Walker v. RIVER CITY LOGISTICS INC.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Walker v. RIVER CITY LOGISTICS INC.

14 So. 3d 1122, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 7929, 2009 WL 1639533

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedJune 12, 2009

Docket1D09-0780

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 14 So. 3d 1122 (Walker v. RIVER CITY LOGISTICS INC.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Walker v. RIVER CITY LOGISTICS INC., 14 So. 3d 1122, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 7929, 2009 WL 1639533 (Fla. Ct. App. 2009).

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Opinion

THOMAS, J.

Petitioner/Claimant seeks review of an order disqualifying his workers’ compensation counsel below for possession of documents deemed privileged. For the reasons explained below, we grant the petition.

This court will grant a certiorari petition when an interlocutory order “departs from the essential requirements of law, causing material injury of an irreparable nature which cannot be remedied on appeal from a final order.” Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. Higgins, 975 So.2d 1169, 1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (citing Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So.2d 1097, 1099 (Fla.1987)). The irreparable harm prong of this test should be considered first, as it is a condition precedent to invoking certiorari jurisdiction. Id.; see Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 720 So.2d 214, 215 (Fla.1998).

As Claimant points out, because disqualification of counsel denies a party its counsel of choice, such disqualification constitutes a material injury not remediable on plenary appeal. See, e.g., Secours-Maria Manor Nursing Care Ctr., Inc. v. Seaman, 959 So.2d 774, 775 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Akrey v. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. E., LLC, 837 So.2d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Disqualification of counsel is an extraordinary remedy. See Yang Enters., Inc. v. Georgalis, 988 So.2d 1180, 1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). Accordingly, this court reviews an order of disqualification by certiorari and, upon a showing that the order departed from the essential requirements of law, this court may issue the writ. See, e.g., Seaman, 959 So.2d at 775; Akrey, 837 So.2d at 1144.

The JCC’s order departed from the essential requirements of law. The employer/Carrier’s (E/C) motion to disqualify counsel contains statements that the E/C disclosed privileged documents to Claimant’s public defender in another proceeding. The E/C has not argued that this disclosure was inadvertent. The E/C’s voluntary disclosure of the documents waived the privilege. See § 90.507, Fla. Stat. (2006). Because the documents were no longer privileged, the JCC’s order disqualifying Claimant’s workers’ compensa *1124 tion counsel below departed from the essential requirements of law.

The petition for writ of certiorari is GRANTED.

DAVIS and BROWNING, JJ., concur.

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THOMAS, J.

Petitioner/Claimant seeks review of an order disqualifying his workers’ compensation counsel below for possession of documents deemed privileged. For the reasons explained below, we grant the petition.

This court will grant a certiorari petition when an interlocutory order “departs from the essential requirements of law, causing material injury of an irreparable nature which cannot be remedied on appeal from a final order.” Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. Higgins, 975 So.2d 1169, 1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (citing Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So.2d 1097, 1099 (Fla.1987)). The irreparable harm prong of this test should be considered first, as it is a condition precedent to invoking certiorari jurisdiction. Id.; see Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 720 So.2d 214, 215 (Fla.1998).

As Claimant points out, because disqualification of counsel denies a party its counsel of choice, such disqualification constitutes a material injury not remediable on plenary appeal. See, e.g., Secours-Maria Manor Nursing Care Ctr., Inc. v. Seaman, 959 So.2d 774, 775 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Akrey v. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. E., LLC, 837 So.2d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Disqualification of counsel is an extraordinary remedy. See Yang Enters., Inc. v. Georgalis, 988 So.2d 1180, 1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). Accordingly, this court reviews an order of disqualification by certiorari and, upon a showing that the order departed from the essential requirements of law, this court may issue the writ. See, e.g., Seaman, 959 So.2d at 775; Akrey, 837 So.2d at 1144.

The JCC’s order departed from the essential requirements of law. The employer/Carrier’s (E/C) motion to disqualify counsel contains statements that the E/C disclosed privileged documents to Claimant’s public defender in another proceeding. The E/C has not argued that this disclosure was inadvertent. The E/C’s voluntary disclosure of the documents waived the privilege. See § 90.507, Fla. Stat. (2006). Because the documents were no longer privileged, the JCC’s order disqualifying Claimant’s workers’ compensa *1124 tion counsel below departed from the essential requirements of law.

The petition for writ of certiorari is GRANTED.

DAVIS and BROWNING, JJ., concur.

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14 So. 3d 1122, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 7929, 2009 WL 1639533, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walker-v-river-city-logistics-inc-fladistctapp-2009.

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