UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TIMOTHY WADE,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 23 - 1527 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan
FIONTA, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Timothy Wade worked for Fionta, Inc., a consulting firm, for about five short months
before Fionta fired him. Mr. Wade sued Fionta for discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work
environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the D.C. Human Rights
Act (DCHRA). Mr. Wade, who describes himself as an African American homosexual male,
alleges that he was bullied, harassed, and ultimately fired because of his race, sex, and sexual
orientation. Fionta now seeks summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The
Court takes seriously Mr. Wade’s allegations that he was treated unfairly at Fionta. But the record
does not support violations of the relevant statutes. Accordingly, the Court must grant Fionta’s
motion and enter summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The Court draws the facts from the Parties’ Statements of Material Facts and the underlying
materials referenced in those statements. See Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
(DSOF), ECF No. 24-2; Pl.’s Statement of Genuine Issues of Material Facts in Dispute (PSOF),
ECF No. 29-1. The Court assumes the facts in those statements to be true unless they have been specifically disputed, and it assumes the truth of other undisputed statements in the record. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); see also LCvR 7(h)(1). 1
Fionta is a consulting firm that serves nonprofit organizations and associations. Compl.
¶ 13, ECF No. 1. In October 2017, Mr. Wade—who is an African American homosexual male,
DSOF ¶¶ 1–2—interviewed with several firm officials for a Technical Architect position at Fionta,
Opp’n Ex. 1 at 35:3–36:12, 37:21, ECF No. 30-1; DSOF ¶¶ 1–2. At the end of the interview, one
of those officials, Josh Darrin, told Mr. Wade that he would be a better fit for a Salesforce
Consultant position than for a “technical or tech lead role.” Opp’n Ex. 1 at 41:20–42:2. The
Technical Architect role involved supervisory responsibilities, whereas the Salesforce Consultant
position did not. Id. at 25:5–10, 34:12–13. After the interview, Fionta offered Mr. Wade the
Salesforce Consultant position, and he accepted. Id. at 75:4–10.
1. Incidents at Fionta
Mr. Wade began working at Fionta in November 2017. See Opp’n Ex. 5 at P00170,
ECF No. 30-5. The incidents at the core of this case occurred about three months later. On
February 12, 2018, Mr. Darrin called Mr. Wade into his office, along with another Salesforce
Consultant, Eli Nesson. DSOF ¶ 14; Opp’n Ex. 8, ECF No. 30-8. Mr. Wade’s line manager, Al
Scott, was also present. DSOF ¶ 14; Opp’n Ex. 8. They discussed a recent error by Fionta that
caused a large number of emails to be sent to a client. DSOF ¶ 16; Opp’n Ex. 8. Both Mr. Scott
and Mr. Nesson suspected at the time that the error was related to work by Mr. Wade. DSOF
1 Local Rule 7(h) provides that “the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion.” LCvR 7(h)(1). Fionta contends that Mr. Wade’s statement is inadequate and that all of the facts asserted in its statement should be deemed admitted. Reply 1–3, ECF No. 32. Although the Court did not find Mr. Wade’s statement particularly helpful, it declines to say more about the sufficiency of that document, especially because it ultimately grants Fionta’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
2 ¶¶ 17–18; Opp’n Ex. 8. Mr. Darrin began the meeting by questioning Mr. Wade in a manner that
was “obviously accusatory.” Opp’n Ex. 8. He “yelled at” Mr. Wade for two to three minutes,
DSOF ¶ 15; PSOF ¶ 9, while pointing at him “aggressively” and turning red, Opp’n Ex. 1
at 347:6–13. Mr. Nesson tried to explain that Mr. Wade’s role in the mistake was “minimal” and
that “at least the bulk of the responsibility for the error” was his. Opp’n Ex. 8. Although Mr. Darrin
eventually “let up a bit,” id., he continued yelling at Mr. Wade “even when Mr. Nesson admitted”
to the error, PSOF ¶ 9. In fact, the error turned out to be “entirely” Mr. Nesson’s fault. Opp’n
Ex. 8.
