SUMMERS, Justice:
Plaintiff sued her residential landlord for actual and punitive damages, claiming (1) that she was wrongfully evicted, and (2) that he took, lost, and damaged her personal property. Defendant moved to strike the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, arguing that statutory remedies were exclusive. The trial court declined to strike the prayer, but certified the issue for interlocutory review under 12 O.S.1981 § 952(b)(3). The proceedings have been stayed pending our decision.
We have granted certiorari and conclude that the issue as certified and briefed fairly consists of three questions: First, may a residential tenant in an action for wrongful eviction recover punitive damages in addition to the damages allowed by statute? Second, in the event she cannot, may she elect, at her option, whether to sue under the Oklahoma Residential Landlord and Tenant Act or at common law? Third, may she pursue a common law cause of action for conversion of, or damage to, her personal property in addition to the statutory claim for wrongful eviction? We answer the first two questions in the negative, and the third in the positive.
I. WRONGFUL EVICTION
Plaintiff Wagoner brought suit in August, 1989, for damages claimed due for additional rent and utilities, emotional and mental duress,1 plus punitive damages for [478]*478the defendant’s wilful and unlawful acts. We have not before addressed the issue of whether punitive damages may be awarded for wrongful eviction along with double damages under the Oklahoma Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 41 O.S.1981 § 101 et seq. Section 123 of that Act limits damage in wrongful eviction cases to “an amount not more than twice the average monthly rental, or twice [the] actual damages, whichever is greater.” Defendant Bennett urges that recovery of both punitive and statutory double damages is prohibited under the general rule which disallows “double recovery” for a single inury. John Mohr & Sons, Inc. v. Jahnke, 55 Wis.2d 402,198 N.W.2d 363, 368 (1972); see generally Annot., 40 A.L.R.4th 11, 51-55 (1985).
To resolve this question, we focus on the question of whether the double damages allowed under Section 123 are penal (or punitive) in nature. Punitive damages are those damages which are given because of the wanton, reckless, malicious, or oppressive character of the acts of the defendant. Hamilton v. Amwar Petroleum Co., Inc., 769 P.2d 146, 149 (Okla.1989); Slocum v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 678 P.2d 716, 719 (Okla.1983); In re Smith, 211 Kan. 397, 507 P.2d 189, 193 (1973). They are meant to punish the wrongdoers and to act as a deterrent to others. Hamilton, 769 P.2d at 149.
Such damages are allowed not because of any special merit in the injured party’s case, but are imposed by way of punishing the wrongdoer for malicious, vindictive or a willful and wanton invasion of the injured party’s rights, the purpose being to restrain and deter others from the commission of like wrongs. (Citations omitted) Smith, 507 P.2d at 194.
We note that several other jurisdictions have addressed similar questions regarding double recovery. For example, a Pennsylvania Court held that punitive damages could not be awarded because the statutes governing the landlord and tenant relationship provided for double damages. His World, Inc. v. Cleto M., Inc., 250 Pa.Super. 293, 378 A.2d 943 (1977). There, the landlord entered into the leased premises and sold the personal property even though the rent was not in arrears. The landlord claimed that the premises had been abandoned. The tenants disagreed, stating that they intended to remodel the leased space, and to continue to pay rent. The court held that there was no basis for allowing the recovery of both punitive damages and statutory double damages because the statutory damages were punitive in nature.
The Arkansas Supreme Court addressed a similar question in Stoner v. Houston, 265 Ark. 928, 582 S.W.2d 28 (1979). The plaintiff brought suit under a statute governing timber damage, seeking both actual and punitive damages. The statute allowed for treble damages. The jury awarded actual and punitive damages. The trial court then tripled the actual damages, relying on the language of the statute. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court noted that the treble damages were punitive in nature, and refused to award both, finding that this would allow for a double punitive recovery. Id. 582 S.W.2d at 30-31; see also Bill Terry’s, Inc. v. Atlantic Motor Sales, 409 So.2d 507 (Fla. App.1982). The court determined, however, that the plaintiffs could elect the remedy they wanted to pursue.
