NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 250310-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-25-0310 April 21, 2026 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
BRADLEY WALTERS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Ogle County THE OGLE COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, ) No. 24LA19 Defendant-Appellee. ) ) Honorable ) Anthony Peska, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE VANCIL delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Doherty and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss where plaintiff failed to allege a constitutional claim pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
¶2 Plaintiff, Bradley Walters, is a federal detainee housed at the Ogle County jail
while awaiting trial for federal criminal charges. In December 2024, plaintiff filed a first
amended complaint against defendant, the Ogle County Sheriff’s Office (Sheriff’s Office),
alleging various constitutional violations under section 1983 of the federal Civil Rights Act (42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2024)). The Sheriff’s Office filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the
trial court granted with prejudice.
¶3 Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his civil rights complaint. We affirm.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 In May 2024, plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to section 1983 against the Sheriff’s Office, Sergeant William White, Molly Engelkes (a nurse practitioner), and Stacy
Cavanaugh (a nurse) (collectively, the original defendants). Plaintiff identified himself as a
federal detainee who was being held at the Ogle County jail. White was an employee of the
Sheriff’s Office in charge of grievances in the jail. Engelkes and Cavanaugh were medical staff
at the jail.
¶6 The complaint alleged the original defendants violated plaintiff’s (1) first
amendment (U.S. Const., amend. I) rights by not allowing him to complete the grievance and
appeal process and ignoring his grievances, (2) fifth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. V) rights
by denying him medical care, and (3) fourteenth amendment right to equal protection (U.S.
Const., amend. XIV) by denying him reasonable medical care. Plaintiff also alleged medical
negligence, medical indifference, negligence by lack of oversight, and negligence by failing to
abide by Sheriff’s Office policy.
¶7 The original defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to
section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2024)).
¶8 In December 2024, before the trial court ruled on the original defendants’ motion
to dismiss, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint, which attached his
first amended complaint. The court granted plaintiff’s motion, dismissed plaintiff’s original
complaint, and dismissed the original defendants’ motion to dismiss as moot. Plaintiff’s first
amended complaint named only the Sheriff’s Office as defendant. No documents were attached
to the first amended complaint, although the complaint referenced exhibits.
¶9 In his first amended complaint, plaintiff alleged the Sheriff’s Office violated his
first amendment rights by failing to address his grievances and not allowing him to exhaust his
legal remedies in order to seek judicial review. Plaintiff also alleged the Sheriff’s Office violated
-2- his fifth amendment due process rights and fourteenth amendment equal protection rights
through his conditions of confinement and by denying him proper medical care.
¶ 10 The facts as presented in plaintiff’s first amended complaint are as follows.
Plaintiff was transferred to the Ogle County jail in November 2023. At the time of his transfer,
he was under the care of two doctors, including Dr. Nathan Norem with Mercyhealth. On
plaintiff’s behalf, defendant submitted a request to the United States Marshals Service (U.S.
Marshals) for plaintiff to get surgery on his right ankle. The U.S. Marshals denied the surgery
but requested more information about plaintiff’s condition, including a recommendation for
surgery from Dr. Norem. Plaintiff filed a grievance requesting defendant contact Dr. Norem and
request a letter recommending surgery. Defendant refused to contact Dr. Norem. Plaintiff
simultaneously filed a medical request for the medical department to contact Dr. Norem for the
letter of recommendation. The request was denied, referencing the aforementioned grievance.
Plaintiff alleged the failure by defendant to follow the instructions from the U.S. Marshals and
contact Dr. Norem resulted in plaintiff experiencing continued pain, increased mobility issues,
and extended suffering.
¶ 11 Plaintiff was prescribed gabapentin, a nerve pain medication, by a doctor
contracted with the Winnebago County jail prior to his transfer. After his arrival at the Ogle
County jail, defendant refused to provide plaintiff with the prescribed medication. Defendant
delayed and rescheduled plaintiff’s appointment with Dr. Norem from April 14, 2024, to May 7,
2024, so defendant could contact Dr. Norem and notify him not to prescribe gabapentin to
plaintiff. Rather than providing plaintiff with gabapentin, defendant prescribed plaintiff the
antidepressant Cymbalta, which plaintiff referred to as a “ ‘happy pill.’ ” Plaintiff eventually
refused to take Cymbalta. Plaintiff alleged it was defendant’s policy to deny inmates gabapentin.
