Walker v. Priest

29 S.W.3d 657, 342 Ark. 410, 2000 Ark. LEXIS 493
Supreme Court of Arkansas·Decided October 20, 2000·No. 00-1037·Published·Cited by 22 cases

Opinions

Tom Glaze, Justice.

Representative Bill Walker and other members of the Arkansas Legislative Black Caucus filed this original action petition, under Ark. Const, amend. 7, seeking to enjoin the Secretary of State from placing Proposed Initiated Act No. 1 (“The Tobacco Settlement Proceeds Act”) on the November 7, 2000, General Election ballot. The petitioners generally allege that the ballot tide of the act “fails to convey an intelligible idea of the scope and import of the Proposed [Act], and is insufficient to enable a voter ... to make an intelligent choice, fully aware of the consequences of his or her vote.” James Lane subsequently intervened in this action, and joined in the petitioners’ challenge of the Act’s ballot title. The petitioners and Lane allege two primary defects in the ballot tide: (1) it is so complex, lengthy, and detailed that a voter cannot intelligendy make a choice in the time allotted him or her to vote, and (2) despite the tide’s length, the title is misleading, incomplete, deceptive, and has serious omissions.1

Respondent Sharon Priest, Secretary of State, through her counsel, Attorney General Mark Pryor, answered the petitioners’ and Lane’s allegations, denying that the Act’s ballot tide is defective. The Act’s sponsors, known as the Coalition for a Healthy Arkansas Today (CHART), intervened in this proceeding and joined the State’s argument that the Act’s ballot tide is complete, fair, and intelligible and should remain on the general election ballot and be counted.

As background information, the initiated Act’s ballot title was certified by the Attorney General and submitted to the Secretary of State on May 3, 2000; the Secretary of State approved and certified the sufficiency of the ballot title on May 5, 2000, and certified that the petition met the signature requirements and the requirements of Amendment 7 for placement on the November 7 ballot.

In his opinion accompanying the ballot title’s certification, the Attorney General commented on “the particular hazards attendant to the preparation of a ballot title for a lengthy and complex proposal such as this one.” Op. Att’y Gen. # 2000-137, at 7. This opinion also noted that the ballot title in this case measured 994 words long, and the longest title ever approved contained 900 words. Bailey v. Hall, 198 Ark. 815, 131 S.W.2d 635 (1939). The Attorney General pointed out “that with any proposed act of considerable length and complexity, the sponsor runs the risk of a challenge and of a finding by the court that a ballot title prepared for the measure would be unacceptable, either because it is too ‘complex, detailed, and lengthy,’ or because it has ‘serious omissions.’ ” Op. Att’y Gen. # 2000-137, at 8 (citing Crochet v. Priest, 326 Ark. 338, 931 S.W.2d 128 (1996)). Finally, the Attorney General noted that this court has held in some instances that “the text of some measures ‘precludes the writing of an acceptable ballot title.’ ” However, he would not determine “whether this is such a measure,” stating he would be “loath ... to follow the only option other than certification . . . of rejecting your submission based upon the substance of the proposed act.”

The questions now before us are whether the ballot title to the proposed initiated act is too complex, detailed, and lengthy for a voter to make an intelligent choice, and whether it is misleading, incomplete, deceptive, and suffering from serious omissions.

We turn first to petitioners’ contention that the Act’s ballot title is so lengthy and complex that the voter cannot reasonably understand the tide when reading it in the time allotted the voter to cast his or her ballot. Petitioners complain that the title contains 994 words and “is riddled with clause upon clause and modifier upon modifier.” They claim a voter reading the tide would be unable to ascertain bow tbe tobacco settlement proceeds and its percentages will be allocated, how the trust fund with the proceeds will be impacted, what option the legislature will have over the proceeds in the future, and what role the various state agencies will have. They further assert that the title is as complex and lengthy a tide as this court has ever considered, and for these reasons, the Act should be stricken from the November 7 ballot. Taking this same general ground of attack, Intervenor Lane complains that the title’s words include “legalese” and terms that are not defined or explained, and that the average voter will not be able to read and comprehend this act and the other proposed constitutional amendments on the ballot, when making choices between them and the various federal, state, and local candidates. Lane claims that, under these circumstances, length alone should be a sufficient ground to determine the Act’s ballot deficient.2

The standards of review of a ballot-title case under Amendment 7 are well settled. In the more recent case of Crochet v. Priest, 326 Ark. 338, 931 S.W.2d 128 (1996), we repeated many of these controlling principles beginning with the established rules that Amendment 7 places the burden of proof in legal challenges to initiative matters upon those who challenge the proposed measure, and that this court will construe the requirements of Amendment 7 liberally in order to secure its purposes to reserve to the people the right to adopt or reject legislation. However, the court has also stated that liberality is not without limits or common sense. Id. at 342.

When we are confronted with a challenge to a ballot title based on the length of that title, as we are in this case, language found in Page v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 342, 884 S.W.2d 951 (1994), is instructive. In Page, certain petitioners challenged a 587-word ballot title which attempted to cover a forty-page long proposal, comprised of twenty-three sections and more than 150 subsections. The court first noted that in drafting the ballot title for the proposed amendment there, the sponsors could not possibly cover the entire proposal because, if they had, the voter would have found it impossible to read, understand and cast his or her vote on the issue while at the polling precinct. See Page, 318 Ark. at 344. After discussing a number of omissions and misleading statements that amounted to fatal defects, the Page court held as follows:

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Walker v. Priest, 29 S.W.3d 657, 342 Ark. 410, 2000 Ark. LEXIS 493 (Ark. 2000).

29 S.W.3d 657 (Walker v. Priest) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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