In John Mohr & Sons, Inc. v. Jahnke, 55 Wis.2d 402, 198 N.W.2d 363 (1972), the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered a “restraint of trade” statute which provided for treble damages. The court found that a person could not recover damages both under the statute and at common law because “when a statute creates a cause of action and provides the remedy, the remedy is exclusive.” Id. 198 N.W.2d at 368. As such, allowing punitive damages in addition to the treble damages provided by statute was held inconsistent as allowing double recovery for a single injury. Only those damages provided by the statute, it being punitive in nature, would be allowed. Id. at 369.
Following the reasoning of Mohr, the Iowa Supreme Court agreed that both punitive damages and treble damages under a trespass statute were not recoverable. [479]*479Johnson v. Tyler, 277 N.W.2d 617, 619 (Iowa 1979). The court stated that by-bringing the suit under the statute the plaintiff had elected to pursue statutory damages, and that those damages were themselves punitive in nature. Id. at 618.
In Eastern Star, Inc. v. Union Bldg. Materials, 6 Haw.App. 125, 712 P.2d 1148 (1985), the plaintiff prayed for punitive damages as well as treble damages under a “deceptive trade practices” statute. The appellate court followed the Mohr decision, reasoning that an award of both treble damages and punitive damages for the same act constituted improper double recovery. Id. 712 P.2d at 1159. It held that the proper amount of recovery is either treble damages or punitive damages, whichever is the greatest.
Wagoner cites Ramirez v. Baran, 730 P.2d 515 (Okla.1986) for the proposition that both types of damages are recoverable. In Ramirez, the plaintiffs leased from the defendant a commercial building in which they operated a restaurant. Following negotiations on a new lease, defendant instructed that the lease had to be returned to her by 5:00 p.m. Plaintiffs attempted to return the signed lease but could not find the defendant. The following morning defendant locked ■ the plaintiffs out of the building and they were not allowed to reenter for over three weeks. Plaintiffs brought an action for wrongful eviction and conversion, asking for punitive damages. We held that punitive damages were properly allowed.
We find Ramirez to be inapplicable to our present case. Ramirez involved commercial property rather than residential property, and thus did not fall under the ORLTA.
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SUMMERS, Justice:
Plaintiff sued her residential landlord for actual and punitive damages, claiming (1) that she was wrongfully evicted, and (2) that he took, lost, and damaged her personal property. Defendant moved to strike the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, arguing that statutory remedies were exclusive. The trial court declined to strike the prayer, but certified the issue for interlocutory review under 12 O.S.1981 § 952(b)(3). The proceedings have been stayed pending our decision.
We have granted certiorari and conclude that the issue as certified and briefed fairly consists of three questions: First, may a residential tenant in an action for wrongful eviction recover punitive damages in addition to the damages allowed by statute? Second, in the event she cannot, may she elect, at her option, whether to sue under the Oklahoma Residential Landlord and Tenant Act or at common law? Third, may she pursue a common law cause of action for conversion of, or damage to, her personal property in addition to the statutory claim for wrongful eviction? We answer the first two questions in the negative, and the third in the positive.
I. WRONGFUL EVICTION
Plaintiff Wagoner brought suit in August, 1989, for damages claimed due for additional rent and utilities, emotional and mental duress,1 plus punitive damages for [478]*478the defendant’s wilful and unlawful acts. We have not before addressed the issue of whether punitive damages may be awarded for wrongful eviction along with double damages under the Oklahoma Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 41 O.S.1981 § 101 et seq. Section 123 of that Act limits damage in wrongful eviction cases to “an amount not more than twice the average monthly rental, or twice [the] actual damages, whichever is greater.” Defendant Bennett urges that recovery of both punitive and statutory double damages is prohibited under the general rule which disallows “double recovery” for a single inury. John Mohr & Sons, Inc. v. Jahnke, 55 Wis.2d 402,198 N.W.2d 363, 368 (1972); see generally Annot., 40 A.L.R.4th 11, 51-55 (1985).
