Duncan v. Comm'r

121 T.C. No. 17, 121 T.C. 293, 2003 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 38
United States Tax Court·Decided November 24, 2003·No. No. 16607-97; No. 13579-98; No. 10022-02; No. 11095-02; No. 11313-02; No. 11324-02; No. 11326-02; No. 11327-02; No. 11338-02; No. 11339-02; No. 11441-02 ·Published·Cited by 4 cases

Opinion

OPINION

Thornton, Judge:

A primary issue in these consolidated cases is the fair market value of numerous West Virginia natural gas wells with respect to which petitioners claimed charitable contribution deductions. The parties have agreed to resolve this factual valuation issue by voluntary binding arbitration, pursuant to Rule 124.2 The case is now before us on petitioners’ motion to delay entering the arbitrator’s findings in the record.

Background

On April 14, 2003, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Rule 124 Arbitration, moving that certain factual issues common to these consolidated cases be submitted for voluntary binding arbitration. Attached as an exhibit to the joint motion was the parties’ arbitration agreement, executed by the parties’ representatives. On April 18, 2003, this Court granted the joint motion.

In the arbitration agreement (reproduced in the appendix hereto) the parties agreed, as relevant herein, to place “no limitations on the materials or sources used by the Arbitrator”. The arbitration agreement states:

Given the Arbitrator’s unique knowledge of the facts * * *, coupled with both parties’ confidence in the Arbitrator’s good faith and neutrality in this arbitration, the parties agree that there is no need for either party to submit testimony, expert reports, written summaries or affidavits supporting their respective positions to the Arbitrator. * * *
The parties agree that the Arbitrator may request that the parties clarify the Issues or request any additional information that the Arbitrator deems necessary, during any phase of the arbitration process provided all parties are notified of such requests and are given the opportunity to participate in any discussions. * * * [Emphasis added.]

Pursuant to the arbitration agreement, the arbitration schedule began with a 30-day discovery period, during which petitioners were required to provide previously requested information to the arbitrator, and each party was to provide “any additional information * * * relevant and probative” to the arbitral issues. At the conclusion of the 30-day discovery period, if the arbitrator determined that he had sufficient information to prepare findings, then a 30-day review period was to commence. If the arbitrator determined that he did not have sufficient information to prepare findings, then the 30-day review period could be tolled for up to 30 days to allow the arbitrator to request and the parties to provide additional information. At the conclusion of the review period, the arbitrator was required to provide his written findings to both parties simultaneously. Within 10 days thereafter, the parties were required to submit the arbitrator’s findings to the Court.

The 30-day discovery period began on May 5, 2003. In a June 30, 2003, letter, the arbitrator advised the parties that he was extending the initial 30-day discovery deadline from June 5 to July 1, 2003, after which “no additional information” could be accepted. On June 13, 2003, petitioners submitted information to the arbitrator. On July 6, 2003, 5 days after the extended deadline, petitioners submitted additional information to the arbitrator. Respondent alleges, and petitioners do not dispute, that on July 24, 2003, the parties informally agreed that respondent would not object to petitioners’ July 6, 2003, submission as being untimely if petitioners would submit no additional information to the arbitrator.

On August 29, 2003, the arbitrator submitted his written findings to the parties and the Court.3 On October 6, 2003, petitioners filed a motion to delay entering the arbitrator’s findings in the record. In their motion, petitioners note that the arbitrator’s written findings include this statement:

Mr. Williams [petitioners’ consultant] correctly points out that if all of the behind-the-pipe reserves were immediately completed to produce, the discount for time would be greatly reduced. However, there has been no information provided to me that this practice had become a standard procedure in 1993, or even since that date. [Emphasis added.]

Petitioners argue that by failing to request the information alluded to in the just-quoted passage, the arbitrator “reached his conclusion as to the fair market value of the subject wells without the benefit of * * * full and complete data and information with respect to an essential element of Petitioners’ presentation.”

On October 23, 2003, respondent filed his opposition to petitioners’ motion.

Discussion

Under Rule 124, “The parties may move that any factual issue in controversy be resolved through voluntary binding arbitration.” Rule 124(a). The parties must attach to their motion requesting arbitration “a stipulation executed by each party or counsel for each party” regarding the arbitral issues, an agreement to be bound by the arbitrator’s findings, and other matters related to the arbitration. Rule 124(b).

An arbitration agreement represents a contract between the parties. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995); AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960). Consequently, a stipulated arbitration agreement, like other stipulations in this Court, is governed by general principles of contract law, cf. Bankamerica Corp. v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 1, 12 (1997); Dorchester Indus. Inc. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 320, 330 (1997), affd. without published opinion 208 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2000); Stamos v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1451, 1455 (1986); Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 420, 435-436 (1969), and is enforceable, like other contracts, according to its terms and the parties’ intentions, see, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, supra at 947; Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63 (1995); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989). Absent good cause, we shall not set aside the terms of an arbitration agreement. Cf. Dorchester Indus. Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 334; Saigh v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 171, 176 (1956).

In the instant case, the arbitration agreement provides a schedule for submitting information to the arbitrator. After, the initial 30-day discovery deadline was extended from June 5 to July 1, 2003, petitioners made an untimely submission of information to the arbitrator on July 6, 2003. Respondent agreed to waive any objection to the untimeliness of this submission on the condition that petitioners submit no additional information. Now, apparently, petitioners wish to have the arbitrator consider additional information.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Duncan v. Comm'r, 121 T.C. No. 17, 121 T.C. 293, 2003 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 38 (tax 2003).

121 T.C. No. 17 (Duncan v. Comm'r) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Dutton v. Comm'r
122 T.C. No. 7 (U.S. Tax Court, 2004)
Wallace and Donnetta Duncan v. Commissioner
121 T.C. No. 17 (U.S. Tax Court, 2003)
Duncan v. Comm'r
121 T.C. No. 17 (U.S. Tax Court, 2003)