The second incident occurred the next day, February 13, 2018. Mr. Darrin again called
Mr. Wade into his office to discuss an assignment. Opp’n Ex. 1 at 143:1–17. He began “yelling”
at Mr. Wade in a “very aggressive” manner, telling Mr. Wade that the document he created was
“too pretty” and insubstantial. Id. at 144:5–15, 145:10–13, 147:6; DSOF ¶ 9. He was “very red”
and had “his fingers in [Mr. Wade’s] face.” Opp’n Ex. 1 at 147:3–4. When Mr. Wade tried to
respond, Mr. Darrin interrupted him and banged his fist on a desk. Id. 149:5–11. The incident
lasted between two and five minutes. Id. at 149:20–21; DSOF ¶ 8. During this incident, Mr. Darrin
did not refer to Mr. Wade’s race, gender, or sexuality. Opp’n Ex. 1 at 148:10–22. 2
On February 15, 2018, a different manager at Fionta, Natalie Dudhat (then called Natalie
Murchinson), emailed Mr. Wade and asked to speak on the phone, observing that his “workload
2 There is some confusion about which of these incidents occurred on February 12 and which occurred on February 13. The Complaint alleges that the meeting with Mr. Scott and Mr. Nesson occurred on February 13, Compl. ¶ 27, ECF No. 1, which is consistent with Mr. Nesson’s deposition testimony, Opp’n Ex. 2 at 90:17–22, ECF No. 30-2. But when deposed, Mr. Wade said that he mixed up the dates in his Complaint, and that this incident actually occurred on February 12. Opp’n Ex. 1 at 152:12–18, ECF No. 30-1. Fionta notes this discrepancy, DSOF at 1 n.1, ECF No. 24-2, but Mr. Wade does not, see Opp’n 3–4, ECF No. 30; PSOF ¶ 9, ECF No. 29-1. Because there appears to be no significance to the sequence of these incidents, the Court adopts Mr. Wade’s deposition testimony for purposes of this motion.
3 ha[d] been light lately.” Decl. Natalie Dudhat (Dudhat Decl.) Ex. D, ECF No. 24-8. Ms. Dudhat
said that she wanted to “plan for a daily check-in” at which Mr. Wade would let her know “what
work is on [his] plate for the day and the associated budget,” and she would “then work on filling
any gaps for the day.” Id. Mr. Wade called Ms. Dudhat a couple hours later. Dudhat Decl. ¶ 10.
During that phone call, Mr. Wade “complained” about the two incidents with Mr. Darrin. Id. He
told Ms. Dudhat that he “was subjected to a hostile work environment” and that Mr. Darrin treated
him “with hostility and aggression” because he “was the only gay black male in the office.” Opp’n
Ex. 3 at P00144, ECF No. 30-3; see Dudhat Decl. ¶ 10. Ms. Dudhat told Mr. Wade that his
complaint would be investigated. Dudhat Decl. ¶ 13; Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 2 at 2, ECF No. 24-4; see
Dudhat Decl. Ex. I, ECF No. 24-8.
That same day, Ms. Dudhat—joined by Fionta co-founder Jeffrey Sullivan—interviewed
Mr. Nesson and Mr. Scott about the February 12 incident. Dudhat Decl. ¶ 11; Decl. Jeffrey
Sullivan (Sullivan Decl.) ¶¶ 7–8, ECF No. 24-7. Mr. Nesson said that he thought Mr. Darrin’s
“tone” and “vibe” were “unnecessarily harsh towards Mr. Wade.” Sullivan Decl. ¶ 9. He also said
that Mr. Darrin had been “harsher” to a different employee (who was an Asian male) than “anyone
else he had seen.” Id. ¶ 10. Mr. Scott reported that “he did not get a sense” that Mr. Darrin
“threatened” Mr. Wade, and that he thought that Mr. Darrin was exhibiting “aggravation.” Id. ¶ 12.
After these interviews, Fionta contacted its outside Human Resources consultants. Dudhat Decl.
¶ 12.
The next day, February 16, 2018, Mr. Sullivan gave Mr. Darrin a memorandum titled
“Inappropriate Workplace Behavior and Corrective Action.” Sullivan Decl. ¶ 13. The
memorandum stated that Mr. Wade had reported “[m]ultiple incidents” when Mr. Darrin’s
“communications and interactions” with Mr. Wade had been “inappropriate and contributed to a
4 hostile work environment that is not acceptable.” Sullivan Decl. Ex. E, ECF No. 24-7. It further
stated that “[o]ther employees ha[d] reported feeling uncomfortable in interactions” with
Mr. Darrin. Id. The memorandum directed “immediate corrective action,” including prohibiting
Mr. Darrin from working at the Fionta office, reassigning Mr. Darrin’s direct reports, and
scheduling a mediation session between Mr. Wade and Mr. Darrin. Id.
A week later, Mr. Sullivan issued a performance improvement plan for Mr. Darrin.
Sullivan Decl. Ex. F, ECF No. 24-7. That plan reiterated that Mr. Darrin’s concerning behavior
“w[ould] no longer be tolerated,” including his failure to “[d]emonstrat[e] equal respect to all
employees regardless of race, gender, sexual orientation, or workplace tenure, or other identities
or distinctions.” Id. Under that heading, the plan referenced Mr. Darrin’s “unequal treatment by
Tim in a meeting.” Id. The plan informed Mr. Darrin that his “performance w[ould] be closely
monitored” for the next month. Id.
Mr. Wade says that, around this time, he had a meeting with Ms. Dudhat and Mr. Sullivan.
