, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are 8 merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and 9 plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 10 In determining whether a plaintiff has met this plausibility standard, the Court must 11 “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most 12 favorable” to the plaintiff. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). “Dismissal 13 under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate . . . where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or 14 sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 15 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). If the motion to dismiss is granted, the court should grant 16 leave to amend “unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the 17 allegation of other facts.” Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal 18 quotation marks and citation omitted). 19 V. DISCUSSION 20 A. County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 21 The County Defendants move to dismiss this federal action on Younger abstention grounds 22 because the related state court dependency proceeding involving WW is currently pending. See 23 ECF No. 45 at 9-10 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49-53 (1971)). In the alternative, the 24 County Defendants ask the Court to dismiss all claims against them because the complaint violates 25 Rule 8; they are immune from suit; and because the complaint is barred by the Rooker-Feldman 26 doctrine. County Defendants also argue that any claims based on the Indian Child Welfare Act 27 (“ICWA”) are barred by collateral estoppel. 1 that would interfere with a pending state court case. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41. In the absence of 2 “extraordinary circumstances,” abstention in favor of state judicial proceedings is required if the 3 state proceedings (1) are ongoing, (2) implicate important state interests, and (3) provide the 4 plaintiff an adequate opportunity to litigate his or her federal claims. See Middlesex Cty. Ethics 5 Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1982). 6 Although Younger itself dealt with a criminal case, the Supreme Court has extended the 7 doctrine to civil matters such as juvenile dependency proceedings. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ANJALI WARD, Case No. 21-cv-00530-JST Plaintiff, 8 ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 9 v. DISMISS 10 RENEE PALMER, et al., Re: ECF Nos. 43, 45, 48, 51, 54, 79, 87, 105 Defendants. 11 12 13 Before the Court are seven motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Carla Gorum, Leigh 14 Mueller, Margaret Mary Moore; Helene Walters and Jodee Noll; Renee Palmer; Krystle Stringer, 15 Sophia Webb, Chelsea Abreau, Kellie Case, Toni Nestore, Abryan Seabron, Roxanna Alavi, and 16 Patricia Lowe (collectively, “Contra Costa County Defendants”); Janet Santoyo; Araceli Ramirez; 17 and Nina Bhutani. The Court will grant the motions. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 This case stems from state court proceedings involving Plaintiff Anjali Ward’s loss of 20 custody of her infant, WW, due to suspected drug use shortly after his birth in January 2019. 21 Ward has sued the doctors that delivered WW and suspected drug use (Defendants Gorum, 22 Mueller, Moore); the nurses that reported suspected child endangerment to the authorities (Walters 23 and Noll); the Santa Cruz County social worker who questioned Ward while at the hospital about 24 Ward’s past drug use (Palmer); the Contra Costa County social workers, lawyers, and other staff 25 involved in the juvenile dependency investigation and action (the Contra Costa County 26 Defendants); the police officer who detained Ward and executed an arrest warrant after she failed 27 to appear for the court-ordered juvenile dependency hearing (Santoyo); and the court-appointed 1 Bhutani). Ward seeks monetary damages, a restraining order against Defendants, and the return of 2 her sons WW and CW.1 Defendants now move to dismiss. 3 II. JURISDICTION 4 This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 5 III. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 6 Courts may take judicial notice of a fact “not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is 7 either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of 8 accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 9 questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Courts may take judicial notice of matters of public record 10 without converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a summary judgment motion. Mack v. S. Bay 11 Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). Public records are appropriate subjects for 12 judicial notice. United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 13 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (approving taking notice of records “in other courts, both within and 14 without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue”). 15 Defendants seek judicial notice of numerous documents. See ECF Nos. 43-2, 46, 49, 52, 16 55, 56, 80. Except for the court records showing a pending appeal of the juvenile dependency 17 proceeding involving WW before the First Appellate District, ECF No. 46-1 at 2, ECF No. 80 at 5, 18 the other documents do not bear on the Court’s analysis of the motions to dismiss, and 19 Defendants’ requests are therefore denied as moot. The court records from the First Appellate 20 District are public court records whose authenticity cannot be reasonably questioned, so the Court 21 judicially notices them. 22 IV. MOTIONS TO DISMISS 23 A. Legal Standard 24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While a complaint need not 26 1 CW is Ward’s older son. Like WW, Ward lost custody of CW due to drug-related child abuse. 27 Although the complaint seeks CW’s return, it draws no connection between Defendants and the 1 contain detailed factual allegations, facts pleaded by a plaintiff must be “enough to raise a right to 2 relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To 3 survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to, 4 when accepted as true, state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 5 678 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 6 the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 7 Id. While this standard is not a probability requirement, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are 8 merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and 9 plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 10 In determining whether a plaintiff has met this plausibility standard, the Court must 11 “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most 12 favorable” to the plaintiff. