Walker v. City Council of Montgomery

139 Ala. 468
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedNovember 15, 1903
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 139 Ala. 468 (Walker v. City Council of Montgomery) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Walker v. City Council of Montgomery, 139 Ala. 468 (Ala. 1903).

Opinion

McCLELLAN, C. J. —

Section 20, Art. 4 of the constitution of 1875 was in this language: “No bill shall become a law until it shall have been referred to a committee of each house and returned therefrom.” When the Constitutional Convention of 1901 came to deal with this matter of referring bills to committees, etc., it was suggested that certain eiril practices had grown up in the conduct of committees of the house in respect of bills referred, and it was sought to eradicate these practices by certain emendations of this section 20 as carried and embodied, into the new constitution. The practices in question were specified in the discussion of the subject in the convention. It was said that sometimes bills which had been referred by the House to one committee had, without the sanction of the House, gotten into the possession of and been considered and reported by another and distinct committee, and to prevent this in future a provision was inserted requiring the committee to which the reference liad been made to consider, act upon-and return the bill to the house. It was also stated that it had become a custom for the members of a committee to which a bill had been referred to be approached individually and singly when the committee was not in session and ashed to sign a report of the bill to the house, and for members thus to make a report as and for the [474]*474report of the committee without any consideration, discussion or action of or upon the bill by the committee as a committee. To break up-this practice it was provided that a bill referred to a committee must be acted upon.by the committee as a body in session. Again it was brought to the attention of the convention that a prdctice obtained in the legislature to refer local bills to members representing the localities to be affected and for such members to act upon such bills and report them to the house; and to put an end to this evil, the convention added the requirement that every bill should be referred to a standing committee. Emphasizing the importance of these new provisions and for the purpose of enforcing their observance, the convention further ordained that the journals of the Houses should affirmatively show certain facts as to a compliance with them. As thus amplified, section 20 of Art. 4 of the former constitution was embodied in the present constitution as section 62, in this language: “No bill shall become a law until it shall have been referred to a standing committee of each house, acted upon by such committee in session, and returned therefrom, which facts shall affirmatively appear upon the journal of such house.” In reporting this section to the convention, its committee on Legislative Department made the following statement: “To section 20 [of Aid. 4, constitution of 1875] are added the requirements that the reference of bills therein provided for must be to a standing committee of each House, that the action of such committee thereon must be had in session, and that the facts of reference, action in session, and return must affirmatively appear on the journal of each House.”

Such is the genesis of section 62 of the constitution of 1901, and such the circumstances of its ordination. With its text illumined by a consideration of the former organic provision, by the report of the convention committee, and by the discussion had upon it in the convention, we come now to interpret it in so far as a correct reading of it is necessary to the decision of the case before us.

[475]*475Under the provisions of the former constitution in this regard, but two things were necessary to he done: first, the reference of the hill to a committee, and second, its return from that committee to the House. No requirement was made as to what the committee should do with the bill while in its possession, or that it would do anything whatever with it. Of course, the contemplation was that the committee should consider the bill, and report to the House the result of its consideration, and the rules of the respective Houses proceed upon that idea; but nothing of that sort was necessary to the passage of the bill. And, as there was no requirement that the facts of reference and return should appear affirmatively on the journal, a bill might well become a law in point of fact without such reference to or return from a committee. However, the requirement has doubtless been uniformly complied with, and in consonance with the theory and purpose of such references, and with the rules of the Houses, it has been always the practice and custom for committees to make reports on the bills referred to them. In cases where the committees have no purpose to suggest amendments to bills referred, to them, and apart from bills returned to the House for re-reference to another committee, three forms of report have been in common and constant use in the legislature as appears from the journals of the two Houses throughout the years, viz.: one, a report favoring the passage of the bill, another, a report adverse to its passage, and, the third, a report that the committee returns the bill without recommendation; that is, they do not recommend either the passage or rejection of the bill by the House. So far as the status of bills in the House after report is concerned, those favorably reported and those reported “without recommendation’’ stand upon the same footing, both, upon the coming in of the report, being .read a second time and put upon the calendar. And this is true even when the rule of the House provides only for the second reading and putting on the calendar of bills favorably reported; the theory of the rule being that all bills not adversely reported are favorably reported for all the purposes of their subsequent legislative status. [476]*476From all this one thing clearly appears, to-wit, that the determination ■ of a committee to return a bill to the House “without recommendation” was always, prior to the present constitution, recognized as action by the committee upon such bill; and in view of the advantageous status such determination and report gave to the bill in the House, the same indeed as that of a bill favorably reported, there is no ground or reason for saying that it was not essentially and inherently affirmative action by the committee on the bill. We are not aware that this mode of action by committees and the consequence accorded to such committee action by the respective Houses of the Legislature has ever been the subject of complaint or criticism. It has never, we believe, been considered an evil legislative practice. There was no suggestion in the report of the convention committee upon the proposed additions to section 20, Art. IY of the former constitution nor iu the discussion thereon in the convention that any change as to this matter was necessary or desirable or was intended to be made. The only change that was proposed or made in respect of committee ad ion, had no reference to the nature of such action, but only to the circumstances under which action should be taken. It was to the effect that whatever action a committee should take on a bill, should be had while the committee was in session. It forbids a committee to act on a bill hereafter unless the body is assembled and acts as'a body; but the amended section leaves the committee the same freedom of action while in session that it has heretofore had. The reference in section 62 to action by the committee was necessary to the declaration that it must be had in a session of the committee, and was made for no other purpose.

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Bluebook (online)
139 Ala. 468, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walker-v-city-council-of-montgomery-ala-1903.