Filed 9/21/26 Walkine v. Bromberg CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
ZACHARY WALKINE, B348516
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 25STCV04518)
v.
JASON S. BROMBERG et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jon R. Takasugi, Judge. Affirmed.
Park, Daniel E. Park, Wil J. Rios and Jason H. Holtman for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law + Brandmeyer, Kent T. Brandmeyer and Jacob S.
Rosenberg for Defendants and Respondents.
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Plaintiff Zachary Walkine alleges that, in the midst of a dispute with his ex-wife Melissa Rowland over child custody, Rowland prevailed upon a pediatrician to make a report of suspected child abuse by Walkine to governmental authorities. Walkine alleges that as a result, he lost custody for several months while the unfounded allegation was investigated. Claiming the pediatrician, Dr. Jason S. Bromberg, had no reasonable basis for reporting potential child abuse, Walkine sued Bromberg for defamation and other torts. Bromberg filed an anti-SLAPP1 motion to strike the complaint. He argued that his report of suspected child abuse to governmental authorities was protected activity, and that Walkine could not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits because Bromberg (as a mandated reporter) had absolute immunity for making the report he did. The trial court agreed, granted the anti-SLAPP motion, and struck Walkine’s complaint.
Walkine now appeals. He does not dispute that his claims arise from protected activity. He contends that he has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the merits because Bromberg’s immunity does not extend to mandated reporters who lack reasonable suspicion of the abuse they report, and because he adduced sufficient evidence that Bromberg had no such reasonable suspicion. Both the immunity provision of the Child
1 SLAPP is an acronym for “strategic lawsuit against public participation.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 57.) For clarity, we also refer to a “SLAPP” or “anti-SLAPP” motion as “a special motion to strike”—the language used in the statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1)). Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
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Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (Act; Pen. Code, § 11164 et seq.) and decades of precedent interpreting it foreclose Walkine’s argument. We affirm the trial court’s order striking the complaint.
BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Allegations in the Complaint Walkine’s complaint alleges the following: On November 28, 2023, Rowland took one of their children to Bromberg’s office at Agoura-West Valley Pediatric Medical Group (Agoura-West). While there, Rowland misrepresented that redness on the child’s skin was the result of abuse and asked Bromberg to report the abuse to “Child Protective Services (‘CPS’).” The complaint does not state who Rowland accused of committing the abuse. Bromberg diagnosed the redness as dry skin, but notwithstanding this diagnosis, submitted a report to CPS alleging suspected child abuse “despite having no medical evidence to support such a claim.” At some point, Bromberg admitted to Walkine that Bromberg had filed the report “under duress,” and dismissed Walkine’s concerns about it by stating, “ ‘Have fun in court.’ ” As a result of Bromberg’s report, Walkine’s children were removed from his custody for seven months before “the case was dismissed.”
Based on these allegations, Walkine asserted claims against Bromberg and Agoura-West for defamation (libel per se), medical malpractice, and both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
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B. Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP Motion and the Court’s Ruling 1. Defendants’ Motion Bromberg and Agoura-West filed a special motion to strike the complaint under section 425.16. They argued that each cause of action arose out of Bromberg’s right of petition and free speech in connection with an issue under consideration by an executive body or another official proceeding authorized by law. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2).) As relevant to this appeal, they further argued that Walkine had no probability of prevailing on his claims because Penal Code section 11172, subdivision (a) gives mandated reporters such as Bromberg unqualified and absolute immunity from civil liability for reporting suspected child abuse.
2. Walkine’s Opposition Walkine opposed the special motion to strike. He first asserted that his claims did not arise from protected activity; as Walkine has abandoned this position on appeal we do not discuss it further. Walkine also submitted declarations from himself and his attorney with attached exhibits, and argued that this evidence showed he had the requisite probability of prevailing on his claims.2 Walkine declared that he requested medical records from the November 28, 2023 appointment. Agoura-West initially provided only a note dated November 29, 2023, which stated the
2 Bromberg and Agoura-West filed objections to this evidence along with their reply to Walkine’s opposition. The court did not find it necessary to rule on these objections given its conclusion that Bromberg and Agoura-West were immune from liability.