Opp’n Ex. 3 at P00144. Mr. Sullivan apologized for the events that occurred and asked what
Mr. Wade thought the resolution should be. Id. Mr. Wade suggested that he could work from home
when Mr. Darrin was in the office, but Mr. Sullivan refused. Id. According to Mr. Wade,
Mr. Sullivan said that if Mr. Wade did not wish to work with Mr. Darrin, Mr. Sullivan would
“simply get rid of both of [them].” Id. Mr. Wade asked if his job was on the line, and Mr. Sullivan
responded “Yes.” Id.
Soon after, Fionta fired Mr. Darrin. DSOF ¶ 52. It did so “because of his treatment of
Mr. Wade.” Sullivan Decl. ¶ 22; see DSOF ¶ 52. Fionta almost immediately re-hired Mr. Darrin
as a consultant “on a transition basis” because it needed his expertise to complete an ongoing
5 project. See Sullivan Decl. ¶ 23. But Mr. Darrin never returned to the office and Mr. Wade never
interacted with him after the two incidents in mid-February. Id.; Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 2 at 2.
2. Work Performance and Termination
As noted above, around the time of the incidents at issue, managers at Fionta were making
efforts to address Mr. Wade’s light workload. At the end of January 2018, Ms. Dudhat told
Fionta’s co-founders, Mr. Sullivan and Lisa Rau, that Mr. Wade had averaged 11% billable hours
for the first three weeks of January, compared to 44% and 31% for two of his peers. Dudhat Decl.
Ex. A, ECF No. 24-8. On February 12 (the day of the first incident with Mr. Darrin), Ms. Dudhat
emailed some Fiona higher-ups, informing them that Mr. Wade “d[id] not have enough work this
week” and asking if they had clients he could do work for. Dudhat Decl. Ex. B, ECF No. 24-8.
The next day (the day of the second incident), Ms. Dudhat emailed other Fionta managers to ask
for work for Mr. Wade and another employee, who “need[ed] billable work.” Dudhat Decl. Ex. C,
ECF No. 24-8. And as already mentioned, on February 15, Ms. Dudhat asked for a meeting with
Mr. Wade to discuss his “light” workload—this is the meeting at which Mr. Wade first reported
Mr. Darrin’s conduct. See Dudhat Decl. Ex. D, ECF No. 24-8.
While Fionta management investigated the incidents involving Mr. Darrin, Mr. Wade’s
managers continued to focus on his workload. See DSOF ¶ 103. On February 22, 2018, Ms. Dudhat
noted to another manager that Mr. Wade “has no work tomorrow.” Dudhat Decl. Ex. M,
ECF No. 24-8. About a week later, Ms. Dudhat emailed Mr. Wade, directing him to “try to get
ahead of mornings wherein [he doesn’t] have work” and that she would “prioritize finding work”
for him. Dudhat Decl. Ex. Q, ECF No. 24-8. A week after that, Mr. Wade reported needing
“roughly 5 hours of work” that day, which Ms. Dudhat tried to help fill. Dudhat Decl. Exs. T, U,
6 ECF No. 24-8. According to Ms. Dudhat, “Mr. Wade failed to consistently email [her] in the
evenings when he had insufficient work the next day.” Dudhat Decl. ¶ 23.
Some personnel at Fionta also expressed concerns about the quality and speed of
Mr. Wade’s work. See DSOF ¶¶ 91–92, 101. After Mr. Wade completed one task in late February,
a Fionta manager went to Ms. Dudhat to “express frustration and confusion” that the task had taken
Mr. Wade longer than anticipated. Dudhat Decl. Ex. R, ECF No. 24-8. And Ms. Rau attests that
Mr. Wade was “by far[] the poorest performer of the Salesforce Consultants on his team while
receiving the highest salary.” Decl. Lisa Rau (Rau Decl.) ¶ 12, ECF No. 24-9. According to
Ms. Rau, “Fionta was concerned about Mr. Wade’s performance, lack of billing, and low output
prior to February 15, 2018.” Id. ¶ 13.
On March 19, 2018, Mr. Sullivan and Ms. Rau decided to fire Mr. Wade. Rau Decl. ¶ 34;
Sullivan Decl. ¶ 25. Mr. Wade was fired that same day. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 2 at 2. According to
Ms. Rau, they made that decision because of Mr. Wade’s “chronic lack of billable hours.” Rau
Decl. ¶ 35. When Fionta fired Mr. Wade, he was told that the reason was “lack of work.” Mot.
Summ. J. Ex. 2 at 2. Around that time, Fionta also fired two other consultants. See DSOF
¶¶ 106–07.
In August 2018, Mr. Wade filed a Charge of Discrimination with the District of Columbia
Office of Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging
discrimination on the basis of race, sexual orientation, and sex. Charge of Discrimination (Charge)
at 1, ECF No. 24-3. He described the incidents that occurred on February 12 and 13, and he also
alleged that his firing was retaliation for reporting Mr. Darrin’s conduct. Id.
