Wang v. NH Board of Reg. in Medicine CV-91-685-B 09/23/93
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
John W. Wang, M.D.
v. No. 91-685-B
New Hampshire Board of Registration in Medicine, et al.
O R D E R
Dr. John W. Wang ("Dr. Wang") seeks injunctive relief,
declaratory relief, and damages arising from a decision of the
New Hampshire Board of Registration in Medicine ("the Board"),
revoking his license to practice medicine in New Hampshire. He
has sued the Board, its members in their individual and official
capacities, and the Board's attorney in his individual capacity.
The defendants have moved to dismiss Dr. Wang's claim against the
Board and its members in their official capacities on the ground
that these claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The
defendants also seek dismissal of Wang's individual capacity
claims on the ground that the defendants against whom these
claims have been brought are entitled to either absolute or good faith immunity.1 For the reasons that follow, I conclude that
the Eleventh Amendment bars Dr. Wang's claims for damages and
retrospective eguitable relief against the Board and its members
in their official capacities. I also conclude that the
individual capacity defendants are entitled to absolute immunity
with respect to plaintiff's damage claims. Thus, all that
remains for decision is Dr. Wang's claim for prospective
eguitable relief against the Board members.
FACTS2
Dr. Wang began practicing medicine in the United States when
he arrived in this country in 1967. He became licensed to
practice medicine in New Hampshire in 1983. In July 1988, in
defendants' motion to dismiss was filed in January 1992. Before the motion was decided, the court granted Dr. Wang's motion for a stay to allow him to seek state appellate review of the Board's order revoking his license to practice medicine. The New Hampshire Supreme Court subseguently summarily affirmed the Board's decision and the stay has now been lifted. Because state court proceedings have been concluded, defendants' argument that the court lacks jurisdiction to consider Dr. Wang's claims while state proceedings are pending and their contention that the court should abstain while the state proceedings are pending are moot.
2 The facts are drawn from Dr. Wang's Complaint. They are stated in the light most favorable to him and are assumed to be true for purposes of this order.
2 reliance on a decision of the Massachusetts Board of Medicine
revoking Wang's medical license, the Board revoked his New
Hampshire license. Shortly thereafter, Wang obtained a
preliminary injunction in state superior court preventing the
Board's decision from going into effect. He later obtained a
second order from the same court directing the Board to convene a
new hearing with different Board members before it took further
action against him. This order was later vacated. Meanwhile,
the Board appointed a prosecutor to investigate Wang. This
investigation culminated in additional charges and a new hearing
several years after the Board's July 1988 decision. The hearing
was replete with serious procedural errors that individually and
collectively deprived Wang of his right to due process.
Moreover, the Board members and their attorney acted with malice
and in bad faith in committing these due process violations.
When the complaint was filed in 1991, the Board had not yet
decided whether to revoke Dr. Wang's license. However, his New
Hampshire license was eventually revoked and the Board's decision
was subseguently affirmed by the New Hampshire Supreme Court.
3 DISCUSSION
A. Eleventh Amendment
Dr. Wang argues that the State of New Hampshire waived its
Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal court jurisdiction when
it waived sovereign immunity with respect to the claims at issue.
This argument misconstrues the nature of the immunity accorded by
the Eleventh Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has
observed that "[a]lthough a [s]tate's general waiver of sovereign
immunity may subject it to suit in state court, it is not enough
to waive the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment."
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985)
(citation omitted). Since Wang offers nothing else to support
his challenge to the defendants' Eleventh Amendment argument, his
objection is unavailing.
Dr. Wang argues that he is entitled to seek injunctive
relief against the Board members in their official capacities
because he contends that he is seeking prospective relief. I
agree. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims against state
officials in their official capacities for prospective eguitable
relief based upon violations of federal law. See Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 160 (1980); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167,
n.14 (1985). In determining whether a complaint seeks
4 prospective relief, the court must look to the substance of the
requested relief, rather than its form. Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265, 279 (1986). In the present case, although the
allegedly illegal actions resulting in the revocation of Dr.
Wang's license to practice medicine have concluded, the
revocation decision has a prospective effect that can be
addressed through equitable relief. That is to say. Dr. Wang
will continue to be denied the privilege of practicing medicine
in New Hampshire unless an injunction is issued by this court
directing the state to restore his license to practice medicine.
