Appellate Case: 21-1119 Document: 010110648603 Date Filed: 02/23/2022 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 23, 2022 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court MARK WALKER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 21-1119 (D.C. No. 1:20-CV-00364-PAB-NY) PARK COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; (D. Colo.) LEIGH COCHRAN, Deputy; DUMB FRIENDS LEAGUE HARMONY EQUINE CENTER; BOBBI PRIESTLY,
Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before McHUGH, MORITZ, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Mark Walker appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action, which raised claims concerning the seizure of his horses. The primary
issue in this appeal is whether Leigh Cochran and Bobbi Priestly are entitled to
qualified immunity from Mr. Walker’s Fourth Amendment unreasonable-seizure
claim. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 21-1119 Document: 010110648603 Date Filed: 02/23/2022 Page: 2
I. BACKGROUND1
For more than 40 years, Mr. Walker bred horses to be resistant to the cold
winters typically found in the high country. He used his horses in his outfitting
business. In January 2019, Mr. Walker had 78 horses at three different locations in
Park County, Colorado: 48 at Badger Basin Ranch, 20 at Hartsel Springs Ranch, and
10 at another ranch (Durbin Ranch). The weather was particularly harsh, with more
than 30 inches of snow and temperatures as low as negative 40℉ for a two-week
period. This required Mr. Walker to double the amount of time it took him to feed
the herd, from three to at least six hours, and to plow lanes in the pasture to bring out
feed.
On January 28, 2019, defendant Leigh Cochran, the animal control officer for
defendant Park County Sheriff’s Office (PCSO), received complaints regarding thin
horses at Badger Basin Ranch. Deputy Cochran went to the ranch, but could not find
any horses, so she contacted Mr. Walker to inform him of the complaints. On
January 29, another deputy received a call regarding a dead horse on the same ranch.
Deputy Cochran went to the ranch and found the dead horse; according to
Mr. Walker, the horse, Ringo, was 32 years old and not of his heartier breed. Deputy
1 Because we are reviewing an order granting a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we draw the background facts from Mr. Walker’s amended complaint. See Mobley v. McCormick , 40 F.3d 337, 340 (10th Cir. 1994) (explaining that “a Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the allegations within the four corners of the complaint after taking those allegations as true”). But as we later discuss, see footnote 6, infra, it is permissible to consider the affidavits and warrants when resolving the legal issues in this case. 2 Appellate Case: 21-1119 Document: 010110648603 Date Filed: 02/23/2022 Page: 3
Cochran again told Mr. Walker about the complaints regarding thin horses on his
ranch. That same day, “Deputy Cochran posted a Notice of Warning that Mr. Walker
was to provide food, water, and veterinary care for the horses.” Aplt. App., Vol. I
at 16, ¶ 12. On February 4, Deputy Cochran went back to the ranch, where she saw
that “Mr. Walker was feeding milo round bales, grass hay, alfalfa hay and high
protein range cake” to his horses, buffalo, and cattle in the same pasture. Id., ¶ 14.
Over the next few days, Mr. Walker separated the animals “so they could be fed
independently.” Id.
On February 14, Deputy Cochran contacted defendant Bobbi Priestly, the
manager of Field Services for defendant Dumb Friends League Harmony Equine
Center (“Harmony”) and a peace officer with the Colorado Department of
Agriculture. Agent Priestly went to Badger Basin Ranch, where she saw Mr. Walker
moving his horses. Also on February 14, Deputy Cochran issued Mr. Walker a
second notice that he had to provide food, water, and veterinary care to his herd.
Although the notice stated that he had until February 18 to improve the herd’s
condition, Deputy Cochran told him he had 30 days.
On February 15, Deputy Cochran and Agent Priestly returned to Badger Basin
Ranch. Mr. Walker moved seven skinny horses to a pen near the ranch buildings.