-3- ¶ 12 Plaintiff further alleged it was defendant’s “widespread policy” to punish any
inmate who requested medical attention or services “beyond cold tabs, Asprin [sic], or
bandaids.” Defendant placed inmates who requested a flu shot into restrictive housing or solitary
confinement. It was the policy of the Ogle County jail to defer any medically necessary treatment
until the inmate was released or transferred. Defendant failed to provide plaintiff with a
treatment plain until he filed a complaint with the court. Plaintiff cited his complaint in Ogle
County case No. 24-LA-24 and another inmate’s case in Ogle County case No. 24-LA-44 as
examples of defendant’s policy of violating inmate’s rights until a complaint was filed. In the
other inmate’s case, plaintiff alleged the inmate filed a complaint alleging excessive solitary
confinement, and he was released from solitary confinement after the complaint was filed with
the court.
¶ 13 Plaintiff also asserted his medical requests were closed without response and his
grievances ignored. Plaintiff alleged he filed grievances pursuant to the medical requests, the
grievance process itself, and his conditions of confinement.
¶ 14 The Sheriff’s Office filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to
section 2-615 of the Code (id.). Defendant emphasized its identity as a municipal entity.
Therefore, it asserted, plaintiff would need to present a section 1983 claim under the framework
of Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
As to each of plaintiff’s claims, defendant argued he failed to allege sufficient facts to state a
cause of action under section 1983 against defendant and defendant cannot be held liable for the
actions of its employees. Defendant also noted plaintiff failed to comply with section 2-603(b) of
the Code, which requires “[e]ach separate cause of action upon which a separate recovery might
be had shall be stated in a separate count.” 735 ILCS 5/2-603(b) (West 2024).
-4- ¶ 15 Plaintiff filed a response to the motion to dismiss, in which he included factual
details not included in his first amended complaint.
¶ 16 The trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss. After the hearing, the
court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss with prejudice.
¶ 17 This appeal followed.
¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 19 On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to
dismiss his complaint. Specifically, plaintiff contends his complaint demonstrated viable claims
under section 1983 for violations of his first, fifth, and fourteenth amendment rights.
¶ 20 A. Dismissal Pursuant to Section 2-615
¶ 21 Plaintiff’s amended complaint was dismissed under section 2-615 of the Code (id.
§ 2-615). A motion to dismiss under section 2-615 attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint.
Grant v. State, 2018 IL App (4th) 170920, ¶ 12. When a section 2-615 motion to dismiss is filed,
the movant argues the facts pleaded by the plaintiff do not state a cause of action. Id.
¶ 22 When considering the sufficiency of a complaint on review, we construe its
allegations “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff” and “accept as true all well-pleaded facts
and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts.” Marshall v. Burger King
Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 429 (2006). “A complaint should be dismissed under section 2-615 only if
it is clearly apparent from the pleadings that no set of facts can be proved that would entitle the
plaintiff to recovery.” Grant, 2018 IL App (4th) 170920, ¶ 12.
¶ 23 Additionally, “Illinois is a fact-pleading jurisdiction.” Marshall, 222 Ill. 2d at
429; see Kucinsky v. Pfister, 2020 IL App (3d) 170719, ¶ 55 (stating Illinois is a fact-pleading
jurisdiction and “[f]act pleading imposes a heavier burden on the plaintiff, so that a complaint
-5- that would survive a motion to dismiss in a notice-pleading jurisdiction (e.g., in federal court)
might not do so in a fact-pleading jurisdiction”). Thus, “[w]hile the plaintiff is not required to set
forth evidence in the complaint [citation], [he or she] must allege facts sufficient to bring a claim
within a legally recognized cause of action [citation], not simply conclusions.” Marshall, 222 Ill.
2d at 429-30.
¶ 24 “In determining whether a cause of action has been stated, the whole complaint
must be considered.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kucinsky, 2020 IL App (3d) 170719,
¶ 56. We review an order granting a section 2-615 motion to dismiss de novo. Grant, 2018 IL
App (4th) 170920, ¶ 12. Ultimately, “[w]e may affirm an order dismissing a complaint on any
basis supported by the record, regardless of the trial court’s reasoning.” Kucinsky, 2020 IL App
(3d) 170719, ¶ 34.
¶ 25 B. Section 1983
¶ 26 “Section 1983 protects citizens’ constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities
from being infringed by state actors.” Bilski v. Walker, 392 Ill. App. 3d 153, 157 (2009). “[T]o
establish a section 1983 cause of action, the plaintiff must show that (1) a person acting under
color of state law committed the conduct complained of and (2) such conduct deprived him of
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution or the laws of the United States.” Id.
