Ward v. Commissioner
This text of 25 T.C. 815 (Ward v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
OPINION.
Petitioner contends first that the $32,000 in question herein was compensation within the meaning of section 107 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, and in the alternative that it was back pay within the meaning of section 107 (d) :4
It is clear, we think, that it was not. compensation within the meaning of section 107 (a). To qualify as compensation under that section “at least 80 per centum of the total compensation for personal services covering a period of thirty-six calendar months or more (from the beginning to the completion of such services) ” must have been received or accrued to petitioner in the taxable year. The facts show that petitioner’s employment by the company had been continuous from 1937 when the company was formed. For such employment “from the beginning” through 1947 the petitioner was to receive a total of $92,000, only $32,000 of which was received in the taxable year. It is patent, therefore, that section 107 (a) does not apply. See Cowan v. Henslee, 180 F. 2d 73.
We are also of the view and hold that the said $32,000 was not back pay within the meaning of 107 (d). Under that section compensation payments qualify as back pay provided the compensation received “would have been paid prior to the taxable year except for the intervention” of events specified which include bankruptcy or receivership of the employer; or “any other event determined to be similar in nature under regulations prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary.”
It is the claim of the petitioner that the conveyance to the State of California under tax deeds was an event similar in nature to bankruptcy or receivership of his employer. We find it unnecessary, however, to decide that point since on the facts it is clear that payment of the compensation was not made prior to 1949 not because of the holding of the company lands by the State of California under tax deeds, but because the company saw fit to apply or use its earnings and profits for other purposes, including the payment of $180,000 in dividends in 1946, 3 years prior to the taxable year herein. The lands in'Del Norte County had been returned to the company clear of tax liens in 1940, the year before the first of the years for which the compensation here claimed as back pay was paid. In short, since 1940 the company had been free to sell or otherwise deal with its properties in Del Norte County in a perfectly normal manner and it did so deal with them and at a profit. Furthermore, the same had been true of its properties in Humboldt County from and after the decree of the Superior Court of' that county filed May 11, 1945. Thus the failure on the part of the company to pay petitioner for the services rendered by him to it for the years 1941 through Í944 prior to 1949 was not due to an event described in section 107 (d) (2) but because the company chose to apply its funds otherwise. And so far as appears, such other use of its funds was with petitioner’s consent and approval.
In light of the above, it is accordingly unnecessary to decide whether the holding of petitioner’s properties by the State of California under tax deeds was an event falling within the ambit of section 107 (d).
Decision will be entered for the respondent.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
25 T.C. 815, 1956 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 296, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ward-v-commissioner-tax-1956.