Deputy Cochran drove through the fields with Mr. Walker and identified four more
horses to be brought to the pen. Later that day, Mr. Walker’s veterinarian inspected
one horse in the “‘skinny pen’” and told Mr. Walker to “keep doing what he was
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doing with [that horse].” Id. at 17, ¶ 18. The veterinarian made no comment about
the other horses in the skinny pen.
On February 16, Deputy Cochran returned to the ranch and suggested feeding
the horses grass hay instead of oat hay. She contacted another veterinarian to assess
Dakota, who was more than 30 years old. The veterinarian rated Dakota “as a 1 on
the Henneke scoring system, which is the lowest rating out of nine points,” and
recommended a particular feeding plan, with which Mr. Walker agreed. Id. at 17,
¶ 19. Deputy Cochran returned on February 18 and “noted that all the horses were
eating better grass hay and all had water.” Id., ¶ 20. Dakota, however, had “gone
down” and “was not doing well,” and “Mr. Walker did not think she would survive.”
Id. Ultimately, Ringo, Dakota, and two other horses died in Hartsel (a 2.5-year old
who “was not skinny and died of colic” and a 25-year old “far out in the pasture
beyond where the tractor could go,” id. at 18, ¶ 23). Two more died after being
moved to Harmony.
The next day, Agent Priestly informed Deputy Cochran that she did not think
Mr. Walker had been “adequately caring for” his horses and “their survival was not
likely if left in [his] care.” Id. at 17-18, ¶ 21. Agent Priestly added that “it would be
difficult for any healthy animal to survive in the harsh conditions during that winter
in Hartsel.” Id. at 18, ¶ 21. Deputy Cochran agreed and “drafted an affidavit to
support a warrant to seize the horses.” Id., ¶ 22. Deputy Cochran “signed all the
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search warrants [sic2] used,” and “Agent Priestly decided to execute the warrants.”
Id. at 19, ¶ 26.
On February 21, “defendants” went to Badger Basin Ranch with “11 trailers
and 21 people” and “seized 48 horses.” Id. at 18, ¶ 24. An additional 10 horses were
seized from the other two ranches on February 25 and 27, for a total of 58 horses.
The horses were brought to Harmony. In early- to mid-March, the weather in Hartsel
“greatly improved.” Id. at 19, ¶ 29.
Mr. Walker tried to retrieve his horses, but to do so, “he had to put up a bond
of $250 per month for each horse to pay for its care.” Id. at 20, ¶ 30. He could not
afford the bond.
The Park County district attorney charged Mr. Walker with eight counts of
animal cruelty. Mr. Walker was found not guilty on all counts in December 2019.
Soon after, Mr. Walker asked Harmony to return any horses remaining in its
possession. By then, all but five of the horses had apparently been adopted, and
Harmony declined to return any of the remaining five horses.
Mr. Walker then filed this action. He asserted two constitutional claims
against all defendants: unconstitutional seizure of the horses in violation of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (apparently including a constitutional
excessive-bond claim), and malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. He also asserted three state-law claims: civil theft, outrageous
2 Deputy Cochran signed all four supporting affidavits; the warrants bear only judges’ signatures. 5 Appellate Case: 21-1119 Document: 010110648603 Date Filed: 02/23/2022 Page: 6
conduct, and defamation. Defendants filed motions to dismiss under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing, among other things, that they were entitled to
qualified immunity and that Mr. Walker failed to state a claim for relief. In response
to those motions, Mr. Walker agreed to dismiss his malicious-prosecution claim
against Harmony and his § 1983 claim against the PCSO.
The district court granted both motions to dismiss. The court dismissed the
§ 1983 claims on the merits, ruling (among other things) that Deputy Cochran and
Agent Priestly were entitled to qualified immunity. The court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Mr. Walker appeals.
