Walker v. Dwelle

187 Iowa 1384
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedJanuary 16, 1920
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 187 Iowa 1384 (Walker v. Dwelle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Walker v. Dwelle, 187 Iowa 1384 (iowa 1920).

Opinion

Ladd, J.

1. deeds: ap^profit^& I. A dam had been constructed across the Shell Rock River, prior to 1871, and a mill erected at the north end of the dam. This was in the northeastern part of the NW14 NE]4 of Section 32, in Township 100 North, Range 20 West, in Worth County, about 10 rods south of the section line. The property belonged to L. [1386]*1386and A. J. Dwelle, as also did about 125 acres of the SE% of Section 29, in the same township. In 1875, the Dwelles conveyed the tract first mentioned, containing about 10.88 acres, to A.. N. Nye and J'. H. Willing, describing it as in Worth County, “commencing at the southwest corner of Block No. sixty-nine in the village of Northwood, as platted and recorded in the town plat record of Worth County, Iowa; thence south one chain and seventy-three links (1-73 links) to a place of beginning. Thence south 2 degrees east 300 links; thence south 18% degrees west 295 links; thence south 73 degrees west 600 links; thence south 82% west 600 links; thence north 61 degrees west 500 links; thence north 30% west 412 links; thence north 83 degrees east, 1,950 links to the place of beginning, containing ten 88-100 acres more or less according to the survey. Also granting the use of the gravel pit situated north of the gristmill (about thirty-five rods) to repair the dam now in connection with said gristmill; and we, L. and A. J. Dwelle, our assigns or representatives, reserve all and the use of the surplus water of the millpond not used in running the grist- and sawmill and machinery and shall have the privilege to build, maintain and keep in repair a flume leading from the flume occupied by said gristmill and sawmill, and machinery used by said water (power) to propel other machinery situated east of said water (power) whei’ever located, the whole use of such surplus water.”

The covenant of warranty was “against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever, including the right of flowage for the use of the mill power at the present height of the dam now built.” The plaintiff acquired this land through mesne conveyances under Nye and Willing, and in this suit seeks to have established the right perpetually to use gravel for the repair of the dam from the strata of gravel beneath the surface soil of land described as follows:

“Beginning at a point in the southeast quarter of Sec[1387]*1387tion 29, in Town 100 North, in Range 20 West, 21 rods west of the north and south qr.-qr. line of said section, and 25 rods north of the south line of said section and running thence north 48 rods, thence east 100 rods more or less to the east line of said Section 29, thence north 31 rods, thence west 20 rods, thence north 8 rods, thence east 20 rods, thence north 12 rods, thence west 20* rods, thence north 18 rods, thence east 20 rods, thence north 12 rods, thence west 20 rods, thence north 14 rods to the east and west quarter line, of said Section 29, thence west 140 rods, more or less to the center of said Section 29, thence south 56 rods, thence east 31 rods, thence south 30 rods, thence west 31 rods, thence south 51 rods, thence east 59 rods to place of beginning.”

The grant of “the use of the gravel pit to repair the dam now in connection with the said gristmill” gave the grantee the right to remove the gravel from the pit; for in no other beneficial manner might the pit be used. The grant of the right to take gravel from the pit is what is denominated in law as profit a prendre, and is the right to take a part of the soil or the produce of the land. Pierce v. Keator, 70 N. Y. 419 (26 Am. Rep. 612); Ladd v. Smith, 107 Ala. 506. This right, when attached to another estate, is in the nature of an easement, but not technically such. In Goddard’s Law of Easements, page 6, the author points out that:

“An easement is a privilege without profit; a right by which one person is entitled to remove and appropriate for his own use, any part of the soil belonging to another man, or anything growing in or attached to, or subsisting upon his land, for the purpose of the profit to be gained from the property thereby acquired in the thing removed, has always been considered in law a different species of right from an easement, and is commonly called a profit a, prendre.”

Thus, it has been held that a right to take stones from the land of another to mend roads, is profit d prendre, and [1388]*1388not an easement. Constable v. Nicholson, 14 C. B. Rep. (N. S.) 229. So, too, of the fight to turn cattle into a lane for the purpose of obtaining pasture, and “to enter land and to cut and carry away trees there growing.” The rule is otherwise concerning water unconfined, for the reason that it is not a product of the soil, and not a permanent part thereof.

“This right of profit d prendre,” as said in Washburn on Easements (4th Ed.), Section 7, “if enjoyed by reason of holding certain other estate, is regarded in the light of an easement appurtenant to an estate; whereas, if it belongs to an individual, distinct from any ownership of other lands, it takes the character of an interest or estate in the land itself, rather than that of a proper easement in or out of the same.”

“Rights to take profits from another’s land may exist in gross, — that is, they may be held by one independently of his ownership of other land, the rule in this respect differing from that usually regarded as applying to easements, unattended with a right of profit. They may, however, be appurtenant to other land, the land to which the right appertains being then the ‘dominant tenement,’ and the land from which the profits are taken being the ‘servient tenement.’ A right of profit, in order that it may be appurtenant to other land, and pass therewith, must be such as to be in some way connected with the enjoyment of the right of property in the dominant tenement, and must be limited by the needs of the latter.” 1 Tiffany on Real Property, Section 336.

In Grubb v. Grubb, 74 Pa. St. 25, Judge Agnew, in the course of his opinion, observed that:

“A right of profit d prendre, which may be held apart from the possession of land, differs therein from an easement, which requires a dominant tenement for its existence. Bainb. Mines, Ed. 1871, p. 237. But a right of profit d [1389]*1389prendre, if enjoyed by reason of holding another estate, is regarded in the light of an easement appurtenant to such other estate. Washb. Easem., Ed. 1863, p. 7. And, says Mr. Justice Strong, in Huff v. McCauley, supra, 209, some modem decisions have called it an easement, though it was a privilege on another man’s land with profit; and he refers to Ritger v. Parker, 8 Cush. 145, and Post v. Pearsall, 22 Wend. 425. It is immaterial, however, whether we call it an easement or a right of profit a prendre annexed to land. It is the same in nature, and is such a right as can be annexed to other land by express grant, and will pass as appurtenant to it. Even land itself, under some circumstances, may be so annexed to other land as to pass as an appurtenant. Murphy v. Campbell, 4 Barr 480, 484-5; Swartz v. Swartz, Id. 353; Cope v. Grant, 7 Id. 488; Blain’s Lessee v. Chambers, 1 S. & R. 169; Pickering v. Stapler, 5 S. & R. 107; Hill v. West, 4 Yeates 142, 146; Grubb v. Guilford, 4 Watts 244. In this case, the right is.

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187 Iowa 1384, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walker-v-dwelle-iowa-1920.