Wang v. Zymergen Inc.

District Court, N.D. California·Decided February 27, 2024·No. 5:21-cv-06028·Unknown

Opinion

BIAO WANG, et al., Case No. 21-cv-06028-PCP

Plaintiffs, SEALING ORDER v. Re: Nos. 233, 243, 246, 247, 249, 253, 272, ZYMERGEN INC., et al., 273, 294, 297, 298, 308 Defendants.

This order resolves the pending sealing motions filed in conjunction with lead plaintiff Biao Wang’s recently granted motion for leave to amend. I. Legal Standard The public has a longstanding “right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). Public access bolsters “understanding of the judicial process” and “confidence in the administration of justice,” and it provides a “measure of accountability” for courts. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016). There is thus a “strong presumption in favor of access” to court records. Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). To overcome this, a party who seeks to seal a record must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings ... that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure.” Id. at 1178–79 (cleaned up). Sealing may be justified when “court files ... become a vehicle for improper purposes, such as ... to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Id. at 1179. Without more, though, the “fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or presumption of access is not rebutted” simply because “documents … are the subject of a protective order.” Id. at 1177. Ultimately, under the “stringent” compelling reasons standard, the Court must “balance the competing interests of the public and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial records secret.” Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1096–9. Although a lower “good cause” standard applies to discovery material included with motions that are only “tangentially related to the underlying cause of action,” Auto Safety, 809 F.3d. at 1099, the default compelling reasons standard applies to motions for leave to file an amended complaint because such motions are inherently central to the merits of a case, see Apple Inc. v. Rivos, Inc., No. 22-CV-02637-PCP, 2024 WL 748394, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2024). Under Civil Local Rule 79-5(c)(1) and (f)(3), the party seeking to seal must provide “a specific statement” of the justification, explaining the interests that warrant sealing and the injury that will otherwise result. II. Discussion Mr. Wang filed an administrative sealing motion in conjunction with his motion for leave to amend and the exhibits attached to the declaration in support of that motion, seeking to seal information designated as confidential or highly confidential by the Zymergen defendants (Zymergen Inc., Josh Hoffman, Enakshi Singh, Steven Chu, Jay T. Flatley, Christine M. Gorjanc, Travis Murdoch, Matthew A. Ocko, Sandra E. Peterson, Zach Serber, and Rohit Sharma) and/or the then third-parties who have now been re-added as defendants (SB Investment Advisers (US) Inc., DCVC Management Co, LLC, and True Venture Management, L.L.C.). The Zymergen defendants and SB Investment Advisers (SBIA) filed statements in support of Mr. Wang’s motion. The Zymergen defendants seek to seal several portions of Mr. Wang’s motion and proposed amended complaint (and redline). They argue that permitting the information at issue to be published “could severely harm Zymergen and its former directors and officers by revealing sensitive, confidential, and personal information about compensation; the company’s proprietary technology, funding, compliance processes, corporate governance, and competitive position; and Zymergen’s relationships with investors and creditors, alike.” Dkt. No. 235, at 4. standard they think applies. SBIA seeks to seal portions of those same documents on the basis that the marked portions “contain sensitive details regarding SBIA’s internal business operations and describe in detail various internal documents containing SBIA’s business strategies.” Dkt. No. 236, at 3. It asserts that if the marked material is publicized, “SBIA’s competitors would gain access to its confidential business practices regarding SBIA’s investments and operations, which could harm SBIA’s competitive standing.” Id. at 4. SBIA argues that the good cause standard applies because Mr. Wang’s motion is not dispositive. The other then non-parties, DCVC and True Venture, did not file statements in support of Mr. Wang’s sealing motion. The primary document at issue is Mr. Wang’s amended complaint. As discussed above, there must be compelling reasons to seal portions of a complaint. Preventing disclosure of trade secrets can be a compelling reason. Upon review, however, the marked material does not appear to involve trade secrets or other similarly sensitive information of either Zymergen or SBIA. As the Restatement explains, a trade secret is a “process or device for continuous use in the operation of the business” as opposed to “information as to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of the business.” Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 (1939) (emphasis added).1 Here, the marked material involves information that, while confidential, does not seem to meet this definition. It includes:

1 The Ninth Circuit has applied the Restatement’s definition of trade secrets. See Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1972); In re Elec. Arts, Inc., 298 Fed. Appx. 568, 569–70 (9th Cir. 2008) (nonprecedential). The Restatement provides the following definition:

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Wang v. Zymergen Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2024).

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Related

Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.
435 U.S. 589 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Larry E. Clark v. Berkeley L. Bunker
453 F.2d 1006 (Ninth Circuit, 1972)
Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, LLC
809 F.3d 1092 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Ramírez v. Arlequín
447 F.3d 19 (First Circuit, 2006)
Electronic Arts, Inc. v. United States District Court
298 F. App'x 568 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)