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). “Dismissal 13 under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate . . . where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or 14 sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 15 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). If the motion to dismiss is granted, the court should grant 16 leave to amend “unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the 17 allegation of other facts.” Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal 18 quotation marks and citation omitted). 19 V. DISCUSSION 20 A. County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 21 The County Defendants move to dismiss this federal action on Younger abstention grounds 22 because the related state court dependency proceeding involving WW is currently pending. See 23 ECF No. 45 at 9-10 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49-53 (1971)). In the alternative, the 24 County Defendants ask the Court to dismiss all claims against them because the complaint violates 25 Rule 8; they are immune from suit; and because the complaint is barred by the Rooker-Feldman 26 doctrine. County Defendants also argue that any claims based on the Indian Child Welfare Act 27 (“ICWA”) are barred by collateral estoppel. 1 that would interfere with a pending state court case. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41. In the absence of 2 “extraordinary circumstances,” abstention in favor of state judicial proceedings is required if the 3 state proceedings (1) are ongoing, (2) implicate important state interests, and (3) provide the 4 plaintiff an adequate opportunity to litigate his or her federal claims. See Middlesex Cty. Ethics 5 Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1982). 6 Although Younger itself dealt with a criminal case, the Supreme Court has extended the 7 doctrine to civil matters such as juvenile dependency proceedings. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 8 423 (1979). The doctrine has also been applied specifically to ICWA claims. See Belinda K. v. 9 Cty. of Alameda, No. 10-CV-05797-LHK, 2012 WL 273720, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2012) 10 (denying, on the basis of Younger abstention, a motion under ICWA to invalidate state 11 dependency court protective order because the motion was “essentially an attempt to issue an 12 injunction in a pending state court proceeding”); see also Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1392 13 (10th Cir. 1996) (remanding ICWA case to district court with directions to abstain under Younger 14 and to dismiss case without prejudice). 15 This case meets all three requirements for Younger abstention. First, the termination of 16 Ward’s parental rights is still pending before the state appellate court. See ECF No. 46-1 (docket 17 for Contra Costa Cty. Children & Family Servs. Bureau v. A.W., Cal. Ct. App., Case No. 18 A164214); ECF No. 80 at 5 (same). Second, important state interests are implicated by the 19 dependency proceedings at issue here. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979) (“Family 20 relations are a traditional area of state concern.”); H.C. ex rel. Gordon v. Koppel, 203 F.3d 610, 21 612-14 (9th Cir. 2000) (pending state custody proceedings are “precisely the type of case suited to 22 Younger abstention”). Third, the ongoing state proceedings “afford an adequate opportunity to 23 raise the ICWA and constitutional claims . . . and there is no showing of a procedural bar against 24 [Plaintiffs’] assertion of those claims.” Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1398 (10th Cir. 1996) 25 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 26 “When a case is one in which the Younger doctrine applies, the district court has no 27 discretion; it must dismiss.” Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc. v. Mendoza, 139 F.3d 1289, 1294 (9th 1 no choice but to dismiss the action. Accordingly, the claims against the County Defendants are 2 || dismissed without prejudice. 3 B. Gorum, Mueller, and Moore’s Motion to Dismiss 4 Like the County Defendants, Gorum, Mueller, and Moore invoke Younger abstention. For 5 || the same reasons set forth above, their motion to dismiss is granted. Ward’s claims against 6 Gorum, Mueller, and Moore are dismissed without prejudice. 7 C. The Remaining Defendants 8 Palmer, Bhutani, Ramirez, Santoyo, and Walter and Noell do not invoke Younger 9 abstention in their motions to dismiss. But “[i]t is well-settled that a court may raise abstention 10 sua sponte.” Scarlett vy. Alemzadeh, No. 19-CV-07466-LHK, 2020 WL 3617781, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 11 July 2, 2020), appeal dismissed, No. 20-16491, 2021 WL 3417911 (9th Cir. June 9, 2021) (citing a 12 Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018)). Accordingly, for the same reasons just
13 discussed, Ward’s claims against Palmer, Bhutani, Ramirez, Santoyo, Walter, and Noell are
ismissed without prejudice under Younger. 14 || dismissed without prejudi der Y 2 Oo CONCLUSION QO 16 For the reasons stated, this case is dismissed without prejudice to refiling once the state
17 court appeal has concluded. The clerk shall close the file.
18 IT IS SO ORDERED. ® 19 || Dated: July 22, 2022 20 JON S. TIGA 2] nited States District Judge 22 23 24 || 2 One defendant — Irana Maramica — recently filed a motion to dismiss that has not yet been fully 25 briefed but which likewise does not raise Younger abstention as a defense, ECF No. 105. And several defendants — Sarah Flynn, Jack Flynn, Todd Stroud, and Tyler Prentice — have not entered 26 an appearance. Because these defendants’ claims may be dismissed on Younger abstention grounds as well, those claims are also dismissed without prejudice. See Silverton v. Department of 07 Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a district court “may on its own motion dismiss an action as to defendants who have not moved to dismiss where such defendants 28 are in a position similar to that of moving defendants or where claims against such defendants integrally related”).