Walker's Appeal

2 A.2d 770, 332 Pa. 488, 1938 Pa. LEXIS 803
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedSeptember 28, 1938
DocketAppeal, 269
StatusPublished
Cited by42 cases

This text of 2 A.2d 770 (Walker's Appeal) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Walker's Appeal, 2 A.2d 770, 332 Pa. 488, 1938 Pa. LEXIS 803 (Pa. 1938).

Opinion

Opinion by

Mr. Chief Justice Kephart,

On February 22, 1935, tlie School Districts of Berlin Borough and Brothersvalley Township, entered into a preliminary organization (under the provisions of article XVIII, sections 1801-8 of the School Code of May 18, 1911, P. L. 309, as amended), for the establishment of a joint high school, the two districts to function separately until the proposed joint high school building was completed. While in process of erection, the Berlin Board, on May 11, 1936, elected appellant supervising principal of the public schools in that district for the school year 1936-7. On January 27, 1937, when the building neared completion, the Berlin Board notified appellant of the termination of his contract at the close of the school year. He was employed as a teacher when the Tenure Act was passed, April 6,1937, P. L. 213, and came within its provisions unless the law determined otherwise. The Tenure Act contained definite restrictions on the heretofore absolute discretion of school directors to dismiss professional employees or terminate existing contracts which will later be discussed.

On August 16, 1937, the Boards of Berlin and Brothersvalley, at a joint meeting, formally by resolution entered into an agreement of consolidation of all the schools in the two districts. The Berlin Board on August 20,1937, sent appellant a second notice of termination, stating that the schools of Berlin and Brothers-valley were consolidated into joint schools and the Berlin Board had no authority to employ teachers for the ensuing year for the joint board. September 3, 1937, a third notice was sent appellant reciting the causes for the termination of his contract. These reasons set forth, in addition to consolidation, that there had been a decrease of one hundred per cent in the number of pupils of Berlin District as a result thereof, and reiterated the board was without power to elect. A hearing was had at which appellant appeared. He was denied em *491 ployment, and appealed from this action to the court of common pleas. Appellant also instituted proceedings in mandamus to compel the Berlin Board, his former employer, to give him a new contract. This writ being refused, and the action of the board affirmed by the court below, in one opinion, this appeal was taken from both decrees. Separate mandamus proceedings were instituted by appellant to compel the joint school board to employ him under the Tenure Act, and this writ also was refused, but no appeal from that decree has been filed.

The questions involved present what' have been termed conflicting features of two important policies of the school law, namely, — the joint consolidation of schools and the teachers’ tenure. The fundamental public policy, expressed in the Constitution and underlying school laws, is to obtain a better education for the children of the Commonwealth. Both policies derive their inspiration from this source, though in themselves separate, they must be considered subordinate to that cardinal purpose of making more effective our public school system as a whole.

We stated in the Teachers’ Tenure Act Cases, 329 Pa. 213, 231, that the purpose of that act was the maintenance of an adequate and competent teaching staff, free from political or arbitrary interference, whereby capable and competent teachers might feel secure, and more efficiently perform their duty of instruction. In its sphere of operation, as there indicated, it was intended to carry out this policy.

In another sphere, as important to the public, was the legislation for the consolidation and establishment of joint schools, 1 to provide better working equipment, vocational and instructional advantages, and more adequate financial resources. Through it new departments *492 may be set up, new courses added to the curriculum,— advantages which the smaller abandoned schools could not have obtained acting alone. For successful operation of these joint schools it is provided that the old districts’ control be transferred to a joint board, with joint though separate control in the districts. This new organization is a distinct separate legal entity from each of the district boards which make it up. 2 The board of either one of the districts is not the exclusive agency of the State to make contracts with teachers for the new joint schools, as it was for the schools of the old district. The joint board elects a president, secretary 3 and treasurer, 4 and may appoint a joint school committee to manage the joint schools. 5 Election of teachers, however, as well as establishment of new departments, 6 shall be by a majority vote of each of the separate district boards which make up a joint board. 7 Each district is powerless to act alone, nor may the joint board act on a simple majority vote of its members. Thus a teacher must be elected by a majority of the board members of each of the separate districts to become the choice of or be se *493 lected by the joint board. When the teacher is legally elected, his contract is with the joint board, which becomes responsible for its execution.

These conclusions necessitate a fuller discussion of the status of professional employees of the separate district boards, and the new joint board, when joint schools are formed. When the Tenure Act was passed, under it appellant became a professional employee, and, it is urged, entitled to a perpetual contract, as therein provided. It is contended that the consolidation and consequent abandonment of the district schools in. no way affected appellant’s rights under the Tenure Act; that the Berlin Board must reelect him since his contract with them can only be dissolved in the manner therein prescribed. 8 This section, it is stated, is all-inclusive as to what grounds may be the basis for termination of his contract. 9

*494 The interpretation requested by appellant would mean that the old school board must continue to hire and pay him, and other teachers in his position, for life or until retirement though there are no pupils for them to instruct. All legislation must be construed as intending to favor the public interest; when it conflicts with private interests, the public interest to be primarily served is the dominating one, not that of the individual. 10 Any other conclusion in the situation before us would result in benefit to one group of persons only, the teachers thus denied employment in the joint schools. Unless the legislature clearly intended by apt language that the school board was to be thus bound, appellant’s contention must fail. The very essence of his contract, teaching, is made impossible of performance. He did not receive the majority votes of both boards, and Berlin School District has no schools in which he can teach.

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Bluebook (online)
2 A.2d 770, 332 Pa. 488, 1938 Pa. LEXIS 803, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walkers-appeal-pa-1938.