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar this type of relief against
state officials.3
B. Absolute Immunity
Dr. Wang makes two arguments in support of his contention
that the defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity.
First, he contends that the defendants' right to absolute
3 Viewing Dr. Wang's arguments under the liberal standard of review that is applied to a motion to dismiss, I reject defendants' argument that Wang's complaint fails to state a claim for equitable relief. Moreover, since it has not been raised by the defendants, I leave for another day the possibility that Wang may be estopped from asserting in this proceeding arguments that have been resolved against him in a related state court proceeding.
5 immunity from § 1983 claims is limited by N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
329:17 IX, which impliedly allows damage claims against Board
members and Board employees for actions undertaken in bad faith.
Second, he argues that neither the Board members nor the Board's
attorney are entitled to absolute immunity because they were not
acting in a guasi-judicial capacity when they engaged in the
conduct that forms the basis of Wang's claim. I find neither
argument persuasive.
Dr. Wang's first argument is plainly without merit.
Regardless of whether the State of New Hampshire has decided to
subject its officials to damages for certain state law claims,
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Wang v. NH Board of Reg. in Medicine CV-91-685-B 09/23/93
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
John W. Wang, M.D.
v. No. 91-685-B
New Hampshire Board of Registration in Medicine, et al.
O R D E R
Dr. John W. Wang ("Dr. Wang") seeks injunctive relief,
declaratory relief, and damages arising from a decision of the
New Hampshire Board of Registration in Medicine ("the Board"),
revoking his license to practice medicine in New Hampshire. He
has sued the Board, its members in their individual and official
capacities, and the Board's attorney in his individual capacity.
The defendants have moved to dismiss Dr. Wang's claim against the
Board and its members in their official capacities on the ground
that these claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The
defendants also seek dismissal of Wang's individual capacity
claims on the ground that the defendants against whom these
claims have been brought are entitled to either absolute or good faith immunity.1 For the reasons that follow, I conclude that
the Eleventh Amendment bars Dr. Wang's claims for damages and
retrospective eguitable relief against the Board and its members
in their official capacities. I also conclude that the
individual capacity defendants are entitled to absolute immunity
with respect to plaintiff's damage claims. Thus, all that
remains for decision is Dr. Wang's claim for prospective
eguitable relief against the Board members.
FACTS2
Dr. Wang began practicing medicine in the United States when
he arrived in this country in 1967. He became licensed to
practice medicine in New Hampshire in 1983. In July 1988, in
defendants' motion to dismiss was filed in January 1992. Before the motion was decided, the court granted Dr. Wang's motion for a stay to allow him to seek state appellate review of the Board's order revoking his license to practice medicine. The New Hampshire Supreme Court subseguently summarily affirmed the Board's decision and the stay has now been lifted. Because state court proceedings have been concluded, defendants' argument that the court lacks jurisdiction to consider Dr. Wang's claims while state proceedings are pending and their contention that the court should abstain while the state proceedings are pending are moot.
2 The facts are drawn from Dr. Wang's Complaint. They are stated in the light most favorable to him and are assumed to be true for purposes of this order.
2 reliance on a decision of the Massachusetts Board of Medicine
revoking Wang's medical license, the Board revoked his New
Hampshire license. Shortly thereafter, Wang obtained a
preliminary injunction in state superior court preventing the
Board's decision from going into effect. He later obtained a
second order from the same court directing the Board to convene a
new hearing with different Board members before it took further
action against him. This order was later vacated. Meanwhile,
the Board appointed a prosecutor to investigate Wang. This
investigation culminated in additional charges and a new hearing
several years after the Board's July 1988 decision. The hearing
was replete with serious procedural errors that individually and
collectively deprived Wang of his right to due process.
Moreover, the Board members and their attorney acted with malice
and in bad faith in committing these due process violations.
When the complaint was filed in 1991, the Board had not yet
decided whether to revoke Dr. Wang's license. However, his New
Hampshire license was eventually revoked and the Board's decision
was subseguently affirmed by the New Hampshire Supreme Court.