II. SCOPE OF APPEAL
In his opening brief, Mr. Walker states that he “abandons his
14th [A]mendment claim and only pursues the unreasonable seizure claim under the
[F]ourth [A]mendment.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 4 n.2. We construe this as
abandonment of his excessive-bond claim, which he raised as a Fourteenth
Amendment claim. In his reply brief, he has abandoned any remaining claims
against Harmony and the PCSO. See Aplt. Reply Br. at 5. And he has not argued
that the district court should have retained jurisdiction over his state-law claims, so
we do not consider that ruling. See Sawyers v. Norton, 962 F.3d 1270, 1286
(10th Cir. 2020) (“Issues not raised in the opening brief are deemed abandoned or
waived.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Consequently, what remains for our
consideration is whether the district court erred in dismissing the Fourth Amendment
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unreasonable-seizure claim against Deputy Cochran and Agent Priestly on the ground
of qualified immunity.
III. DISCUSSION
We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) due to
qualified immunity. See Moya v. Schollenbarger, 465 F.3d 444, 454-55 (10th Cir.
2006). In doing so, “we accept as true all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from
conclusory allegations, and view those facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Id. at 455 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“When a defendant raises the qualified-immunity defense, the plaintiff must . . .
establish (1) the defendant violated a federal statutory or constitutional right and
(2) the right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s conduct.” Ullery
v. Bradley, 949 F.3d 1282, 1289 (10th Cir. 2020). Courts have discretion to decide
which of the two prongs of the qualified-immunity analysis to address first. Pearson,
555 U.S. at 236. The district court decided the qualified-immunity question on the
first prong, and so do we.
In the qualified-immunity context, personal liability “for an allegedly unlawful
official action generally turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the action,
assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was
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taken.” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures,” and provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV. When a seizure is conducted pursuant to a warrant, “the fact
that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the
officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner.” Messerschmidt, 565 U.S.
at 546.3 However, as relevant to the probable-cause issue in this appeal, there are
two situations, drawn from United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), where a
seizure pursuant to a warrant will not cloak an officer with qualified immunity:
(1) “the affidavit in support of the warrant is ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause
as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,’” and (2) “the
issuing magistrate was misled by an affidavit containing false information or
information that the affiant would have known was false if not for [her] ‘reckless
3 In his reply brief, Mr. Walker argues that reliance on Messerschmidt is problematic, because unlike Messerschmidt, this case involves specialized knowledge of horses—that his were bred to withstand the cold, they could be skinny without being abused, transporting them might stress them more than leaving them at the ranches, and the veterinary standard to use in deciding which horses would be seized. See Aplt. Reply Br. at 6-8. We reject this argument. The issuing judges were not called on to make specialized judgments regarding the horses’ condition but to evaluate facts set forth in the affidavit for probable cause, which is their “responsibility” and a matter within their “professional competence,” Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 547-48 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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disregard of the truth.’” United States v. Danhauer, 229 F.3d 1002, 1007 (10th Cir.
