Walsh v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedJune 14, 2017
Docket05-975
StatusUnpublished

This text of Walsh v. Secretary of Health and Human Services (Walsh v. Secretary of Health and Human Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Walsh v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, (uscfc 2017).

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS Filed: May 19, 2017 No. 05-975V

************************* WILLIAM WALSH and * CHRISTEN WALSH, parents of * S.W., a minor, * UNPUBLISHED OPINION Petitioners, * v. * Special Master Gowen * SECRETARY OF HEALTH * Attorneys’ Fees and Costs; AND HUMAN SERVICES, * Petitioners’ Costs; * Special Master’s Discretion Respondent. * * *************************

Ronald Homer, Conway, Homer & Chin-Caplan, P.C., Boston, MA for petitioner. Linda Sara Renzi, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC for respondent.

DECISION AWARDING ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS1

On September 9, 2005, William Walsh and Christen Walsh, on behalf of their son S.W. (“petitioners”), filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.2 [the “Vaccine Act” or “Program”]. Petitioners allege that as a result of a diphtheria-tetanus-acellular pertussis (“DTaP”) vaccine administered on September 19, 2002, S.W. suffered a seizure disorder and developmental delay. Stipulation at ¶ 4. In the alternative, petitioners allege that S.W.’s seizure disorder and

1 Because this unpublished decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, the undersigned intends to post this decision on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to delete medical or other information, that satisfies the criteria in § 300aa-12(d)(4)(B). Further, consistent with the rule requirement, a motion for redaction must include a proposed redacted decision. If, upon review, the undersigned agrees that the identified material fits within the requirements of that provision, she will delete such material from public access. 2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2012).

1 developmental delay were significantly aggravated by receipt of the DTaP vaccine. Id. On November 22, 2016, I issued a decision awarding compensation to petitioners based on the parties’ stipulation.

On May 12, 2017, petitioners filed a Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (“Petitioners’ Motion”). ECF No. 99. Petitioner requests attorneys’ fees in the amount of $69,658.00, attorneys’ costs in the amount of $16,907.33, and petitioner’s costs in the amount of $9,743.00. Id. Thus, the total amount requested is $96,308.33. Id. On May 12, 2017, petitioners filed their signed statement consistent with General Order #9 that they incurred $9,743.00 in costs related to the prosecution of this claim and that they paid no retainer to their counsel. ECF No. 98.

On May 18, 2017, respondent filed a Response to Petitioners’ Motion (Respondent’s Response). ECF No. 99. Respondent states he is “satisfied the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs are met in this case.” Id. at 2. He “respectfully recommends that the Special Master exercise his discretion and determine a reasonable award for attorneys’ fees and costs.” Id. at 3.

I. Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

The Vaccine Act permits an award of “reasonable attorneys’ fees” and “other costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa—15(e)(1). A petitioner need not prevail on entitlement to receive a fee award as long as petitioner brought the claim in “good faith” and with a “reasonable basis” to proceed. Id. In the present case, petitioners were awarded compensation pursuant to a joint stipulation agreement and are therefore entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Special Masters have “wide discretion in determining the reasonableness” of attorneys’ fees and costs. See Perreira v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 27 Fed. Cl. 29, 34 (1992), aff'd, 33 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Saxton v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Vaccine program special masters are also entitled to use their prior experience in reviewing fee applications”).

a. Attorneys’ Fees

The Federal Circuit has approved use of the lodestar approach to determine reasonable attorneys' fees and costs under the Vaccine Act. Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Using the lodestar approach, the court first determines “an initial estimate of a reasonable attorneys’ fee by ‘multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.’” Id. at 1347–58 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). Then, the court may make an upward or downward departure from the initial calculation of the fee award based on other specific findings. Id. at 1348.

Counsel must submit fee requests that include contemporaneous and specific billing records indicating the service performed, the number of hours expended on the service, and the name of the person performing the service. See Savin v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 85 Fed. Cl. 313, 316–18 (2008). Counsel should not include in their fee request hours that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Saxton, 3 F.3d 1517 at 1521 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). It is “well within the special master's 2 discretion to reduce the hours to a number that, in his experience and judgment, [is] reasonable for the work done.” Id. at 1522. Furthermore, the special master may reduce a fee request sua sponte, apart from objections raised by respondent and without providing petitioners with notice and opportunity to respond. See Sabella v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 86 Fed. Cl. 201, 209 (Fed. Cl. 2009). A special master need not engage in a line-by-line analysis of petitioner's fee application when reducing fees. See Broekelschen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 102 Fed. Cl. 719, 729 (Fed. Cl. 2011). Just as “[t]rial court courts routinely use their prior experience to reduce hourly rates and the number of hours claimed in attorney fee requests . . . [v]accine program special masters are also entitled to use their prior experience in reviewing fee applications.” Saxton, 3 F.3d at 1521 (citing Farrar v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 1992 WL 336502 at * 2-3 (Cl. Ct. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 2, 1992)).

i. Reasonable Hourly Rate

Petitioners request the following hourly rates:

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