To resolve this question, we focus on the question of whether the double damages allowed under Section 123 are penal (or punitive) in nature. Punitive damages are those damages which are given because of the wanton, reckless, malicious, or oppressive character of the acts of the defendant. Hamilton v. Amwar Petroleum Co., Inc., 769 P.2d 146, 149 (Okla.1989); Slocum v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 678 P.2d 716, 719 (Okla.1983); In re Smith, 211 Kan. 397, 507 P.2d 189, 193 (1973). They are meant to punish the wrongdoers and to act as a deterrent to others. Hamilton, 769 P.2d at 149.
Such damages are allowed not because of any special merit in the injured party’s case, but are imposed by way of punishing the wrongdoer for malicious, vindictive or a willful and wanton invasion of the injured party’s rights, the purpose being to restrain and deter others from the commission of like wrongs. (Citations omitted) Smith, 507 P.2d at 194.
We note that several other jurisdictions have addressed similar questions regarding double recovery. For example, a Pennsylvania Court held that punitive damages could not be awarded because the statutes governing the landlord and tenant relationship provided for double damages. His World, Inc. v. Cleto M., Inc., 250 Pa.Super. 293, 378 A.2d 943 (1977). There, the landlord entered into the leased premises and sold the personal property even though the rent was not in arrears. The landlord claimed that the premises had been abandoned. The tenants disagreed, stating that they intended to remodel the leased space, and to continue to pay rent. The court held that there was no basis for allowing the recovery of both punitive damages and statutory double damages because the statutory damages were punitive in nature.
The Arkansas Supreme Court addressed a similar question in Stoner v. Houston, 265 Ark. 928, 582 S.W.2d 28 (1979). The plaintiff brought suit under a statute governing timber damage, seeking both actual and punitive damages. The statute allowed for treble damages. The jury awarded actual and punitive damages. The trial court then tripled the actual damages, relying on the language of the statute. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court noted that the treble damages were punitive in nature, and refused to award both, finding that this would allow for a double punitive recovery. Id. 582 S.W.2d at 30-31; see also Bill Terry’s, Inc. v. Atlantic Motor Sales, 409 So.2d 507 (Fla. App.1982). The court determined, however, that the plaintiffs could elect the remedy they wanted to pursue.
In John Mohr & Sons, Inc. v. Jahnke, 55 Wis.2d 402, 198 N.W.2d 363 (1972), the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered a “restraint of trade” statute which provided for treble damages. The court found that a person could not recover damages both under the statute and at common law because “when a statute creates a cause of action and provides the remedy, the remedy is exclusive.” Id. 198 N.W.2d at 368. As such, allowing punitive damages in addition to the treble damages provided by statute was held inconsistent as allowing double recovery for a single injury. Only those damages provided by the statute, it being punitive in nature, would be allowed. Id. at 369.
Following the reasoning of Mohr, the Iowa Supreme Court agreed that both punitive damages and treble damages under a trespass statute were not recoverable. [479]*479Johnson v. Tyler, 277 N.W.2d 617, 619 (Iowa 1979). The court stated that by-bringing the suit under the statute the plaintiff had elected to pursue statutory damages, and that those damages were themselves punitive in nature. Id. at 618.
In Eastern Star, Inc. v. Union Bldg. Materials, 6 Haw.App. 125, 712 P.2d 1148 (1985), the plaintiff prayed for punitive damages as well as treble damages under a “deceptive trade practices” statute. The appellate court followed the Mohr decision, reasoning that an award of both treble damages and punitive damages for the same act constituted improper double recovery. Id. 712 P.2d at 1159. It held that the proper amount of recovery is either treble damages or punitive damages, whichever is the greatest.
Wagoner cites Ramirez v. Baran, 730 P.2d 515 (Okla.1986) for the proposition that both types of damages are recoverable. In Ramirez, the plaintiffs leased from the defendant a commercial building in which they operated a restaurant. Following negotiations on a new lease, defendant instructed that the lease had to be returned to her by 5:00 p.m. Plaintiffs attempted to return the signed lease but could not find the defendant. The following morning defendant locked ■ the plaintiffs out of the building and they were not allowed to reenter for over three weeks. Plaintiffs brought an action for wrongful eviction and conversion, asking for punitive damages. We held that punitive damages were properly allowed.
