Walkup v. Wabash National Corp.

702 N.E.2d 713, 1998 Ind. LEXIS 610
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 9, 1998
Docket79S04-9808-CV-456
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 702 N.E.2d 713 (Walkup v. Wabash National Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Walkup v. Wabash National Corp., 702 N.E.2d 713, 1998 Ind. LEXIS 610 (Ind. 1998).

Opinion

ON PETITION TO TRANSFER

BOEHM, Justice.

We hold that recovery by an injured worker under an uninsured motorist policy that excludes coverage of claims eligible for worker’s compensation benefits is not subject to a lien in favor of the worker’s employer or its worker’s compensation carrier pursuant to Indiana Code § 22-3-2-13.

Factual and Procedural History

In 1994, David Walkup was injured in a motor vehicle accident while driving in the course of his employment for Wabash National Corporation (“Wabash”). Wabash self-insured its worker’s compensation obligation and paid $8,599 in benefits to Walkup’s health care providers.

Walkup then filed a personal injury suit against Jimmy Pruett, the driver of the other car involved in the accident. Pruett was uninsured, but the policy Wabash had obtained for itself and its drivers from Cincinnati Insurance Company (“Cincinnati”) included uninsured motorist coverage. That *714 coverage excluded any payments for worker’s compensation benefits in language quoted below. Wabash placed a lien on any recovery Walkup received from Pruett pursuant to Indiana Code § 22-3-2-13, which provides: “the employer or the employer’s compensation insurance carrier shall have a lien upon any settlement award, judgment or fund out of which the employee might be compensated from the third party.” Cincinnati agreed to pay Walkup $18,000 for, in the language of the parties’ stipulation of facts, “general damages.”

Wabash then asserted a lien against the settlement proceeds and ultimately sued Walkup to enforce the lien. The parties entered into a stipulation of facts, filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and waived hearing on the motions. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Wabash. Walkup appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Walkup v. Wabash Nat’l Corp., 691 N.E.2d 1282 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). We granted Walkup’s petition for transfer.

Walkup presents two issues:

(1) Is an uninsured motorist carrier an “other person” under Indiana Code § 22-3-2-13 governing a lien by a payor of worker’s compensation benefits on recovery from other persons?
(2) Is payment from an uninsured motorist carrier under an employer’s policy that explicitly excludes coverage for injuries subject to worker’s compensation benefits subject to a lien by the payor of worker’s compensation benefits?

Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when the designated evidence shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Because the parties stipulated to all material facts, this appeal turns on the construction of the worker’s compensation statutes and the Cincinnati policy, and presents only a question of law.

I. An Uninsured Motorist Carrier is an “Other Person”

Walkup argues that the “other person” and “third person” described in Indiana Code § 22-3-2-13 is the tortfeasor and not an uninsured motorist carrier such as Cincinnati. Wabash argues that Cincinnati is both an “other person” and a “third party” as meant by the statute. Indiana Code § 22-3-2-13 provides in part:

Whenever an injury or death, for which compensation is payable under chapters 2 through 6 of this article shall have been sustained under circumstances creating in some other person than the employer and not in the same employ a legal liability to pay damages in respect thereto, the injured employee, or his dependents, in case of death, may commence legal proceedings against the other person ... and judgment is obtained and paid, and accepted or settlement is made with the other person, either with or without suit, then from the amount received by the employee or dependents there shall be paid to the employer or the employer’s compensation insurance carrier, subject to its paying its pro-rata share of the reasonable and necessary costs and expenses of asserting the third party claim, the amount of compensation paid to the employee or dependents, plus the medical, surgical, hospital and nurses’ services and supplies and burial expenses paid by the employer or the employer’s compensation insurance carrier
If the injured employee or his dependents shall agree to receive compensation from the employer or the employer’s compensation insurance carrier or to accept from the employer or the employer’s compensation insurance carrier, by loan or otherwise, any payment on account of the compensation, or institute proceedings to recover the same, the employer or the employer’s compensation insurance carrier shall have a lien upon any settlement award, judgment or fund out of which the employee might be compensated from the third party.

Ind.Code § 22-3-2-13 (1998) (emphasis added).

*715 The Court of Appeals recently observed that nothing in the statute “expressly limits the phrase ‘other person’ to the tortfeasor’ ” and held that an underinsured motorist 1 carrier could be an “other person.” Ansert Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Ansert, 690 N.E.2d 305, 308 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). In An-sert, an employee injured in the course and scope of employment received a payment of $900,000 from the employer’s underinsured motorist carrier (“UIM”). The Court of Appeals held that “an employer or worker’s compensation carrier is entitled to a lien on [the] proceeds” of “payments made to an injured employee under a UIM policy.” Id., 690 N.E.2d at 310.

We agree with the Court of Appeals in this case and its decision in Ansert that an employer’s uninsured motorist carrier is an “other person” under Indiana Code § 22-3-2-13. The purpose of the statute is to make the employer or its carrier whole and prevent double recovery by the worker. If the third party tortfeasor is uninsured and the employer has provided coverage for that event there is no reason why that coverage should not respond as would Pruett’s if he had it. We express no opinion as to this analysis if the uninsured motorist coverage is purchased by the employee.

II. The Policy Exclusion for Worker’s Compensation Benefits

Walkup points to the policy exclusion and asserts that Wabash’s lien does not reach the payment from Cincinnati because the payment does not, by definition, include costs covered by worker’s compensation. The Cincinnati policy states: “insurance does not apply to: ... 2. The direct or indirect benefit of any insurer of self-insurer under any worker’s compensation, disability benefits or similar law.” Based on Cincinnati’s policy exclusion, its settlement with Walkup does not include costs covered by worker’s compensation benefits.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
702 N.E.2d 713, 1998 Ind. LEXIS 610, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walkup-v-wabash-national-corp-ind-1998.