Ward v. PAD Properties Group, LP

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: April 3, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-00698
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 REBECA BRINKLY WARD, Case No.: 3:25-cv-00698-CAB-DEB

12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING MOTION TO 14 PAD PROPERTIES GROUP, LP, et al., PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; 15 Defendants. (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT 16

17 On March 25, 2025, Plaintiff Rebeca Brinkley Ward filed a complaint against 18 Defendants PAD Properties Group, LP, West Star Properties, C&J Legacy Residential, 19 LLC, and Adain Perone. [Doc. No. 1.] Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fees required 20 by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time of filing; instead, she filed a motion to proceed in forma 21 pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). [Doc. No. 2.] For the reasons outlined 22 below, Plaintiff’s IFP motion is GRANTED, and her complaint is DISMISSED with leave 23 to amend. 24 I. Motion to Proceed IFP 25 Generally, all parties instituting a civil action in this court must pay a filing fee. See 26 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); S.D. Cal. CivLR 4.5(a). However, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the 27 court may authorize the commencement, prosecution, or defense of any suit without 28 1 payment of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit, including a statement of all his or her 2 assets, showing that he or she is unable to pay filing fees or costs. “An affidavit in support 3 of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs 4 and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th 5 Cir. 2015). “[A] plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege poverty with some particularity, 6 definiteness and certainty.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The granting or denial 7 of leave to proceed IFP in civil cases is within the sound discretion of the district court. 8 Venerable v. Meyers, 500 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted). 9 In support of her application, Plaintiff lists no assets. [Doc. No. 2 at 3.] She receives 10 $1,030 in public assistance. [Id. at 2.] She lists her average monthly expenses at $2,135 11 and provides some detail to support this amount. [Id. at 4–5.] Her expenses are greater 12 than her source of income, which appears to be solely public benefits. Based on the 13 “particularity, definiteness and certainty” in the information provided, the Court is 14 persuaded that Plaintiff lacks the funds to pay the filing fee and “still afford the necessities 15 of life.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. The motion to proceed IFP is GRANTED. 16 II. Screening of the Complaint Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 17 Nevertheless, upon granting a request to proceed IFP, the Court must additionally 18 analyze a complaint’s sufficiency under 28 U.S.C § 1915. A plaintiff seeking to proceed 19 IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to sua sponte dismissal if the complaint is 20 “frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks 21 monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 22 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 23 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”). Congress enacted this safeguard 24 because “a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public . . . lacks an 25 economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” 26 Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 27 324 (1989)). 28 1 The Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint liberally. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 2 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff alleges a series of state and common law claims related 3 to a residential property she rented at some point. [See Doc. No. 1.] Plaintiff does not 4 assert a single federal claim. 5 The only way this Court would have jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s complaint is 6 through diversity jurisdiction, which requires complete diversity between the parties. 28 7 U.S.C. § 1332. More simply, Plaintiff cannot be a citizen of a state that is the same as any 8 Defendant. Id.; see Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 829 (1989). 9 As alleged in her complaint, Plaintiff is a California resident along with Defendant PAD 10 Properties Group, LP.1 [See Doc. No. 1-1 (“County of Residence of First Listed Defendant 11 [PAD Properties Group, LP]: San Diego”).] Thus, the parties are not diverse and the Court 12 lacks jurisdiction over this case. 13 Plaintiff may amend her complaint to either properly plead complete diversity or a 14 federal claim. Plaintiff is instructed to clearly identify the citizenship of each Defendant 15 in any amended complaint. 16 17 /// 18 /// 19 /// 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

27 1 Plaintiff also appears to establish in her complaint caption that Defendant Adain Perone resides at 28 l II. Conclusion 2 The Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP and DISMISSES □□□□□□□□□□□ 3 || complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Plaintiff shall have until April 24, 2025 to amend 4 ||her complaint. Plaintiff's amended complaint must be complete by itself without reference 5 her original pleading. Defendants not named and claims not re-alleged in the amended 6 ||complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1(a); see also Lacey v. 7 || Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiffis reminded that federal courts 8 required to examine jurisdiction sua sponte—meaning on their own initiative. See 9 || Bernhardt v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2002). 10 It is SO ORDERED. 11 12 Kb 13 Dated: April 3, 202° Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 14 United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28