Wagafe v. Biden

Opinion

1 HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES 2 3

5 6 7

8 9 10 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 12 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 13 AT SEATTLE 14 ABDIQAFAR WAGAFE, et al., 15 CASE NO. C17-00094 RAJ Plaintiffs, 16 ORDER ON SANCTIONS v. 17 18 DONALD TRUMP, et al., 19 Defendants. 20 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ supplemental briefing in support of 21 Plaintiffs’ previous motion for sanctions (Dkt. # 137). Dkt. # 231. For the following 22 reasons the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 The procedural history of this case has been recounted at length in previous orders 25 and the Court will not repeat it here. Of particular relevance to this dispute is this Court’s 26 February 27, 2019 order granting Plaintiffs’ previous motion for sanctions (Dkt. # 137) 27 1 based on Defendants’ resistance to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests necessitating multiple 2 motions to compel. Dkt. # 223. The Court ordered Defendants to pay Plaintiffs’ 3 reasonable attorney fees in connection with the litigation of Plaintiffs’ September 2017 4 motion to compel (Dkt. # 91) and instructed Plaintiffs to submit supplemental briefing 5 detailing the reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in preparing the motion for sanctions 6 (Dkt. # 137). Dkt. # 223 at 13. Plaintiffs subsequently submitted supplemental briefing 7 (Dkt. # 231), Defendants responded (Dkt. # 255), and this matter is currently before the 8 Court. 9 II. DISCUSSION 10 Because the Court has already concluded that attorney fees are warranted, the only 11 remaining question is the reasonableness of the requested fees. District courts have broad 12 discretion to determine the reasonableness of fees. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 13 1398 (9th Cir. 1992). To make this determination, courts determine the “lodestar 14 amount,” which is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended 15 by a reasonable hourly rate. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th 16 Cir. 2008). The lodestar figure is presumptively a reasonable fee award. Id. at 977. The 17 moving party has the burden to produce evidence that the rates and hours worked are 18 reasonable. See Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Int’l, 6 F.3d 614, 623 (9th Cir. 1983). 19 To assist the Court in calculating the lodestar, the fee applicant must submit 20 “satisfactory evidence . . . that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the 21 community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, 22 and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895–96 n.11 (1984). The relevant 23 community is that in which the district court sits. See Schwarz v. Sec’y of Health & 24 Human Serv., 73 F.3d 895, 906 (9th Cir. 1995). 25 Plaintiffs request $73,476.08 for 132.25 hours of work at hourly rates of $415.36 26 to $815.62 in connection with the litigation of their motion for sanctions. Dkt. # 231 at 3. 27 Plaintiffs submit several declarations in support of their motion, detailing the experience, 1 hourly rates, hours, and work performed by Plaintiffs’ attorneys. Dkt. ## 232-237. The 2 Court previously reviewed Plaintiffs’ requested 2017 rates in connection with the initial 3 motion for sanctions and found them reasonable. # 223 at 11. Although the requested 4 rates are now based on hourly rates for 2018, after reviewing the supporting declarations, 5 the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ requested rates are reasonable. 6 As for the number of hours worked, in determining the reasonableness of hours 7 spent preparing a motion, the Court may exclude any hours that are excessive, redundant, 8 or otherwise unnecessary. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1983). In 9 determining the reasonableness of hours spent preparing a motion, the Court may exclude 10 any hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 11 461 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1983). Defendants object to Plaintiffs’ requested fees on multiple 12 grounds arguing that the requested hours are duplicative, excessive, impermissibly based 13 on “block-billed” time entries, and unreasonably ambiguous. Dkt. # 255, Ex. 1. 14 Overall, the Court finds that the hours claimed are reasonable. However, as noted 15 by Defendants, Plaintiffs were not fully successful on their motion for sanctions. See 16 Dkt. # 223 (granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions). Thus, a 17 50% reduction of the total fees claimed is warranted. This apportionment is 18 approximately in line with the percentage of arguments Plaintiffs prevailed on in their 19 motion for sanctions. Id. The Court calculates the total amount of attorneys’ fees to be 20 awarded in connection with the motion for sanctions as $36,738.04. This amount 21 represents 50% of the sum of the hours and fees claimed in Plaintiffs’ supplemental brief 22 and supporting declarations. See Dkt. ## 231-237. 23 III. CONCLUSION 24 For the above reasons, Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions in connection with the 25 litigation of Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions (Dkt. # 137) is GRANTED. Dkt. # 231. 26 Within 30 (thirty) days of the date of this order, Defendants are ordered to pay 27 1 $36,738.04, along with the $50,507.92 previously ordered (see Dkt. # 223), to the Perkins 2 Coie Trust Account. 3 4 Dated this 14th day of May, 2020. 5 ____________________________ A 6 7 8 The Honorable Richard A. Jones United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27