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visit was a routine “well-child” exam, and omitted any mention of the CPS report or Rowland’s request regarding it. Walkine made repeated requests for additional information, and was eventually provided a November 28, 2023 report about the visit. That report indicates that during the visit the child was “happy,” “smiling,” and in “no distress.” It further states that during Bromberg’s evaluation, Rowland asked the child “if father hits him, [the child] said ‘yes’ ” and pointed to part of his body to indicate where. Bromberg was “[u]nsure as to origination” of the skin discoloration because “it was evaluated over a week after [the] possible incident.” Rowland “requested . . . a report be filed,” and Bromberg’s medical notes state that although he was “[u]nsure as to [the] origination of [the] lesion as it’s been over a week,” he “will file [a] report.”
Walkine asserted this evidence was sufficient to show the report to CPS was filed at Rowland’s request and was not based on Bromberg ’s own medical findings. Walkine averred he spoke to Bromberg after the CPS investigation began. Walkine asked Bromberg why the report was made, and Bromberg responded, “the mother had pressured him to file it.” Walkine “pushed back,” and Bromberg “dismissed [Walkine] with the comment: ‘Have fun in court.’ ”
3. The Trial Court’s Ruling On May 21, 2025, the trial court issued a written ruling granting the anti-SLAPP motion. Relying on Dwight R. v. Christy B. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 697 and other authority, the court held that a report of suspected child abuse to a child protective services agency by a mandated reporter is protected by section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) as an act preparatory to or in anticipation of official proceedings, namely an investigation into
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the abuse allegations. (Dwight R., at p. 711.) The court further found that Walkine had not demonstrated a probability of prevailing on his claims because Bromberg was “absolutely immune from liability for having made the child abuse report, even if that report lacked adequate foundation, as [Walkine] alleges.”
DISCUSSION
A. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review The Legislature enacted section 425.16 “[t]o combat lawsuits designed to chill the exercise of free speech and petition rights.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1060 (Park).) Thus, “[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
When considering whether to strike a claim, courts undertake a two-prong analysis. “First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.) In Park, our Supreme Court set forth how to determine whether a defendant has made a prima facie showing of speech or petitioning rights for purposes of section 425.16: “A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1062.)
“If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by
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establishing a probability of success.” (Baral v. Schnitt, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384.) At this second stage, the court “ ‘ “accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.” ’ ” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 891.)
We review de novo the trial court’s grant or denial of a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067.) B. First Prong: Arising from Protected Activity On appeal, Walkine does not dispute that his claims arise from protected conduct. Section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) identifies protected conduct to include “any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.” That provision applies to reports of suspected child abuse by mandated reporters.
California requires that “[r]eports of suspected child abuse or neglect shall be made by mandated reporters” to appropriate government officials. (Pen. Code, § 11165.9.) As a medical professional, Bromberg is such a mandated reporter. (Id., § 11165.7, subd. (a)(21).) This obligation exists “whenever the mandated reporter, in the mandated reporter’s professional capacity or within the scope of the mandated reporter’s employment, has knowledge of or observes a child whom the mandated reporter knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of child abuse or neglect.” (Id., § 11166, subd. (a).) Mandated reporters that fail to make these required reports are subject to criminal prosecution. (Id., subd. (c).)
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Government authorities use these required reports to discharge their legal obligations to protect children. (See B.H. v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal.4th 168, 191.) Bromberg’s report of suspected child abuse was thus protected activity, because it was an “act[] preparatory to or in anticipation of official proceedings, namely, an investigation by child protective services of [suspected abuse], and possible juvenile dependency proceedings . . . . (. . . § 425.16, subd. (e)(2).)” (Dwight R. v. Christy B., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 711.) C. Prong Two: Probability of Success Whether Walkine demonstrated a probability that he will prevail turns on whether Penal Code section 11172, subdivision (a) immunizes Bromberg from liability.3 Bromberg claims the immunity afforded to a mandated reporter such as himself is absolute. Walkine claims the immunity is not absolute but qualified. Asserting that a mandated reporter must report “whenever [he or she] has knowledge of or observes a child whom the mandated reporter knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of child abuse or neglect” (id., § 11166, subd. (a)), Walkine argues that “where there is no reasonable suspicion [of abuse], there is no duty to report, and where there is no duty to report, there is no immunity.”