We find Ramirez to be inapplicable to our present case. Ramirez involved commercial property rather than residential property, and thus did not fall under the ORLTA. Unlike our situation wherein the statutory scheme explicitly controls and limits the rights of a residential tenant with regard to wrongful eviction, the general statutes governing rentals are not as restrictive as to commercial property. See 41 O.S.1981 §§ 1-40.
Following the reasoning of our sister jurisdictions, the remedy provided in 41 O.S. 1981 § 123 is limited by its own language to “not more than twice the average monthly rental, or twice his actual damages, whichever is greater.” The statute compensates the tenant for any actual damages, and then allows that figure to be doubled. We see no other interpretation but that the legislature intended the landlord to face a monetary penalty for wrongful eviction. This holding is consistent with Crow v. Davidson, 186 Okl. 84, 96 P.2d 70, 72 (1936), wherein we agreed that an ejectment statute which provided for treble damages was penal in nature. We hold that Section 123 is likewise penal in nature. Thus, both punitive damages and double statutory damages are not recoverable by a residential tenant for the same wrongful eviction.
II. ELECTION OF REMEDIES
In light of this resolution, the next question to be answered (and one we believe to be fairly comprised within the issue tendered) is whether the tenant may elect to pursue the common law action of wrongful eviction instead of the statutory cause of action. Plaintiff points out she did not frame her pleadings under the statutory double damage provision, electing instead to pursue her remedy at common law. An election between the two causes of action by the tenant would be permissible if the statutory cause of action did not supplant the common law action. See Bowles v. Neely, 28 Okl. 556, 115 P. 344 (1911); Edwards v. Travelers Ins., 563 F.2d 105, 119-120 (6th Cir.1977). To determine the sweep of the statute, we turn to Section 103 of the Oklahoma Residential Landlord and Tenant Act:
Except as otherwise provided in this act, this act applies to, regulates, and determines rights, obligations and remedies under a rental agreement, wherever made, for a dwelling unit located within this state.
The Act specifies the rights and limits the remedies of a tenant of residential property. It was enacted to codify the changes which have evolved in the area of residential landlord and tenant law. Downing, Oklahoma Residential Landlord and Tenant Act: A Brief Outline, 50 O.B.J. [480]*480412 (1979). With this enactment the legislature sought to “provide specific guidelines for the regulation of residential rental property.” Downing, The Oklahoma Residential Landlord and Tenant Act — The Continuing Experience, 17 Tulsa L.J. 97, 102 (1981).
In Staples v. Baty, 206 Okl. 288, 242 P.2d 705 (1952), this court addressed the exclusivity of a tenant’s cause of action and remedy under 41 O.S.1941 § 31, now 41 O.S.1981 § 118, of the ORLTA. We affirmed prior rulings dating back to 1926, wherein the remedies provided by statute to the tenant were held to be exclusive, and held that “the tenant has no right of action in tort_” Staples, 242 P.2d at 706. We had earlier said that “where a statute creates a right and prescribes a remedy for its violation, the remedy thus prescribed is exclusive.” Ewing v. Cadwell, 121 Okl. 115, 247 P. 665, 666 (1926).
We believe the same holds true under section 123. Section 123 fixes the remedy for one’s wrongful removal or exclusion from a dwelling unit. Considering the legislature’s apparent intent in enacting the ORLTA together with prior case law, we find that the tenant’s cause of action is regulated and determined by the statute, as is the remedy. Section 123 supplants the common law cause of action for wrongful eviction. A choice between the statutory cause of action and the common law cause of action is not available to the residential tenant.
Although the issue was not raised by the parties, the dissent urges that any differentiation between commercial tenants and residential tenants is violative of the “constitutional policy that favors uniformity of treatment for the same class.” Thus the dissent would hold that because commercial tenants have a common law remedy of punitive damages, residential tenants must be given the same remedy.
We disagree. Article 5, Section 59 of the Oklahoma Constitution requires that all persons or things in a designated class be treated equally under the law. Mistletoe Express Serv. v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 674 P.2d 1, 10 (Okla.1983). However, it “allows the legislature to pass special laws when a general law is not applicable. ” Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816, 822 (Okla.1988). “A classification is not infirm if the special class has some reasonable distinction from other subjects of a like general character, which distinction bears some reasonable relation to the legitimate objectives and purposes of the legislation.” Black v. Ball Janitorial Serv. Inc., 730 P.2d 510, 514 (Okla.1986).
