Walling v. Woodruff

49 F. Supp. 52, 1942 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1947
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Georgia
DecidedSeptember 2, 1942
DocketNo. 93
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 49 F. Supp. 52 (Walling v. Woodruff) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Walling v. Woodruff, 49 F. Supp. 52, 1942 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1947 (M.D. Ga. 1942).

Opinion

DEAVER, District Judge.

Defendant resides at Columbus, within the Middle District of Georgia.

Prior to and since October 24, 1938, defendant has been the sole owner of radio station WATL in Atlanta, Georgia, and has operated said station in that city under the name of Atlanta Broadcasting Company, under the license of the Federal Communications Commission.

Defendant in operating said station is engaged in interstate commerce.

In addition to station WATL, defendant operates two other radio stations, one at Albany, Georgia, and one at Columbus, Georgia. Defendant personally has practically nothing to do with the actual operation of these stations, but operates them through his son, J. W. Woodruff, Jr., who has general authority in the conduct of said business and acts in all respects for the owner. In connection with the Atlanta station J. W. Woodruff, Jr., has the title of Executive Manager. He resides in Columbus, Georgia, and is not regularly present at the Atlanta station, but visits said station at irregular intervals. J. W. Wood-ruff, Jr., as executive manager, employs a local or station manager who actually supervises the operation of the Atlanta station.

In addition to a clerical force, there are employed a staff of radio announcers under the immediate supervision of a program director, who is chief announcer, and engineers or technicians under the immediate supervision of a chief engineer.

From October 24, 1938, to December 18, 1940, the local manager directly in charge of active operation was Maurice C. Coleman. Succeeding him, James M. Comer, Jr., was local manager until January 1, 1942. After that date James A. Davenport has acted as local manager. For a time Ken Keese was program director and James E. Cox was personnel manager.

Neither the defendant nor his son, the executive manager, has had any personal contacts or negotiations with employees in regard to the employer-employee relationship, but relied upon the local manager to handle all those matters under instructions of the executive manager.

Those employees who were covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq., had, prior to the effective-date of the act, been working for a stipulated weekly salary. Just before the effective date of the act, in order to bring said employees under the act on its effective date and to continue to pay them thereafter the same salary which they had been re[54]*54ceiving, the executive manager, after conference with the local manager, prepared a schedule showing the number of hours per week to be worked by each employee. The hours to be worked by an employee within a week was arrived at as follows:

Take the number of hours the employee worked within a selected prior week and divide that number into the weekly salary, the quotient being the regular hourly rate. Next, multiply that rate by 44, the number of hours under the statute to be worked at the regular rate. Then, subtract the resultant figure from the weekly salary. Then, divide the remainder by the overtime rate, the quotient being the number of hours in excess of 44 which the employee could work and thus earn the exact amount of his salary.

For example, if an employee had been working 50 hours a week at a salary of $15 per week, his hourly rate would be 30 cents. Then, 44 hours at 300 would be $13.20. Subtract $13.20 from $15 and the remainder is $1.80. Then, divide $1.80 by 450, the overtime rate, and the result is 4 hours. That 4 hours added to 44 hours amounts to 48 hours per week. For such employee, therefore, the schedule would show that he was to work 48 hours per week for his salary of $15.

Each employee knew he was coming under the Fair Labor Standards Act and he knew what his salary was to be and he knew the number of hours he was to work for that salary. He must have understood, therefore, that his hourly rate was such as, under the act, would amount to his salary for the number of hours in his schedule. In the example above stated the employee would know that in order to earn exactly $15 in 48 hours under the act, his rate would have to be 300 for 44 hours and 450 for the remaining 4 hours.

It was understood between the employer and the employee that, if the employee worked fewer hours than called for by his schedule, he was nevertheless to be paid the amount of his salary and that, if he worked more hours than called for by his schedule, he was to be paid time and one-half for the hours in excess of the scheduled hours. The number of hours was placed in the schedule for the purpose of fixing the hourly rate and for the purpose of serving as an elastic standard of working hours, it being recognized that the actual hours would run sometimes more and sometimes less than the number in the schedule. That arrangement amounted to the contract of employment. The executive manager turned the schedule over to the local manager and instructed him to put it into effect.

When the act went into effect the station continued to operate the same number of hours as before, namely, approximately 138 hours per week. No new employees were added immediately after the act became effective. The schedule called for a less number of hours for the employees to work than the estimated hours they had previously worked.

Each employee was instructed to keep his own time and was furnished with a time card on which he was to enter each day the hours he worked. Those cards were turned in to the bookkeeper and payment was made in accordance with the statute for all hours turned in. The schedule itself called for overtime hours in the sense that they exceeded the statutory work week of 44 hours, but pay for those overtime hours at time and one-half up to the number of hours in the schedule was included in the salary. The overtime complained of in this case is time worked in excess of the schedule hours.

Defendant, pursuant to the regulations of the Federal Communications Commission,, kept a program log, which purports to show a continuous record of all the time the station was “on the air”. The log was kept by the engineer on duty, who signed on and off when going on and off the air. The log-covers each minute the station is operating. Though not required to do so, the log shows the name of the announcer who is-“on the air” and for what periods of time. The log is not kept as a record of time for which employees are to be paid.

For more than two years after October,. 1938, the executive manager signed blank checks, so that pay for overtime in excess-of the schedule could be included by the-local manager in the salary checks.

When employees turned in hours in excess of their schedules, they would be paid' for it, but the executive manager would' constantly write the local manager for explanations. Then, the local manager from-time to time issued written instructions to the employees, two samples of which were put in evidence and, are as follows:

1. “WATL — Inter-Office Communication”'
“From Maurice C. Coleman at WATL.
Date: March 2, 1939.
“To Announcers:
“Under the Wages & Hours Act employees are to work forty-four hours a week. [55]*55and for all time over this time and a half will be paid. In order that some definite amount can be anticipated each week, Mr. Keese will post a schedule showing amount of overtime each announcer is to work.

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Bluebook (online)
49 F. Supp. 52, 1942 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1947, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walling-v-woodruff-gamd-1942.