Storch v. Silverman (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 671 rejected this argument 40 years ago. In Storch, a parent and other plaintiffs sued a hospital and certain of its staff physicians for “ ‘negligently, carelessly and recklessly’ ” reporting a minor child
3 Walkine asserts only a vicarious liability theory against Agoura-West based on Bromberg’s conduct. Thus, if Bromberg is immune from liability, so is Agoura-West.
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was a victim of child abuse. (Id. at p. 674.) Like Walkine, the Storch plaintiffs contended that the Act requires a doctor “to report only those instances of child abuse which he or she ‘knows or reasonably suspects’ may have occurred ([Pen. Code, ]§ 11166, subd. (a)), [such] that immunity exists only for reports that meet those criteria,” and thus, “there is no immunity for negligent or knowingly false reports.” (Storch, at p. 678.)
Storch unequivocally rebuffed this assertion and held Penal Code section 11172, subdivision (a) grants “medical practitioners absolute immunity from civil liability for reporting an instance of suspected child abuse to a child protective agency.” (Storch v. Silverman, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 675, fn. omitted.) Analyzing both the statutory scheme and its legislative history, Storch explained that the interpretation advanced by the plaintiff there (and repeated by Walkine in this appeal) “renders the immunity statute virtually meaningless. There is no need for immunity when there can be no liability, as in the case of reports that are true or based upon objectively reasonable suspicion. . . . [¶] The legislative scheme is designed to encourage the reporting of child abuse to the greatest extent possible to prevent further abuse. Reporters are required to report child abuse promptly and they are subject to criminal prosecution if they fail to report as required. Accordingly, absolute immunity from liability for all reports is consistent with that scheme.” (Id. at pp. 678-679, fn. omitted.)
Walkine attempts to distinguish Storch by asserting the doctors in that case had independent clinical involvement with the child, whereas Walkine alleges Bromberg did not report based on his clinical judgment but instead at Rowland’s behest. Walker claims that Storch stands only for the proposition that
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“[t]he Legislature extended absolute immunity to mandatory reporters to protect objective professionals from the chilling effect of civil liability for good-faith clinical misjudgment—not to protect a reporter who had no independent clinical judgment to chill” because Bromberg was acting only at the behest of Rowland.
We do not agree with this cramped reading of Storch, nor have other cases that have come after Storch. In discussing the breadth of the immunity provided by Penal Code section 11172, subdivision (a) to mandatory reporters, Storch went so far as to say that the legislative history indicates such absolute immunity applies even when “a medical practitioner maliciously and knowingly submits a false report of child abuse with the intent to vex, annoy and harass an innocent party.” (Storch v. Silverman, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 681.) Later cases have held the same. (E.g., Arce v. Childrens Hospital Los Angeles (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1485 [Pen. Code, § 11172, subd. (a) immunity for mandatory reporters “extends even to negligent, knowingly false, or malicious reports of abuse”]; Stecks v. Young (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 365, 373 [“The appellate courts of this state . . . have previously evaluated the Act’s immunity provision and, in each case, soundly rejected the argument that immunity does not attach unless ‘reasonable suspicion’ existed”].) A mandatory reporter who makes a knowingly false and malicious report of abuse has immunity. Someone who acts less egregiously, as Walkine alleges Bromberg did by making a report without a proper clinical basis, gets that same immunity.
As aptly summarized by Stecks, “our appellate courts have concluded that immunity is a key ingredient in maintaining the Act’s integrity and thus have rejected efforts aimed at narrowing
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its protection. While we recognize that unfounded reports can lead to serious, sometimes devastating consequences, and we have great sympathy for those who are wrongfully accused, as we noted in [a prior opinion], ‘[i]n this war on child abuse the Legislature selected absolute immunity as part of its arsenal. This value choice is clearly within the province of the Legislature. We cannot defuse this chosen weapon on the ground that its effect is sometimes ill when its general purpose is good.’ ” (Stecks v. Young, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 375.)
DISPOSITION
The order granting respondents’ anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
M. KIM, J.