¶ 27 “Municipalities and other local governmental units are ‘persons’ within the
meaning of section 1983.” Redwood v. Lierman, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 1086 (2002) (citing
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). However, the Supreme Court has held that respondeat superior
liability does not exist under section 1983, stating:
“[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely
by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy
-6- ***, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly
be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an
entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
A local governmental unit may be liable for damages under section 1983 if the alleged
unconstitutional act is caused by “(1) an official policy adopted and promulgated by its officers;
(2) a governmental practice or custom that, although not officially authorized, is widespread and
well settled; or (3) an official with final policy-making authority.” Thomas v. Cook County
Sheriff’s Department, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). “A
widespread custom claim requires showing that the conduct essentially constituted a
governmental policy and was not an isolated incident.” DPH Aurora Properties, LLC v. City of
Aurora, 2025 IL App (2d) 240540, ¶ 67 (citing Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 380 (7th Cir.
2005)). Further, even if the plaintiff identifies a policy or practice of the municipal defendant, he
must also “demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving
force’ behind the injury alleged.” (Emphasis in original.) Board of County Commissioners of
Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). In other words, “a plaintiff must
show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must
demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal
rights.” Id.
¶ 28 A county sheriff’s office is a municipal entity and is ostensibly a viable defendant
for a section 1983 Monell claim. See Ruffino v. Sheahan, 218 F.3d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 2000) (“In
Illinois, the office of the Sheriff as an institutional matter is also ordinarily a suable entity under
§ 1983.”).
¶ 29 In his reply brief, plaintiff contends Monell has no barring on his complaint
-7- because he is a federal detainee held in a county jail. According to plaintiff, because the Sheriff’s
Office has an agreement with the federal government to house plaintiff in exchange for a
financial benefit, Monell cannot limit his complaint. Plaintiff is incorrect. No agreement or
financial benefit, nor plaintiff’s status as a federal detainee in a county jail, can change the
application of Monell to a section 1983 claim.
¶ 30 C. This Case
¶ 31 On appeal, plaintiff contends he presented viable claims against the Sheriff’s
Office for violations of his rights under the first, fifth, and fourteenth Amendments.
¶ 32 1. Well-Pleaded Facts
¶ 33 We must first note what facts are relevant to this appeal. Plaintiff’s brief on
appeal contains a detailed account of his time in the Ogle County jail, including specific actions
of various staff members of the Ogle County jail, far beyond the scope of his first amended
complaint.
¶ 34 “[T]he question presented by a section 2-615 motion to dismiss is whether the
plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts in the complaint which, if proved, would entitle the plaintiff
to relief.” (Emphasis in original.) Hough v. Kalousek, 279 Ill. App. 3d 855, 862 (1996). “The
complaint must sufficiently set forth every essential fact to be proved.” Id. A trial court’s ruling
on a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 “may not consider facts outside the four corners
of the complaint.” Liddle v. Salem School District. No. 600, 249 Ill. App. 3d 768, 770 (1993).
This includes the facts plaintiff set forth in his response to defendant’s motion to dismiss.
¶ 35 Additionally, we cannot consider the facts alleged in plaintiff’s original
complaint, which was filed against various staff members of Ogle County jail in addition to the
Sheriff’s Office. “Where an amendment is complete in itself and does not refer to or adopt the
-8- prior pleading, the earlier pleading ceases to be a part of the record for most purposes, being in
effect abandoned and withdrawn.” Bowman v. Lake County, 29 Ill. 2d 268, 272 (1963). Here, the
trial court expressly dismissed plaintiff’s original complaint when it granted him leave to file his
proposed first amended complaint.
¶ 36 The background presented by plaintiff in his brief on appeal contains many facts
which were not present in the first amended complaint at issue on appeal. Our “sole task is to
determine whether the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to set forth a cause of action for
which relief may be granted.” (Emphasis added.) Baker v. Miller, 159 Ill. 2d 249, 255 (1994).
We therefore disregard any facts plaintiff has alleged on appeal which do not appear in the first
amended complaint, including those facts only present in his original complaint or in his
response to the motion to dismiss.