3 DISCUSSION
A. Eleventh Amendment
Dr. Wang argues that the State of New Hampshire waived its
Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal court jurisdiction when
it waived sovereign immunity with respect to the claims at issue.
This argument misconstrues the nature of the immunity accorded by
the Eleventh Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has
observed that "[a]lthough a [s]tate's general waiver of sovereign
immunity may subject it to suit in state court, it is not enough
to waive the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment."
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985)
(citation omitted). Since Wang offers nothing else to support
his challenge to the defendants' Eleventh Amendment argument, his
objection is unavailing.
Dr. Wang argues that he is entitled to seek injunctive
relief against the Board members in their official capacities
because he contends that he is seeking prospective relief. I
agree. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims against state
officials in their official capacities for prospective eguitable
relief based upon violations of federal law. See Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 160 (1980); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167,
n.14 (1985). In determining whether a complaint seeks
4 prospective relief, the court must look to the substance of the
requested relief, rather than its form. Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265, 279 (1986). In the present case, although the
allegedly illegal actions resulting in the revocation of Dr.
Wang's license to practice medicine have concluded, the
revocation decision has a prospective effect that can be
addressed through equitable relief. That is to say. Dr. Wang
will continue to be denied the privilege of practicing medicine
in New Hampshire unless an injunction is issued by this court
directing the state to restore his license to practice medicine.
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar this type of relief against
state officials.3
B. Absolute Immunity
Dr. Wang makes two arguments in support of his contention
that the defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity.
First, he contends that the defendants' right to absolute
3 Viewing Dr. Wang's arguments under the liberal standard of review that is applied to a motion to dismiss, I reject defendants' argument that Wang's complaint fails to state a claim for equitable relief. Moreover, since it has not been raised by the defendants, I leave for another day the possibility that Wang may be estopped from asserting in this proceeding arguments that have been resolved against him in a related state court proceeding.
5 immunity from § 1983 claims is limited by N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
329:17 IX, which impliedly allows damage claims against Board
members and Board employees for actions undertaken in bad faith.
Second, he argues that neither the Board members nor the Board's
attorney are entitled to absolute immunity because they were not
acting in a guasi-judicial capacity when they engaged in the
conduct that forms the basis of Wang's claim. I find neither
argument persuasive.
Dr. Wang's first argument is plainly without merit.
Regardless of whether the State of New Hampshire has decided to
subject its officials to damages for certain state law claims,
the State lacks the authority to limit the immunity which federal
law grants to state officials with respect to claims based upon
federal law.
Dr. Wang's second argument also lacks merit.
Notwithstanding his argument to the contrary, this is not a case
where the Board members or its attorney acted in the "clear
absence of jurisdiction". Bettencourt v. Bd. of Reg, in
Medicine, 904 F.2d 772, 782 (1st Cir. 1990) (guoting Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1977) (citation omitted). Although
a Superior Court judge initially enjoined several of the Board
members from participating in the hearing against Dr. Wang, this
6 order was vacated prior to the hearing. Thus, in conducting a
license revocation hearing, the Board, its members and its
attorney were performing a function they were reguired to perform
under state law. The fact that they may have exercised this
authority in an unconstitutional manner does not deprive them of
any immunity they might otherwise have been entitled to claim.
I agree with defendants that this case is indistinguishable
from the recent opinion of the First Circuit Court of Appeals in
Bettencourt in which the court determined that the members of the
Massachusetts Board of Registration of Medicine and its staff
were entitled to absolute immunity from a claim for damages
brought by a physician whose license had been revoked by the
Board. See Bettencourt, 904 F.2d at 784. In the present case,
as in Bettencourt, the plaintiff's allegations are based directly
on guasi-judicial functions engaged in by the members of the
Board and its attorney. As such, the defendants are entitled to
absolute immunity with respect to these claims.
CONCLUSION
Dr. Wang's claims against the Board are dismissed because
they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. His claim for damages
against the Board members and the Board's attorney are barred by
7 the doctrine of absolute immunity. The sole remaining issue for
decision in this case is Wang's claim for prospective injunctive
relief against the Board members in their official capacities.
SO ORDERED.
Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge
September 23, 1993
cc: Vincent Martina, Esg. Daniel Mullen, Esg.