Here, the differentiation between commercial and residential tenants is necessary to afford the residential tenant protections which are not particularly needed by commercial tenants. See Backman, The Tenant as a Consumer? A Comparison of Developments in Consumer Law and In Landlord/Tenant Law, 33 O.L.R. 1, 3-4 (1980). Rather than forcing a residential tenant to litigate in the traditional and lengthy manner, the ORLTA provides specific relief to expedite the resolution of such disputes to avoid disruptions resulting from eviction from one’s home. It encourages the residential tenant to file a claim by providing a speedy remedy and the incentive of double damages, even in the absence of provable malicious or oppressive behavior by the landlord.
In several situations the legislature has seen fit to treat the arena of commerce differently from that of the non-commercial consumer. For example, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code applies to consumer credit sales, see 14A O.S.1981 § 2-102, but specifically exempts those credit transactions made to business or governmental borrowers. See 14A O.S.1981 § 1-202. This legislation has withstood constitutional attack under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the Federal Constitution. Aldens Inc. v. Ryan, 571 F.2d 1159 (10th Cir.1978). The Uniform Commercial Code likewise treats the non-commercial customer differently from the commercial customer. See 12A O.S.1981 §§ 2-102, 2-104(1).
We believe the ORLTA bears a reasonable relation to legitimate legislative objectives in providing rights and remedies to residential landlords and tenants. We do [481]*481not agree that the ORLTA violates Art. 5, § 59.
III. CONVERSION OR INJURY TO PROPERTY
The final issue to be addressed is whether Wagoner may assert a common law cause of action for conversion or injury to personal property in addition to her wrongful eviction claim under the ORLTA. In her petition, Wagoner alleges that Bennett wrongfully took, lost, and damaged certain of her personal possessions. We have already determined that the common law cause of action for wrongful eviction was supplanted by the ORLTA; however, this does not exclude the possibility of a traditional cause of action for conversion and/or injury to personal property.
The ORLTA provides a claim when the “landlord wrongfully removes or excludes a tenant from the possession of a dwelling unit.”2 It continues by providing that the tenant may recover possession of the dwelling, or terminate the lease, and in either event, recover damages.3 The Act in effect at the time of the eviction also provided for the sale or disposal of personal property abandoned or surrendered by the tenant. See 41 O.S.1988 § 130(A). But nowhere did the 1988 version mention a cause of action for the wrongful removal or destruction of personal property if the tenant was evicted.4
At common law, conversion was “any act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another’s personal property in denial of or inconsistent with [the individual’s] rights therein.” Steenbergen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan, 753 P.2d 1330, 1332 (Okla.1987). This cause of action focuses on the personal property of an individual. The Act focuses on the wrongful removal or exclusion from a residential dwelling. We do not believe that this 1988 Act supplants that common law action of conversion. Thus, the version of the ORLTA in effect at the time of the eviction does not prevent Wagoner from bringing an action for conversion of personal property.
Punitive damages are permissible in a common law conversion action. See Shipman v. Craig Ayers Chevrolet, Inc., 541 P.2d 876, 880-81 (Okla.App.1975). Because the statutory action for wrongful eviction and the common law action for conversion involve different elements, we find no reason that punitive damages should not be allowed for the latter. This does not violate the general rule against double recovery. Two different wrongs are being asserted and each involves different damages. An award of punitive damages conversion is not governed by the statutory limits set for a wrongful eviction action. Wagoner is not prohibited from asking for punitive damages with regard to the conversion action.
The trial court’s order leaving undisturbed the plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages is thus reversed in part and affirmed in part. The stay is lifted and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with these views.
[482]*482HODGES, V.C.J., and LAVENDER, SIMMS, DOOLIN and HARGRAVE, JJ„ concur.
OPALA,- C.J., concurs in result in Parts I and III, dissents from Part II.
ALMA WILSON and KAUGER, JJ., concur in part; dissent in part.