¶ 37 2. Monell Claim
¶ 38 In his first amended complaint, plaintiff named only the Sheriff’s Office, in its
individual and official capacity, as a defendant. The Sheriff’s Office is not an individual, but a
municipal entity, and therefore plaintiff was required to state a Monell claim to allege section
1983 claims against defendant. See Ruffino, 218 F.3d at 700.
¶ 39 In his first amended complaint, plaintiff alleged the Sheriff’s Office violated his
first, fifth, and fourteenth amendment rights to due process, equal protection, access to the
courts, and redress of his grievances. Plaintiff specifically alleged defendant had policies of
(1) denying gabapentin to all inmates, (2) punishing any inmate who requested medical treatment
beyond cold tabs, aspirin, or Band-Aids, (3) deferring necessary medical care until an inmate is
released or transferred, (4) refusing to provide a treatment plan to inmates, and (5) violating
inmates’ rights until a complaint is filed in court. Plaintiff also alleged he received inadequate
-9- medical care, his grievances were ignored or denied, and he was not allowed to exhaust his
administrative remedies.
¶ 40 First, we note plaintiff made several allegations of Ogle County jail staff taking
actions which violated his constitution rights. Although plaintiff did not explicitly plead a claim
based on respondeat superior, the law is clear respondeat superior does not apply in section
1983 claims. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (“[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983
for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.”). Any claim representing defendant is
responsible for the actions of its employees is not viable.
¶ 41 a. Grievance Process Claims
¶ 42 Plaintiff asserted several claims in relation to how his grievances were handled.
First, it is imperative to note that inmates do not have a constitutional right to a grievance
process. See Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding prison grievance
procedures are not mandated by the first amendment); Daniel v. Cook County, 833 F.3d 728, 736
(7th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he Constitution does not require that jails or prisons provide a grievance
procedure at all, nor does the existence of a grievance procedure create a constitutionally
guaranteed right.”). To the extent that any argument as to a constitutional deprivation could be
made, plaintiff failed to allege any official or unofficial policy existed which led to his
grievances being ignored or denied. Plaintiff gave very little information on the grievances other
than that they were filed. The only grievance plaintiff mentions with any specificity was the
grievance requesting defendant contact Dr. Norem after his surgery request was denied by the
U.S. Marshals. Beyond that information, his first amended complaint does not give any reason
grievances were filed or denied. Rather, plaintiff’s first amended complaint suggests that,
because he filed unsuccessful grievances, his rights were violated. This is woefully insufficient
- 10 - to suggest any constitutional wrongdoing, much less a constitutional wrongdoing which
originated from a policy of the Sheriff’s Office. See Marshall, 222 Ill. 2d at 429-30; Thomas,
604 F.3d at 303; see also Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 424 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[I]f no
constitutional violation occurred in the first place, a Monell claim cannot be supported.”).
¶ 43 Insofar as plaintiff alleges the denial or disregarding of his grievances resulted in
an inability to access the courts, plaintiff has not pointed to any instance when he was unable to
access the courts. In order to demonstrate a claim for violation of his right of access to the courts,
plaintiff must, in part, show “he suffered an actual injury, defined as actual prejudice to existing
or impending litigation.” Romero v. O’Sullivan, 302 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1037 (1999). Plaintiff
only offers the vague implication that he may have attempted to bring his grievances to the court.
“A plaintiff seeking damages under [section] 1983 must allege an actual deprivation of rights
resulting from the defendants’ acts; mere possibility of remote or speculative injury or invasion
of rights is insufficient.” Grassini v. DuPage Township, 279 Ill. App. 3d 614, 623 (1996).
Further, and most importantly, plaintiff has failed to allege there was a policy, custom, or
practice in place which denied him access to the courts.
¶ 44 As plaintiff failed to plead any policy, custom, or practice of defendant existed
which resulted in a violation of any constitutional right pertaining to how his grievances were
handled, he has failed to properly bring a claim against defendant pursuant to Monell, and the
trial court did not err in dismissing his grievance claims against the Sheriff’s Office under
section 2-615. See Grant, 2018 IL App (4th) 170920, ¶ 12.
¶ 45 b. Conditions of Confinement
¶ 46 Plaintiff also made several claims as to the conditions of his confinement in Ogle
County jail, particularly the medical care he received. Plaintiff alleged it was the policy of the
- 11 - Sheriff’s Office to (1) deny the medication gabapentin to all inmates, (2) punish any inmate who
requested medical treatment beyond cold tabs, aspirin, or Band-Aids, (3) defer necessary medical
care until an inmate is released or transferred, (4) refuse to provide a treatment plan to inmates,
and (5) violate inmates’ constitutional rights until a complaint is filed in court.