2000) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923).4
The district court determined that Mr. Walker had invoked the first Leon
situation, because he argued that Deputy Cochran and Agent Priestly lacked probable
cause to seize the horses. The court observed that because the amended complaint
contained nearly the same information and allegations as the affidavits, Mr. Walker
could not have argued that the affidavit contained false or misleading information
(the second Leon situation). The court identified thirteen relevant facts stated in the
affidavits and concluded that those facts “establishe[d] a fair probability that
[Mr. Walker] had not been adequately caring for his herd and [were] sufficient
indicia of probability to support the magistrate’s issuance of the warrant.” R., Vol. II
at 166. Those thirteen facts are:
(1) Deputy Cochran received reports regarding thin horses off Highway 24 and made contact with plaintiff regarding those reports; (2) another deputy received complaints regarding thin horses off the same highway; (3) a citizen reported that she saw a dead horse and that no one had been feeding the horses; (4) Deputy Cochran saw the dead horse herself, which was “mostly covered by snow”; (5) plaintiff told Deputy Cochran he had been unable to move his horses and that the dead horse probably died from the cold; (6) plaintiff informed Deputy Cochran “that he could not access the far back north side of the property due to large snow drifts”; (7) plaintiff had not separated his previously identified thin horses from the rest of his herd and plaintiff “could not point out specifically where the nine horses were”;[5] (8) plaintiff told Deputy
4 Although Leon was a criminal case involving a suppression hearing, the situations described in Leon apply in qualified-immunity cases. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986). 5 The references to “nine horses” in the affidavits for Badger Basin Ranch were to nine apparently skinny horses that were photographed standing near a fence 9 Appellate Case: 21-1119 Document: 010110648603 Date Filed: 02/23/2022 Page: 10
Cochran that “two, possibly four” horses had died; (9) plaintiff informed Deputy Cochran he did not want the horses at the ranch on two separate occasions, to which Deputy Cochran responded that the horses needed adequate care and feeding; (10) on a visit to plaintiff’s ranch, Deputy Cochran and plaintiff rode a tractor through plaintiff’s fields and found more thin horses; plaintiff was “shocked” that the horses were thin “because they were fine” the week prior; (11) on several occasions, starting on January 30, Deputy Cochran directed plaintiff to provide his thin horses different feed, but plaintiff did not feed “better hay” until February 18; however, at that point, he had still not fed the horses the feed directed by Deputy Cochran; (12) a veterinarian assessed one of plaintiff’s horses on the Henneke body score and rated it a one, the lowest score, because “[t]he horse had little to no body fat that could be felt, with deep spaces between the ribs” and the “withers down the back to the hips and tail head were all protruding”; and (13) “there could be as many as ten” deceased horses and two were missing from the originally identified nine.
Id. at 165-66 (citing and quoting affidavit, see id., Vol. I at 46-50).6
We agree with the district court’s assessment. “An affidavit establishes
probable cause for a search warrant if the totality of the information it contains
establishes the fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found
in a particular place.” United States v. Knox, 883 F.3d 1262, 1275 (10th Cir. 2018)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the affidavit was based on suspected
adjacent to Highway 24 by another PCSO deputy on January 29, 2019. See Aplt. App., Vol. I at 46. 6 The affidavit and warrants are central to Mr. Walker’s claims, and he has never disputed their authenticity. Thus, the district court could consider them when ruling on the motions to dismiss, even though they were not attached to the amended complaint. See Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009) (“In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts may consider not only the complaint itself, but also . . . documents referred to in the complaint if the documents are central to the plaintiff’s claim and the parties do not dispute the documents’ authenticity.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 10 Appellate Case: 21-1119 Document: 010110648603 Date Filed: 02/23/2022 Page: 11
violations of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-202, cruelty to animals. Relevant here, a
violation of the statute occurs when a person “knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal
negligence . . . fails to provide [an animal] with proper food, drink, or protection
from the weather consistent with the species, breed, and type of animal involved,”
§ 18-9-202(1)(a). Consistent with this language, Deputy Cochran asserted in the
affidavits that the number of horses “in poor condition” supported a violation of the
statute because Mr. Walker was “unable or unwilling to provide even minimal
standards of nutrition, sanitation, shelter and veterinary care, with this neglect often
resulting in starvation, illness and death.” Aplt. App., Vol. I at 50, 58, 62, 64.