7 B. Procedural Background
Mr. Wade sued Fionta in May 2023, asserting discriminatory-treatment claims, hostile
work environment claims, and retaliation claims under Title VII and the DCHRA. Compl.
¶¶ 43–137. After discovery, Fionta moved for summary judgment against Mr. Wade. Mot. Summ.
J., ECF No. 24. That motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. See Opp’n, ECF No. 30; Reply,
ECF No. 32.
LEGAL STANDARD
A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The burden is on the movant to make the initial showing of the absence of
any genuine issues of material fact.” Ehrman v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 2d 61, 66 (D.D.C.
2006). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be
drawn in [its] favor.” Est. of Parsons v. Palestinian Auth., 651 F.3d 118, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). “A party asserting that a fact
cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion” by “citing to particular parts of
materials in the record” or “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or
presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to
support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
“Evaluating whether evidence offered at summary judgment is sufficient to send a case to
the jury is as much art as science.” Est. of Parsons, 651 F.3d at 123. “Courts must avoid making
credibility determinations or weighing the evidence, since credibility determinations, the weighing
of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not
those of a judge.” Rothberg v. Xerox Corp., No. 12-cv-617, 2016 WL 10953882, at *10 (D.D.C.
Feb. 3, 2016) (cleaned up) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,
8 150–51 (2000)). But a court may “evaluate an inadequately supported assertion of material fact
and deem it not materially disputed.” Id. “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of
which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court
should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary
judgment.” Lash v. Lemke, 786 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
380 (2007)).
DISCUSSION
Mr. Wade presses three kinds of claims under Title VII and the DCHRA:
(1) discriminatory treatment claims, (2) hostile work environment claims, and (3) retaliation
claims. The Court will discuss each in turn.
A. Discriminatory Treatment
Mr. Wade asserts that Fionta discriminated against him based on race, sex, and sexual
orientation in violation of Title VII and the DCHRA. None of these claims survive summary
judgment. 3
“Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer ‘to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.’” Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 354 (2024) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e–2(a)(1)). Similarly, the DCHRA “prohibits any employer or educational institution from
discriminating on the basis of ‘race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status,
personal appearance, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, family responsibilities,
3 In their briefing, the Parties do not distinguish among Mr. Wade’s different claimed bases for discrimination—race, sex, and sexual orientation. The Court follows the Parties’ lead and analyzes Mr. Wade’s discriminatory treatment claims jointly.
9 genetic information, disability, matriculation, or political affiliation of any individual[.]’” Kimmel
v. Gallaudet Univ., 639 F. Supp. 2d 34, 40 (D.D.C. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting D.C.
Code § 2–1402.11(a)). Under both Title VII and the DCHRA, the “two essential elements” for a
discriminatory treatment claim are that “(i) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action
(ii) because of the plaintiff’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability.’” Shanks
v. Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers, 134 F.4th 585, 596 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (quoting
Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2008)); Strong v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp.,
No. 25-cv-1011, 2025 WL 2643457, at *2 n.2 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2025) (“In addressing employment
discrimination claims brought under the DCHRA, ‘courts look to the jurisprudence surrounding
Title VII[.]’” (quoting Burt v. Nat’l Republican Club of Capitol Hill, 828 F. Supp. 2d 115, 122
(D.D.C. 2011))).
On the second element, when a plaintiff “lacks direct evidence of discriminatory decision-
making, courts evaluate Title VII disparate treatment claims using the burden-shifting framework
set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).” Dodson v. U.S. Capitol
Police, 633 F. Supp. 3d 235, 252 (D.D.C. 2022). That framework operates in three steps. First,
“the plaintiff must . . . establish a prima facie case of discrimination” by alleging that “he is a part
of a protected class under Title VII, he suffered a cognizable adverse employment action, and the
action gives rise to an inference of discrimination.” Id. (alterations adopted) (quoting Walker v.
Johnson, 798 F.3d 1085, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). If the plaintiff does so, “the burden then shifts to
the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.” Id. at 253 (quoting
Wheeler v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 812 F.3d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). Finally, if the
employer articulates such a reason, “the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff,” id., who “may
defeat summary judgment by proving either that the defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory
10 reason is a pretext for discrimination, . . . or that the employment action was motivated by
discrimination in addition to the proffered legitimate reason,” Morales v. Gotbaum, 42 F. Supp.
3d 175, 188 (D.D.C. 2014).
“[O]nce the employer asserts a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the question whether
the employee actually made a prima face case is no longer relevant and thus disappears and drops
out of the picture.” Wheeler, 812 F.3d at 1114 (alteration in original) (quoting Brady v. Off. of
Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). In that situation, the “one central inquiry”
is “whether the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the
employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff on a prohibited basis.” Id. (quoting Adeyemi v.
