Walter F. Greer v. Gesa Credit Union et al.

Opinion

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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT SEATTLE 7 WALTER F. GREER, CASE NO. 2:26-cv-00959-JNW 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ v. 10 GESA CREDIT UNION et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Gesa Credit Union’s 14 (“Gesa”) and Bellevue Nissan’s (“Nissan”) motions to dismiss, Dkt. Nos. 6, 7, pro se 15 Plaintiff Walter F. Greer’s complaint, which Gesa removed from King County 16 Superior Court, Dkt. No. 1. The motions are unopposed. The Court has considered 17 the motions, reviewed the complaint, and GRANTS the motions for the reasons 18 stated below. 19 1. LEGAL STANDARD 20 To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain “enough facts to 21 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 22 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 23 1 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 2 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

3 (2009) (citations omitted). The plausibility standard is less than probability, “but it 4 asks for more than a sheer possibility” that a defendant did something wrong. Iqbal, 5 556 U.S. at 678. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 6 defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 7 ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). In other words, a 8 plaintiff must plead “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-

9 me accusation.” Id. 10 When considering a motion to dismiss, courts must accept the complaint’s 11 factual allegations as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the 12 plaintiff. Lund v. Cowan, 5 F.4th 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2021). But courts “do not 13 assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of 14 factual allegations.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, 15 “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat

16 a motion to dismiss.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 17 A pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 18 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985). But liberal construction does not require the Court to 19 supply essential elements of a claim that are not pled. Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 20 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992). 21 2. DISCUSSION

22 Greer alleges in his two-page complaint that he is the holder of a legal 23 instrument and a negotiable instrument and that he seeks a court order to redeem 1 the negotiable instrument. Dkt. No. 1-5. Greer claims that “Defendant,” without 2 specifying which one, denied his “registered security,” “dishonored both securities,”

3 and “did not return the securities.” Id. He alleges that “Defendant knowingly made 4 untrue statements of material fact and/or omitted material facts necessary to make 5 the statements made misleading.” Id. (emphasis added). Greer’s complaint lists 6 state and federal securities laws, including the Washington Securities Act, RCW 7 21.20.010, .020, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Trust Indenture Act of 8 1939. Id.

9 The Court begins with subject-matter jurisdiction. On its face, the complaint 10 invokes federal law. That express reliance on federal statutes is enough to support 11 federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, but whether those statutes 12 state a claim on the facts alleged is a question for Rule 12(b)(6), not a question of 13 jurisdiction. See Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1314 (9th Cir. 1985) 14 (federal question jurisdiction may be based on violation of federal securities laws). 15 The complaint fails to give Defendants fair notice of the claims against them.

16 It does not identify the legal or negotiable instrument Greer relies on, explain his 17 relationship to Defendants, or describe the nature of the dispute. He asserts that 18 “Defendant” dishonored his registered securities, but the complaint never explains 19 what “dishonored” means and what securities are at issue. Even construing the 20 complaint liberally, as the Court must, the complaint lacks any cognizable legal 21 theory. Beyond its list of federal and state securities laws, the complaint alleges

22 only that “Defendant is in breach of fiduciary responsibility and has denied course 23 of remedy.” Dkt. No. 1-5. But Greer pleads none of the elements of a breach-of- 1 fiduciary-duty claim. Micro Enhancement Int’l, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 40 2 P.3d 1206, 1217 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that plaintiff must prove (1)

3 existence of a duty owed, (2) breach of that duty, (3) resulting injury, and (4) that 4 the claimed breach proximately caused the injury). 5 Accordingly, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED. Greer is 6 proceeding pro se, this is his first complaint, and pro se litigants are ordinarily 7 entitled to at least one opportunity to cure pleading deficiencies before dismissal 8 with prejudice. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). To cure the

9 deficiencies identified above, any amended complaint must identify the specific 10 instrument or instruments at issue, describe Greer’s relationship to each defendant, 11 and state what each defendant did that Greer contends was unlawful. 12 3. CONCLUSION 13 In sum, the Court ORDERS as follows: 14 1. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss, Dkt. Nos. 6, 7. 15 2. Plaintiff MUST file an amended complaint within FOURTEEN (14) 16 days of this order. 17 3. Failure to file a proper amended complaint within FOURTEEN (14) 18 days of this order will result in dismissal of this action without 19 prejudice. 20 4. The Clerk of Court is directed to note this matter on the Court’s 21 calendar for review 14 days from the date of this order. 22

23 1 Dated this 9th day of June, 2026. 2 a Jamal N. Whitehead 3 United States District Judge 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

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