The two affidavits for Badger Basin Ranch were each five single-spaced pages
and very detailed.7 They contain sufficient indicia of probable cause such that an
official could reasonably believe there was a fair probability that Mr. Walker had
failed to provide his horses with proper nutrition and shelter. As the district court
aptly summarized, the Badger Basin affidavits described how Mr. Walker had “failed
to provide his horses the appropriate feed until several weeks after he was directed,
and at least two horses, and possibly ten, had died.” Id., Vol. II at 166. They also
described his “refus[al] to bring his horses near the barn for proper shelter until he
7 These affidavits were identical, except the second affidavit added that law enforcement would collect feed and hay samples. Although the affidavits for Hartsel Springs Ranch and the Durbin Ranch were shorter in length and smaller in scope than the affidavits for Badger Basin Ranch, Mr. Walker agrees there is no material difference between the four affidavits, and he does not advance any arguments relating only to the Hartsel Springs and Durbin affidavits. We therefore do not separately analyze those affidavits. 11 Appellate Case: 21-1119 Document: 010110648603 Date Filed: 02/23/2022 Page: 12
was given several warnings and directives.” Id. And the affidavits described
“plaintiff’s property, plaintiff’s horses, plaintiff’s care of the horses, and plaintiff’s
dilatory response to caring for the horses,” which “establishe[d] a fair probability that
plaintiff had not been adequately caring for his herd.” Id.
Although Mr. Walker contends both that the affidavits “did not establish
probable cause” and that they “materially misled the issuing magistrate,” Aplt.
Opening Br. at 16, he does not contest the accuracy of the information included in the
affidavits or develop any argument regarding the first Leon situation described
above—that the included information was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as
to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
He instead argues that Deputy Cochran misled the issuing judges by intentionally
omitting information from the affidavits that, he claims, was crucial to the judges’
decisions to issue the warrants.
Deputy Cochran and Agent Priestly point out that Mr. Walker never presented
an “omitted information” theory to the district court, either through allegations in his
amended complaint or as an argument in response to the motions to dismiss.
Mr. Walker counters that omissions are “simply the inverse” of Leon’s
indicia-of-probable-cause inquiry, Aplt. Reply Br. at 9. We disagree with
Mr. Walker. In Salmon v. Schwarz, 948 F.2d 1131, 1139-40 (10th Cir. 1991), we
explained that the “reckless disregard” standard set out in Leon includes “material
omissions” from an affidavit. Thus, allegedly omitted information fits within the
second Leon situation noted above, where an affidavit misleads an issuing judge by
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setting forth “false information or information that the affiant would have known was
false if not for his ‘reckless disregard of the truth,’” Danhauer, 229 F.3d at 1007
(quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923).
Mr. Walker never presented his “omitted information” theory to the district
court. When a party fails to raise a legal theory below, we typically treat the
argument as forfeited. Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1127-28
(10th Cir. 2011). But when an appellant fails to preserve a theory and also fails to
make a plain-error argument on appeal, we ordinarily deem the theory waived (rather
than merely forfeited) and decline to review it at all—for plain error or otherwise.
Id. at 1130-31. Under such circumstances, “the failure to argue for plain error and its
application on appeal . . . surely marks the end of the road for an argument for
reversal not first presented to the district court.” Id. at 1131.
Applying these rules, we conclude that Mr. Walker has waived appellate
review of his omitted-information theory. He failed to advance it in the district court,
and he has not made a plain-error argument on appeal.8
8 Even if we were to review this argument, we would reject it. The omitted information largely comprises: (1) Mr. Walker’s opinions regarding (a) whether he complied with Deputy Cochran’s instructions, (b) what constitutes animal cruelty, (c) Agent Priestly’s profit motive (due to her affiliation with Harmony), and (d) the role of the weather; (2) an event that occurred after the warrants were issued (the presence of 11 trailers on the first day of seizure); and (3) assertions that the horses were bred to resist the cold. Mr. Walker’s opinions are not facts Deputy Cochran was required to include in the affidavits, and each of the affidavits did in fact observe that the weather had been “harsh” and stated that “[s]upplement[al] feeding for horses during periods of cold weather and deep snow is paramount to survival,” Aplt. App., Vol. I at 50, 58, 61, 65. Further, the number of trailers brought on the first day of seizure post-dated the completion of the affidavits and therefore could not 13 Appellate Case: 21-1119 Document: 010110648603 Date Filed: 02/23/2022 Page: 14
Mr. Walker also argues that even if there was probable cause to seize between
7 and 12 horses, there was not probable cause to seize 58 horses. This appears to be
a challenge to the district court’s consideration of an argument it characterized as an
overbreadth challenge to the warrants and rejected. The court observed that the
warrant directed seizure and impoundment of horses “‘based on veterinary
recommendations.’” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 169 (brackets omitted) (quoting id., Vol. I
at 52). That description, the court determined, was sufficiently particular for a
reasonable officer to conclude she was permitted to seize any horses the veterinarian
recommended for seizure, given that animal cruelty was the alleged offense.