District of Columbia, 525 F.3d 1222, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).
Here, Mr. Wade argues that he suffered three adverse employment actions during his tenure
at Fionta: (1) being hired as a Salesforce Consultant despite initially interviewing for a Technical
Architect position, (2) being inappropriately berated by Mr. Darrin in February 2018, and (3) being
fired. Opp’n 10. The first and third incidents are doubtlessly the kinds of actions that can support
a discriminatory treatment claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (forbidding employers “to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual” for a prohibited reason); D.C. Code
§ 2–1402.11(a)(1)(A) (same). But Mr. Darrin’s inappropriate treatment of Mr. Wade at the two
meetings in February 2018 does not constitute “discriminat[ion] against” Mr. Wade “with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” within the meaning of
Title VII or the DCHRA. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1); D.C. Code § 2–1402.11(a)(1)(A). “[N]ot
everything that happens at the workplace affects an employee’s ‘terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment.’” Chambers v. District of Columbia, 35 F.4th 870, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (en banc).
11 And getting yelled at twice by a higher-up—especially when that higher-up is consequently fired—
is not sufficient. See Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 354 (noting that decisions implicating “the what, where,
and when” of an individual’s employment affect the employment’s terms and conditions).
A contrary rule would be inconsistent with the standard applied to hostile work
environment claims. As discussed below, proving such a claim requires a plaintiff to “show that
his employer subjected him to ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ that is ‘sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment.’” Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1201
(quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). In that context, “a few isolated
incidents of offensive conduct do not amount to actionable harassment.” Stewart v. Evans, 275
F.3d 1126, 1129, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (adopting the district court’s reasoning). Permitting such
isolated incidents, like the ones proffered by Mr. Wade here, to constitute an adverse employment
action supporting a discriminatory treatment claim would make hostile work environment claims
entirely redundant. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (“Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to
create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment . . . is beyond Title VII’s purview.”).
Accordingly, only Mr. Wade’s hiring and firing can support his discriminatory treatment
claims. The Court turns next to addressing whether those claims survive summary judgment.
1. Discrimination in Hiring
Mr. Wade contends that a reasonable jury could conclude that Fionta’s decision to hire him
as a Salesforce Consultant rather than a Technical Architect was discriminatory. Opp’n 10. The
Court disagrees. Fionta asserts that it hired Mr. Wade as a Salesforce Consultant because the
officials who interviewed him believed that he “was not qualified to be a technical lead.” Reply 8.
Because Fionta has asserted this “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for firing Mr. Wade, the
“relevant inquiry” is whether Mr. Wade has “produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
12 conclude that [Fionta’s] asserted nondiscriminatory reason for” declining to hire him as a
Technical Architect “was not the actual reason, and that instead [Fionta] was intentionally
discriminating against [Mr. Wade] on account of [his] race,” sex, or sexual orientation. Wheeler,
812 F.3d at 1114 (quoting Brady, 520 F.3d at 493). Mr. Wade has failed to carry that burden. His
Opposition identifies no record evidence supporting that Fionta’s proffered explanation is
pretextual. See Opp’n 10. And Ms. Rau, one of Fionta’s co-founders, has attested that “all” of the
officials who interviewed Mr. Wade “agreed that [he] was not qualified” for the Technical
Architect position. Rau Decl. ¶ 5. Without any evidence suggesting that the hiring officials
considered Mr. Wade’s protected characteristics in making the hiring decision, Mr. Wade’s claims
based on that decision cannot proceed. 4
2. Discrimination in Firing
Mr. Wade’s remaining discriminatory treatment claims hinge on his firing. Fionta says that
it fired Mr. Wade because it lacked “billable work” for him. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (Mot.) 32,
ECF No. 24-1; Reply 13. Given this “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for firing Mr. Wade,
the inquiry again reduces to whether Mr. Wade has “produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable
jury to conclude that” Fionta fired Mr. Wade on account of his protected characteristics. Wheeler,
812 F.3d at 1114 (quoting Brady, 520 F.3d at 493).
4 Fionta also argues that Mr. Wade cannot bring a discriminatory-hiring claim because he failed to exhaust such a claim in his Charge of Discrimination. Reply 7. It is true that “Title VII requires that a person complaining of a violation file an administrative charge with the EEOC and allow the agency time to act on the charge.” Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The DCHRA, however, “is bereft of any exhaustion requirement.” Viardo v. Families USA Found., Inc., No. 25-cv-1603, 2025 WL 2336223, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2025). Although an employee with a DCHRA claim “may file a complaint with the D.C. Office of Human Rights,” the employee may also “file a private cause of action in a court of competent jurisdiction.” Id. at *2 (quoting D.C. Code § 2–1403.16(a)). Because Fionta is entitled to summary judgment on this hiring claim under both Title VII and the DCHRA regardless of whether Mr. Wade exhausted it, the Court declines to address whether the claim was properly exhausted.