¶ 47 Conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees are derived from the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1). Miranda v. County of Lake,
900 F.3d 335, 350 (7th Cir. 2018). Whether conditions of detention for pretrial detainees are
constitutional depends upon whether “those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.”
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). “Not every disability imposed during pretrial
detention amounts to ‘punishment’ in the constitutional sense.” Id. at 537. That detention of a
pretrial detainee “interferes with the detainee’s understandable desire to live as comfortably as
possible and with as little restraint as possible during confinement does not convert the
conditions or restrictions of detention into ‘punishment.’ ” Id.
¶ 48 On appeal, plaintiff alludes to the “deliberate indifference” standard for his
medical condition-of-confinement claims. Federal courts have used this standard, grafted from
the eighth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. VIII), to analyze pretrial condition-of-confinement
claims, which required a plaintiff to show “(1) the harm to the plaintiff was objectively serious;
and (2) the official was deliberately indifferent to her health or safety.” Board v. Farnham, 394
F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005); Miranda, 900 F.3d at 350 (noting pretrial detainees were “entitled
to at least” as much protection as the eighth amendment offered). However, the Seventh Circuit
recently determined the Supreme Court’s decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389
(2015), should be extended and all pretrial condition-of-confinement claims against individuals
should be analyzed under an objective reasonableness standard. See Miranda, 900 F.3d at 352-
- 12 - 53; Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2019). Under the objective reasonableness
standard adopted by the Seventh Circuit, a plaintiff must show, beyond harm and causation, “that
the conditions in [the jail] posed an objectively serious threat to his health; that the officers’
response was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances; and that they acted purposely,
knowingly, or recklessly with respect to the consequences of their actions.” Mays v. Emanuele,
853 Fed. Appx. 25, 26-27 (7th Cir. 2021).
¶ 49 So far, Illinois courts have not weighed in on this shift in standards, and federal
circuits are split on the application of Kingsley. See Miranda, 900 F.3d at 351 (noting the Ninth
and Second Circuits have extended Kingsley to other condition-of-confinement claims, but the
Eighth, Eleventh, and Fifth Circuits have confined Kingsley to pretrial excessive-force
allegations). However, both the objective reasonableness standard and the deliberate indifference
standard are framed for section 1983 claims raised against individuals. In this case, plaintiff did
not raise the claim against an individual, and Monell still applies. Therefore, plaintiff must allege
enough facts to show a viable claim that the Sheriff’s Office was the moving force behind the
injury alleged, as well as enough facts to support a claim under the elements of the objective
reasonableness standard or deliberate indifference standard. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 404. If
plaintiff cannot demonstrate the Sheriff’s Office was the moving force behind his alleged
violation, he cannot sustain a civil rights claim under either standard.
¶ 50 Turning to plaintiff’s specific claims, plaintiff first contends it was the policy of
the Sheriff’s Office to deny gabapentin to “the Plaintiff, and all inmates of the Ogle County Jail.”
Plaintiff does not elaborate on any official policy in place which denies inmates gabapentin or
any other medication. Nor did he demonstrate a widespread custom resulted in the denial of his
medication. The complaint makes no reference to any other instance of an inmate being denied
- 13 - gabapentin. Although there is no bright-line rule defining a widespread practice or custom by the
number of occurrences, generally, there must be more than one instance. See DPH Aurora
Properties, LLC, 2025 IL App (2d) 240540, ¶ 67 (“A widespread custom claim requires showing
that the conduct essentially constituted a governmental policy and was not an isolated
incident.”); Thomas, 604 F.3d at 303 (“[T]here is no clear consensus as to how frequently such
conduct must occur to impose Monell liability, except that it must be more than one instance[ ]
[citation], or even three.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). On the facts in the complaint, we
can accept as true at this stage that plaintiff had been prescribed gabapentin at another facility
and that medical staff at the Ogle County jail refused to provide plaintiff with gabapentin. There
is no suggestion beyond plaintiff’s conclusory claim that any other inmate was denied any
medication, much less that medication was denied due to an official or unofficial policy of the
Sheriff’s Office.