The district court’s analysis is sound. The Fourth Amendment requires
warrants to “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A description is sufficiently particular
when it enables the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things
authorized to be seized.” United States v. Cooper, 654 F.3d 1104, 1126 (10th Cir.
have been included in the affidavits, and Mr. Walker’s own allegations reveal that a number of horses bred to withstand the cold were faring poorly. Mr. Walker also claims the issuing judges should have been informed that he had been breeding horses and using them in his business for more than 40 years, but we fail to see how omitting that information misled the judges regarding Deputy Cochran’s observations in January and February of 2019. In any event, all four affidavits referred to the most recent 20 years of Mr. Walker’s career by stating he had been at Badger Basin Ranch for 10 years and had run another Colorado ranch for 10 years before that. And contrary to Mr. Walker’s argument, the affidavits did not mislead the issuing judges into believing law enforcement would seize only seven horses in the skinny pen. The affidavits recited the poor condition of more than just seven horses, and they informed the issuing judges that any horse could be seized if an assessing veterinarian recommended it. 14 Appellate Case: 21-1119 Document: 010110648603 Date Filed: 02/23/2022 Page: 15
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). And “whether a search warrant is
sufficiently particular depends in part on the nature of the crimes being investigated.”
Id. at 1127.
In this case, because animal cruelty was under investigation, Deputy Cochran
and Agent Priestly could reasonably conclude that the warrants permitted them to
seize any horses the examining veterinarian recommended for seizure based on the
standard set forth in the warrant—the presence of “compromising health conditions
to include physical injuries,” Aplt. App., Vol. I at 44, 52, 60, 64. Mr. Walker never
alleged (and does not argue) that the horses were not seized pursuant to a
veterinarian’s recommendation. And his contention that the “compromising health
conditions” standard itself is overbroad misses the mark. The qualified-immunity
issue is not whether the warrant itself was overbroad, but whether it was reasonable
for Deputy Cochran and Agent Priestly to conclude it was permissible to seize any
horses the veterinarian recommended for seizure. See Messerschmidt, 565 U.S.
at 548-49 (explaining that even if a warrant is overbroad, qualified immunity protects
an officer who has a reasonable belief, based on the circumstances presented in the
warrant, that the warrant permits the seizure at issue).
Finally, Mr. Walker’s reliance on post-seizure facts, whether construed as
relevant to the probable-cause inquiry or the overbreadth inquiry, is misplaced.9
9 The post-seizure facts Mr. Walker relies on include the improvement in the weather following the seizure, the jury verdict in his favor on the animal-cruelty charges, and the opinion of a veterinarian who examined 12 horses at Harmony that were in the worst shape and opined that the horses were skinny solely because of the 15 Appellate Case: 21-1119 Document: 010110648603 Date Filed: 02/23/2022 Page: 16
“Probable cause for a search warrant depends on the facts known to law-enforcement
officers when they obtain the search warrant.” Harte v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 864 F.3d
1154, 1177 (10th Cir. 2017).10
IV. CONCLUSION
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge
cold and snow, and moving them caused more stress than having left them at the ranches. 10 Based on our resolution of the issues in this appeal, we need not address Deputy Cochran’s argument that an order denying Mr. Walker’s motion to suppress in his state criminal proceeding precludes his unreasonable-seizure claim under principles of issue preclusion.