13 Mr. Wade argues that a jury must hear these claims because there is record evidence
supporting three propositions: (1) that Fionta treated Mr. Wade worse than other employees,
(2) that Fionta’s explanation for firing Mr. Wade has shifted over time, and (3) that Fionta fired
Mr. Wade shortly after the incidents in February 2018. Opp’n 13–14. The Court concludes that the
record evidence is insufficient to permit Mr. Wade’s claim to survive summary judgment.
Worse treatment. Mr. Wade contends that a jury could conclude that his firing was
discriminatory because Fionta treated him worse than employees without his protected
characteristics. Opp’n 13. “[A] plaintiff may support an inference of discrimination with a showing
that the employer treated the plaintiff differently than similarly situated employees outside the
protected class.” Ruppe v. Blinken, 743 F. Supp. 3d 1, 20 (D.D.C. 2024). Here, however, Mr. Wade
“has not made such a showing.” Id.
Mr. Wade first relies on Mr. Darrin’s conduct in February 2012. Opp’n 11. He suggests
that Mr. Darrin treated him harshly and aggressively, which is unlike how Mr. Darrin treated
others. Id. But there is no evidence that Mr. Darrin played any role in Mr. Wade’s firing. Thus,
there is no evidence connecting any discriminatory attitude harbored by Mr. Darrin to Fionta’s
decision to fire Mr. Wade. Hall v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 1074, 1079–80 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(concluding that an employee’s discriminatory remark was insufficient to save a claim from
summary judgment when there was no evidence that the employee influenced the decision to fire
the plaintiff).
Next, Mr. Wade points to Fionta’s treatment of an employee hired after Mr. Wade was
fired, Katherine Onderdonk, as evidence that Fionta’s proffered explanation is pretextual. Opp’n 9,
13. He argues that Fionta retained Ms. Onderdonk despite her having billable-hour percentages
(which the Parties refer to as “utilization”) that were similar to Mr. Wade’s. Id. The record reflects
14 that Ms. Onderdonk’s utilization rates for her first five months at Fionta were 28.1%, 43.5%,
16.5%, 28.2%, and 91.3%. Opp’n Ex. 9 at P00199, ECF No. 30-9. By contrast, Mr. Wade’s
utilization rates during his five months at Fionta were 5%, 8.2%, 21%, 38%, and 15.8%. Rau Decl.
Ex. B at FIONTA-002748, ECF No. 24-9. These metrics reflect that, in fact, Mr. Wade billed a
notably lower percentage of hours than did Ms. Onderdonk in the months after Fionta hired each
employee.
Further, Mr. Wade’s argument misses that he was not the only employee that Fionta fired
in the spring of 2018. Around that time, Fionta fired two other consultants. DSOF ¶¶ 106–07. One
of them was an Asian man whose career average utilization was the second lowest at Fionta (after
Mr. Wade). Opp’n Ex. 9 at P00198. The other was a white man who ranked fifth lowest in
utilization. Id. Fionta explains that around this time, the company was losing money and had
suffered its worst quarter in years. DSOF ¶ 109. One Fionta co-founder noted that although “there
was work on the horizon, there was not a lot of work to go around,” meaning that it was “hard[] to
retain employees who d[id] not produce.” Rau Decl. ¶ 28. The Court recognizes that “whether two
employees are similarly situated is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury.” Wheeler, 812 F.3d
at 1116. But Mr. Wade’s Opposition articulates no reason why a reasonable jury would conclude
that Fionta’s retention of Ms. Onderdonk reflects discrimination when the company fired other
consultants with low utilization metrics—who did not share Mr. Wade’s protected
characteristics—around the same time that it fired Mr. Wade.
Shifting explanation. Mr. Wade next argues that Fionta’s explanation for firing him has
changed over time, which supports concluding that Fionta’s explanation is pretextual. Opp’n 13.
The D.C. Circuit has recognized that “shifting and inconsistent justifications” for an adverse
employment action can be “probative of pretext.” Geleta v. Gray, 645 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir.
15 2011) (quoting EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 243 F.3d 846, 853 (4th Cir. 2001)). Here, Mr. Wade
perceives Fionta’s explanation to have shifted from the company not having enough work to
Mr. Wade not meeting utilization requirements. Opp’n 13. But this argument’s premise is faulty
because no reasonable jury could agree that Fionta has changed its reason for firing Mr. Wade. As
both Mr. Wade and Fionta agree, the explanation given when Fionta fired Mr. Wade was a “lack
of work.” Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 2 at 2; Opp’n 13; Reply 14. Mr. Wade does not identify when or
where Fionta said that Mr. Wade was fired “because he was not meeting his utilization
requirements.” Opp’n 13. He might have in mind Fionta’s focus on his utilization metrics in its
Motion for Summary Judgment, see Mot. 29, or perhaps Ms. Rau’s comment about Mr. Wade’s
“chronic lack of billable hours,” Rau Decl. ¶ 35. But throughout both its Motion for Summary
Judgment and its Reply, Fionta has consistently stated that it fired Mr. Wade for a lack of work.
