Wallace and Donnetta Duncan v. Commissioner

121 T.C. No. 17
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedNovember 24, 2003
Docket16607-97, 13579-98, 10022-02, 11095-02, 11313-02, 11324-02, 11326-02, 11327-02, 11338-02, 11339-02, 11441-02
StatusUnknown

This text of 121 T.C. No. 17 (Wallace and Donnetta Duncan v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wallace and Donnetta Duncan v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. No. 17 (tax 2003).

Opinion

121 T.C. No. 17

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

WALLACE AND DONNETTA DUNCAN, ET AL.,1 Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket Nos. 16607-97, 13579-98, Filed November 24, 2003. 10022-02, 11095-02, 11313-02, 11324-02, 11326-02, 11327-02, 11338-02, 11339-02, 11441-02.

Certain factual issues common to these consolidated cases have been submitted for voluntary

1 The following cases are consolidated herewith: Stevan B. Little, docket No. 13579-98; Edward J. and Lillian C. Lefevre, docket No. 10022-02; Frank M. and Maria B. Foley, docket No. 11095-02; Stephen M. and Linda M. Kirchner, docket No. 11313-02; Bernard and Sherley H. Koteen, docket No. 11324-02; Richard E. Briggs and Peggy E. Perry, docket No. 11326-02; Gregory S. and Susan H. Lewis, docket No. 11327-02; Estate of Marion Cornell, Deceased, Barbara A. Cornell, Administrator, and Barbara A. Cornell, docket No. 11338-02; Arthur D. and Hildegard B. Lewis, docket No. 11339-02; and Harvey B. Jacobson, Jr., docket No. 11441-02. - 2 -

binding arbitration pursuant to Rule 124. The arbitration agreement requires the parties to submit certain information to the arbitrator by a prescribed deadline and gives the arbitrator discretionary authority to request additional information. Ps made a timely submission of information to the arbitrator and another untimely submission to which R waived any objection on condition that Ps submit no additional information. Ps have moved to delay entering the arbitrator’s findings in the record on the ground that the arbitrator failed to request and consider certain additional information that they consider essential to their case. Held: Absent good cause, we shall not set aside the terms of an arbitration agreement. Ps’ motion is denied.

Moshe Schuldinger, for petitioners.

Roger W. Bracken and Avery B. Cousins III, for respondent.

OPINION

THORNTON, Judge: A primary issue in these consolidated

cases is the fair market value of numerous West Virginia natural

gas wells with respect to which petitioners claimed charitable

contribution deductions. The parties have agreed to resolve this

factual valuation issue by voluntary binding arbitration,

pursuant to Rule 124.2 The case is now before us on petitioners’

motion to delay entering the arbitrator’s findings in the record.

2 Unless otherwise indicated, all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. - 3 -

Background

On April 14, 2003, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Rule

124 Arbitration, moving that certain factual issues common to

these consolidated cases be submitted for voluntary binding

arbitration. Attached as an exhibit to the joint motion was the

parties’ arbitration agreement, executed by the parties’

representatives. On April 18, 2003, this Court granted the joint

motion.

In the arbitration agreement (reproduced in the appendix

hereto) the parties agreed, as relevant herein, to place “no

limitations on the materials or sources used by the Arbitrator”.

The arbitration agreement states:

Given the Arbitrator’s unique knowledge of the facts * * *, coupled with both parties’ confidence in the Arbitrator’s good faith and neutrality in this arbitration, the parties agree that there is no need for either party to submit testimony, expert reports, written summaries or affidavits supporting their respective positions to the Arbitrator. * * *

The parties agree that the Arbitrator may request that the parties clarify the Issues or request any additional information that the Arbitrator deems necessary, during any phase of the arbitration process provided all parties are notified of such requests and are given the opportunity to participate in any discussions. * * * [Emphasis added.]

Pursuant to the arbitration agreement, the arbitration

schedule began with a 30-day discovery period, during which

petitioners were required to provide previously requested

information to the arbitrator, and each party was to provide “any - 4 -

additional information * * * relevant and probative” to the

arbitral issues. At the conclusion of the 30-day discovery

period, if the arbitrator determined that he had sufficient

information to prepare findings, then a 30-day review period was

to commence. If the arbitrator determined that he did not have

sufficient information to prepare findings, then the 30-day

review period could be tolled for up to 30 days to allow the

arbitrator to request and the parties to provide additional

information. At the conclusion of the review period, the

arbitrator was required to provide his written findings to both

parties simultaneously. Within 10 days thereafter, the parties

were required to submit the arbitrator’s findings to the Court.

The 30-day discovery period began on May 5, 2003. In a

June 30, 2003, letter, the arbitrator advised the parties that he

was extending the initial 30-day discovery deadline from June 5

to July 1, 2003, after which “no additional information” could be

accepted. On June 13, 2003, petitioners submitted information to

the arbitrator. On July 6, 2003, 5 days after the extended

deadline, petitioners submitted additional information to the

arbitrator. Respondent alleges, and petitioners do not dispute,

that on July 24, 2003, the parties informally agreed that

respondent would not object to petitioners’ July 6, 2003,

submission as being untimely if petitioners would submit no

additional information to the arbitrator. - 5 -

On August 29, 2003, the arbitrator submitted his written

findings to the parties and the Court.3 On October 6, 2003,

petitioners filed a motion to delay entering the arbitrator’s

findings in the record. In their motion, petitioners note that

the arbitrator’s written findings include this statement:

Mr. Williams [petitioners’ consultant] correctly points out that if all of the behind-the-pipe reserves were immediately completed to produce, the discount for time would be greatly reduced. However, there has been no information provided to me that this practice had become a standard procedure in 1993, or even since that date. [Emphasis added.]

Petitioners argue that by failing to request the information

alluded to in the just-quoted passage, the arbitrator “reached

his conclusion as to the fair market value of the subject wells

without the benefit of * * * full and complete data and

information with respect to an essential element of Petitioners’

presentation.”

On October 23, 2003, respondent filed his opposition to

petitioners’ motion.

Discussion

Under Rule 124, “The parties may move that any factual issue

in controversy be resolved through voluntary binding

arbitration.” Rule 124(a). The parties must attach to their

motion requesting arbitration “a stipulation executed by each

3 Contrary to the terms of the arbitration agreement, the parties have not submitted the arbitrator’s written findings to the Court. - 6 -

party or counsel for each party” regarding the arbitral issues,

an agreement to be bound by the arbitrator’s findings, and other

matters related to the arbitration. Rule 124(b).

An arbitration agreement represents a contract between the

parties. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S.

938, 943 (1995); AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475

U.S. 643, 648 (1986); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior &

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Bluebook (online)
121 T.C. No. 17, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wallace-and-donnetta-duncan-v-commissioner-tax-2003.