Wanfalt v. Burlington Bank and Trust

729 N.W.2d 828, 2007 Iowa App. LEXIS 50, 2007 WL 112556
CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
DecidedJanuary 18, 2007
Docket05-1898
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 729 N.W.2d 828 (Wanfalt v. Burlington Bank and Trust) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wanfalt v. Burlington Bank and Trust, 729 N.W.2d 828, 2007 Iowa App. LEXIS 50, 2007 WL 112556 (iowactapp 2007).

Opinions

[829]*829VOGEL, J.

Daniel and Dawn Wanfalt appeal the district court’s directed verdict in favor of the Burlington Bank and Trust (the Bank) on a claim for failing to execute a mandatory disclosure form pursuant to Iowa Code section 558A.1 (2003). After considering the record and arguments on appeal, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that this real estate transaction is excluded under the statute and affirm.

In 1997, the Bank acquired a mortgage from Gary and Beverly Marquardt in connection with the purchase-money financing of 21.56 acres of land with a dwelling unit near Morning Sun, Iowa. After the Mar-quardts experienced financial difficulties, the Bank accepted a quitclaim deed in lieu of foreclosure from the Marquardts for the property. Before the Bank was able to arrange for a resale of the property through an auction service or a realtor, the Wanfalts and another interested party contacted the Bank about purchasing the property. The Bank showed the Wanfalts the appraisal completed in March 2003, valuing the property at $130,000. The Bank asserted that none of its representatives had ever personally viewed the property before it was shown to the Wanfalts. The Wanfalts subsequently inspected the property on their own several times. The property included a seven-year-old manufactured home that was in extremely poor condition. Bank representatives claimed at trial that, during visits to the property with the Wanfalts, they pointed out all of the problems with the home the Bank knew of and expected the property to sell for only about half the value of the appraisal, or $60,000 to $70,000. The appraisal refers to the home intermittently as a “manufactured home” (two references) or as a “modular home” (eleven references). At some point, Dawn Wanfalt contacted Iowa State Bank to inquire about financing for the property. Dawn told Frances McElhinney at Iowa State Bank the home had a plate beside the front door. McElhinney explained that a plate meant it was a manufactured home, to which Dawn acknowledged she and Dan were aware of that fact. The Wanfalts eventually purchased the property for $121,500 after a private auction, bidding against the other interested party. The Wanfalts claim that when attempting to insure the property after the sale, they discovered for the first time that the home was a manufactured home rather than a modular home.

When this suit was originally filed in June 2004, the Wanfalts had named two additional defendants and several theories of recovery. By the time the matter proceeded to a jury trial in October 2005, only the Bank remained as a defendant, and only claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and failure to disclose pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 558A were litigated. At the close of the Wanfalt’s case in chief, the Bank moved for a directed verdict. The district court granted the motion as to the chapter 558A failure to disclose issue by finding as a matter of law that the transfer from the Bank to the Wanfalts was excluded under section 558A.1(4), because the bank had obtained the property by a deed in lieu of foreclosure. The only remaining claim submitted to the jury was fraudulent misrepresentation, on which the jury granted a defense verdict. The district court denied the Wanfalts’ post-trial motions to reconsider and for a new trial on the chapter 558A issue. The Wanfalts appeal only the grant of a directed verdict on this issue.

We review the district court’s rulings on motions for directed verdict for correction of errors at law. Yates v. Iowa West Racing Ass’n, 721 N.W.2d 762, 768 (Iowa [830]*8302006). Likewise, our standard of review on issues of statutory interpretation, including chapter 558A, is for errors at law. Jensen v. Sattler, 696 N.W.2d 582, 585 (Iowa 2005). When interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. Kohrt v. Yetter, 344 N.W.2d 245, 246 (Iowa 1984). We search for legislative intent as shown by what the legislature said, rather than what it should or might have said. Iowa R.App. P. 6.14(6)(to). With this in mind, we review the language of the statute and the objects sought to be accomplished. Slager v. HWA Corp., 435 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Iowa 1989). If the statute is ambiguous, we regard the consequences of a particular construction. Iowa Code § 4.6(5).

The Wanfalts argue that the district court erred when it interpreted chapter 558A as excluding the transfer of the property from the Bank to them. Iowa Code chapter 558A, known as the Real Estate Disclosure Act, requires

persons interested in transferring real estate to deliver a written disclosure statement to prospective buyers. Iowa Code § 558A.2. The disclosure statement must include certain information about the “condition and important characteristics and structures on the property” as provided in rules adopted by the real estate commission. Id. § 558A.4(1); see, e.g., Iowa Admin. Code r. 193E-14.1(6) (setting forth sample disclosure statement).

Jensen, 696 N.W.2d at 585. The district court concluded the subject transaction was excluded under section 558A.1, which reads:

4. “Transfer” means the transfer or conveyance by sale, exchange, real estate contract, or any other method by which real estate and improvements are purchased, if the property includes at least one but not more than four dwelling units. However, a transfer does not include any of the following:
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b. A. transfer to a mortgagee by a mortgagor or successor in interest who is in default, or a transfer by a mortgagee who has acquired real property at a sale conducted pursuant to chapter 651, a transfer back to a mortgagor exercising a right of first refusal pursuant to section 654.16A, a nonjudicial voluntary foreclosure procedure under section 654.18 or chapter 655A, or a deed in lieu of foreclosure under section 654.19.

Iowa Code § 558A.l(4)(b) (emphasis added).

The district court reasoned the confusing syntax of that section should be interpreted so that the phrase “or a deed in lieu of foreclosure under section 654.19” modifies the earlier phrase “or a transfer by a mortgagee who has acquired real property....” This construction has some practical appeal so that all parts of subsection b are afforded a logical and reasonable meaning, consistent with one of the purposes of the statute, see State v. Pickett, 671 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Iowa 2003) (summarizing the rules of statutory construction), which is to relieve commercial lenders that do not occupy residential property, and to which they hold title only for security purposes, from the disclosure requirements of chapter 558A. We could affirm the district court under its rationale and statutory construction, but we may also affirm for a slightly different reason, as follows.

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729 N.W.2d 828, 2007 Iowa App. LEXIS 50, 2007 WL 112556, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wanfalt-v-burlington-bank-and-trust-iowactapp-2007.