Walling v. Ritter Food Stores
This text of 159 F.2d 35 (Walling v. Ritter Food Stores) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The administrator, alleging that the defendant, as to its central office and warehouse employees, had violated and was continuing to violate the minimum wage, overtime and record provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,1 and supporting his allegation by affidavit of one Talmadge P. Walker,2 sued for an injunction.
Defendant filed its answer alleging: that defendant is engaged in business solely as a retail establishment, the greater part of whose selling or servicing is in intra-state [36]*36commerce; and that, within the meaning of and as provided by Section 13 of the Fair Labor Standards Act,3 the invoked provisions do not apply to the employees of the central office and warehouse referred to in the complaint. Supporting the motion by affidavit4 of C. H. Ritter, its president, it also moved for summary judgment, and the parties agreeing that the affidavit of Walker attached to the complaint should be treated and considered by the court as the plaintiff’s affidavit in response to Ritter’s affidavit, the motion came on for hearing. Thereafter, deciding: that there was no genuine issue of fact to be determined; and that the defendant was engaged solely in carrying on and the employees were employed in a local retail establishment, as contended by defendant, the court granted defendant’s motion and gave summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
The administrator is here insisting that the district court erred:
“(1) In ruling that appellee’s employees employed in its central office and warehouse are employed in a retail establishment within the exemption provided by Section 13 (a) (2) of the Act.
“(2) In determining the applicability of the retail establishment exemption on ap-pellee’s motion for summary judgment.”
Appellee insists that the district judge was right throughout in holding, first, that the record made no genuine issue of fact, and, second, that, upon the undisputed [37]*37facts, the employees in question were employed in a local retail establishment within the meaning of and as provided by Section 213 (a) (2), 29 U.S.C.A.
The administrator supports his claim that there was a genuine issue of fact between him and the defendant by pointing to: (1) The definite and precise statements of fact in his complaint and in Walker’s affidavit; (2) the denials contained in defendant’s 6th, 7th, 8th and 10th defenses; (3) the denials and contradictions in Ritter’s affidavit of matters set out in Walker’s affidavit; and (4) the statement in the district judge’s memorandum that in reaching his conclusion, that there was no genuine issue of fact to be determined, he had excluded from consideration paragraphs 10 and 11 of Rit-ter’s affidavit, and that he had “taken Mr. Walker’s affidavit as true, except as to where it is clear that he was stating conclusions or facts about which he had no knowledge ” (Emphasis supplied)
In support of his position, that the court erred in ruling that defendant is engaged solely in conducting, and the employees in question are employed in, a retail establishment, the administrator relies on Phillips Co. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 65 S.Ct. 807, 808, 89 L.Ed. 1095, 157 A.L.R. 876; Fletcher v. Grinnel Bros., 6 Cir., 150 F.2d 337; and Walling v. Goldblatt, 7 Cir., 152 F.2d 475.
Appellee, on the issue of summary judgment, insists that the contradictions and denials on which the administrator relies as raising genuine issues of fact relate to matters not material to a decision of the cause and that on all material matters the evidence is without conflict. On the merits, he points out that the cases relied on by the administrator were, as shown by the quotation following, all true chain store cases:
The “warehouse and central office employees are performing wholesale duties in the very midst of the stream of interstate commerce. They constantly deal with both incoming and outgoing interstate shipments. Such tasks are completely unlike those pursued by employees of the small local retailers, who were the sole concern of Congress in Section 13 (a) (2). These duties, rather, are economically, functionally and physically like those of the independent wholesaler’s employees who, when engaged in interstate commerce, are admittedly entitled to the benefits of the Act.” Phillips v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 65 S.Ct. 807, 89 L.Ed. 1095, 157 A.L.R. 876, as quoted in Walling v. Goldblatt Bros., 7 Cir., 152 F.2d at page 478.
Insisting that such cases are without application, he declares that here there is but a single retail business, operating at five separate places indeed but none the less one retail store or establishment, served by a warehouse which is not in any sense a wholesale establishment, separate or otherwise, but a part of the retail business, a mere storage place for the goods retailed in the stores.
We agree with the administrator that, as presented in the court below, there were genuine conflicts on material issues of fact, and the motion for summary judgment should have been denied. We agree with him, too, that the judgment dismissing the complaint must be reversed and the case must be remanded for trial, on the controverted and determining question whether or not appellee’s warehouse and central office constitutes a wholesale establishment, the duties of whose employees “are economically, financially and physically like those of the independent wholesalers’ employees who when engaged in interstate commerce are admittedly entitled to the benefits of the act.” No useful purpose would, therefore, be served by an analysis on our part of the controverting affidavits or of the decisions on which appellant and appellee rely. It is sufficient to say that the law is authoritatively laid down in the three cases cited, supra, and that it will be for the district judge to apply the law as there laid down to the facts as found by him on retrial.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for trial anew in accordance herewith.
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159 F.2d 35, 1947 U.S. App. LEXIS 3052, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walling-v-ritter-food-stores-ca5-1947.