Mot. 32; Reply 20–21. And regardless, Mr. Wade does not explain why a reasonable jury would
consider a lack of work for an employee to be any different from an employee lacking billable
hours. See Reply 20 (arguing that “inadequate utilization[] and not enough work[] essentially mean
the same thing”).
Mr. Wade also argues that Fionta hiring Ms. Onderdonk belies its assertion that a lack of
work justified his firing. Opp’n 13. He points to evidence suggesting that Fionta hired
Ms. Onderdonk as a Salesforce Consultant one month after firing Mr. Wade. Opp’n Ex. 9
at P00198–99. Even viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Wade, it does not
discredit Fionta’s stated explanation for the firing. The record reflects that in the several weeks
leading up to Mr. Wade’s termination, managers at Fionta consistently sought to find work for him
and expressed concern about his light workload. See, e.g., Dudhat Decl. Exs. B, C, D, M, Q, T, U;
DSOF ¶ 103. And as discussed above, at that time, Fionta was losing money and fired two other
16 consultants with low utilization metrics alongside Mr. Wade. DSOF ¶¶ 106–07, 109. In that
context, the fact that Fionta then hired Ms. Onderdonk does not undercut that its inability to find
work for Mr. Wade drove its decision to fire him. 5
Temporal proximity. Finally, Mr. Wade argues that “[m]ost telling of all” is that all of the
relevant actions occurred within a short period of time. Opp’n 13–14. Specifically, he notes that
Mr. Darrin yelled at him in February 2018, and that he was fired a month later. Id. But Mr. Wade
does not identify any record evidence connecting his firing to the incidents in February 2018. So
the Court sees no reason why these events occurring within a month supports a jury finding that
Mr. Wade’s firing was discriminatory.
* * *
Considering “all the evidence in its full context,” Mr. Wade has failed to meet “his burden
of showing that a reasonable jury could conclude” that his firing was discriminatory. Aka v. Wash.
Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The Court understands that Mr. Wade believes
5 In its Reply, Fionta argues that Mr. Wade cannot rely on the company hiring Ms. Onderdonk to support his claims of discrimination because he failed to mention Ms. Onderdonk in his Charge. Reply 7. This misconceives the administrative exhaustion doctrine. To bring a lawsuit, a plaintiff must have exhausted any “claims” they assert by including them in a charge of discrimination before the EEOC. Hernández v. Mao, 235 F. Supp. 3d 172, 177 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Park, 71 F.3d at 907). That does not mean, however, that a plaintiff is limited to proving their claims using only facts alleged in the charge. Fionta also relies on a supplemental declaration attached to its Reply to dispute Mr. Wade’s characterization of Ms. Onderdonk’s hiring. Courts in this District “have considered supplemental declarations submitted during . . . the motion for summary judgment . . . briefing process[]” when resolving summary judgment motions. ACLU v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 20-cv-2320, 2022 WL 1262112, at *2 n.2 (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 2022); see also Discepolo v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 16-cv-2351, 2018 WL 6624360, at *6 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2018) (collecting cases from other jurisdictions). But here, Mr. Wade’s argument fails even without considering Fionta’s additional evidence, so the Court declines to rely on it. See Est. of Parsons v. Palestinian Auth., 651 F.3d 118, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor.” (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986))).
17 that his firing was unfair because Fionta failed to communicate its expectations about billable
hours or to assign him enough work. See Opp’n 8–9. Unfair as it might have been, “this Court
declines, as it must, to serve as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business
decisions.” McGrath v. Clinton, 674 F. Supp. 2d 131, 144 (D.D.C. 2009) (cleaned up). The Court
must grant summary judgment to Fionta on Mr. Wade’s discriminatory treatment claims.
B. Hostile Work Environment
Next up is Mr. Wade’s hostile work environment claims under Title VII and the DCHRA.
On the record before the Court, Fionta is entitled to summary judgment on these claims, too. 6
A plaintiff may “establish a violation of Title VII by proving that the employer created or
condoned a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment.” Peters v. District of Columbia, 873
F. Supp. 2d 158, 187–88 (D.D.C. 2012). “To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, a
plaintiff must show that his employer subjected him to discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condition of the victim’s employment and
create an abusive working environment.” Baird v. Gotbaum, 662 F.3d 1246, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(cleaned up). “To determine whether a hostile work environment exists, the court looks to the
totality of the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity,
its offensiveness, and whether it interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Baloch, 550
F.3d at 1201.