¶ 51 Similarly, plaintiff alleged the Sheriff’s Office had a policy of punishing any
inmate who requested medical treatment beyond “cold tabs, Asprin [sic], or bandaids.” Yet,
plaintiff did not offer a single example of any inmate, including himself, being punished for
seeking medical attention. Plaintiff did allege an inmate would be placed in restrictive housing or
solitary confinement for requesting a seasonal flu shot, referencing exhibits which were not
included with his complaint. Even if we assume such a policy existed, plaintiff did not allege he
or anyone else avoided getting a flu shot or requested a flu shot and was actually placed in
restrictive housing or solitary confinement. Without an actual constitutional violation, plaintiff
cannot sustain a claim against the Sheriff’s Office. See Petty, 754 F.3d at 424 (“[I]f no
constitutional violation occurred in the first place, a Monell claim cannot be supported.);
Grassini, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 623 (“[M]ere possibility of remote or speculative injury or invasion
- 14 - of rights is insufficient.”).
¶ 52 Next, plaintiff alleged the Sheriff’s Office would defer necessary medical care
until an inmate was transferred or released. However, plaintiff does not point to any actual
instance when his medical care was deferred. Plaintiff noted his appointment with Dr. Norem
was delayed from April 17, 2024, to May 7, 2024, but plaintiff alleged this appointment was
rescheduled so jail staff could contact Dr. Norem to direct him to deny plaintiff gabapentin. A
single appointment rescheduled by three weeks is not at all suggestive of a systematic deferring
of medical care. See DPH Aurora Properties, LLC, 2025 IL App (2d) 240540, ¶ 67. As to
plaintiff’s potential surgery, it was not the Sheriff’s Office which denied the surgery. Plaintiff
stated in his complaint that the medical department submitted his request for surgery to the U.S.
Marshals. The U.S. Marshals then denied the surgery, though it gave plaintiff the option to
provide more documentation. If it was the policy of the Sheriff’s Office to defer necessary
medical care until an inmate was released or transferred, it follows plaintiff’s request for surgery
would not have been submitted in the first place. Further, even if employees of the jail did not
assist plaintiff in getting more documentation after the U.S. Marshals denied the surgery request,
plaintiff still provided no facts to suggest this was due to a policy, practice, or custom in place.
See Brown, 520 U.S. at 404.
¶ 53 Finally, plaintiff alleged it was the policy of the Sheriff’s Office to violate
inmates’ rights until they filed a complaint in court. It is not entirely clear which rights plaintiff
is referring to here. Plaintiff includes this claim in the context of his other claims the Sheriff’s
Office failed to provide him with a treatment plan. However, as examples of the alleged policy,
plaintiff points to another complaint he filed, which he does not explain, and a complaint filed by
another inmate. According to plaintiff, the other inmate filed a complaint that he received
- 15 - excessive solitary confinement, and the inmate was released from solitary confinement after the
complaint was filed. First, plaintiff’s undiscussed other complaint and one instance of an inmate
filing a complaint over alleged solitary confinement misuse is insufficient to demonstrate an
overt policy or widespread custom of continuing constitutional violations until an inmate’s
concerns reach the court. See Thomas, 604 F.3d at 303. Only the solitary confinement case
confidently raises a potential constitutional issue, and even so, we do not know why that inmate
was placed in solitary confinement nor why he was removed. But regardless, plaintiff still failed
to explain what constitutional violation was actually occurring that the supposed policy of the
Sheriff’s Office was allowing to continue. See Petty, 754 F.3d at 424 (“[I]f no constitutional
violation occurred in the first place, a Monell claim cannot be supported.). Plaintiff alleged he
was not provided a treatment plain until he filed a complaint with the court, which “would
include doctor’s [appointments], physical therapy, [proper] medication[,] and discussions about
the injury.” However, we can contemplate no constitutional right to a documented “treatment
plan.” Certainly, plaintiff has not adequately alleged a connection between his claim he was not
given a treatment plan and the other inmate’s claim of excessive solitary confinement to even
suggest an actual policy or practice of the Sheriff’s Office.
¶ 54 As with his grievance claims, plaintiff has failed to (1) adequately plead any
policy, custom, or practice of the Sheriff’s Office existed which resulted in a violation of any
constitutional right pertaining to his conditions of confinement and (2) properly bring a claim
against defendant pursuant to Monell. As such, the trial court did not err in dismissing his
condition-of-confinement claims against the Sheriff’s Office under section 2-615. See Grant,
2018 IL App (4th) 170920, ¶ 12.
¶ 55 III. CONCLUSION
- 16 - ¶ 56 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 57 Affirmed.
- 17 -