6 “A claim for hostile work environment is recognized as a cause of action under the DCHRA.” Walston-Jackson v. CCA of Tenn., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 24, 26 (D.D.C. 2009). “The elements of a hostile work environment claim under the DCHRA mirror the federal requirements.” Elam v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C., 530 F. Supp. 2d 4, 21 n.7 (D.D.C. 2007). The Parties’ arguments regarding Mr. Wade’s hostile work environment claims do not distinguish between Title VII and the DCHRA, and the Court discusses them jointly as well.
18 Here, Mr. Wade again relies on the two incidents in February 2018. He says that those
incidents made him “fear for his safety” and feel “humiliate[ed] and embarrass[ed].” Opp’n 16;
PSOF ¶ 16. The Court does not doubt that a jury could agree that Mr. Wade held a “subjective
belief that []he experienced a hostile work environment.” Jenkins v. District of Columbia, 281 F.
Supp. 3d 77, 87 (D.D.C. 2017). But to succeed on this claim, the jury must also find that the
workplace was objectively hostile, as “judged ‘from the perspective of a reasonable person in the
plaintiff’s position, considering all the circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)).
Even assuming that a jury could reasonably conclude that there was “some linkage”
between Mr. Darrin’s conduct and Mr. Wade’s protected characteristics, such a jury could not
conclude that Mr. Darrin’s conduct clears the “high bar for the types of behavior that create a
hostile workplace.” Id. at 87–88. Although Mr. Darrin’s treatment of Mr. Wade was inappropriate
and unprofessional, it was also “the kind of ‘ordinary tribulation[] of the workplace’ that does not
give rise to a hostile workplace claim.” Uzoukwu v. Metro. Wash. COG, 130 F. Supp. 3d 403, 415
(D.D.C. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Franklin v. Potter, 600 F. Supp. 2d 38, 76 (D.D.C.
2009)); see also Knight v. Mabus, 134 F. Supp. 3d 348, 356 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[O]ne occasion of
yelling is insufficiently pervasive or severe to support a hostile work environment claim.”). Simply
put, “a few isolated incidents of offensive conduct do not amount to actionable harassment.”
Stewart, 275 F.3d at 1129, 1134 (adopting the district court’s reasoning). The Court must grant
summary judgment to Fionta on these claims too.
C. Retaliation
Finally, Mr. Wade claims that Fionta violated Title VII and the DCHRA by firing him in
retaliation for reporting Mr. Darrin’s conduct. These claims also come up short.
19 Title VII “prohibits retaliation against an employee ‘because he has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any matter in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
[Title VII].’” Salak v. Pruitt, 277 F. Supp. 3d 11, 21 (D.D.C. 2017) (alterations in original)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a)). “A plaintiff who seeks to prove that he has been subjected to
unlawful retaliation must show that (1) he engaged in activity that Title VII protects; (2) his
employer took a materially adverse action against him; and (3) the employer took the action
because of the protected activity.” Id. “Evaluation of Title VII retaliation claims follows the same
burden-shifting template as discrimination claims.” Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 901 (D.C.
Cir. 2006). “First, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of retaliation; if she meets that
burden, the employer must articulate a legitimate nonretaliatory reason for its action; finally, the
plaintiff has the ultimate burden of establishing that the reason asserted by the employer is pretext
for retaliation.” Id.
Under the DCHRA, it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice to . . . retaliate against . . .
any person . . . on account of having exercised or enjoyed . . . any right granted or protected under
this chapter.” Simmons v. Langston Lane Ltd. P’ship, No. 18-cv-2169, 2023 WL 2733975, at *5
(D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2023) (quoting D.C. Code § 2–1402.61(a)). The elements of a DCHRA
retaliation claim are essentially the same as for a Title VII retaliation claim, and such DCHRA
claims are also analyzed using the “familiar McDonnell Douglas framework.” Id. That said, there
is a notable difference between retaliation claims under Title VII and under the DCHRA:
Unlike in the Title VII context, the DCHRA does not require that the employee show that retaliation was the “but for” cause of the adverse action. Instead, the employee can “prevail in [her] DCHRA claim ‘by proving that [the employer’s] actions were motivated in substantial part by retaliatory reasons, even if they were motivated also by legitimate business reasons.’”
20 Savignac v. Day, 754 F. Supp. 3d 135, 206 n.21 (D.D.C. 2024) (quoting District of Columbia v.
Bryant, 307 A.3d 443, 452 (D.C. 2024)).
Fionta does not dispute that Mr. Wade’s complaint to his manager about Mr. Darrin
constitutes protected conduct, and it also does not dispute that Mr. Wade’s termination was an
adverse employment action. Mot. 25. Thus, the question is whether a reasonable jury could
conclude that Fionta’s termination of Mr. Wade was “because of the protected activity,” Salak,
277 F. Supp. 3d at 21, or was “motivated in substantial part by retaliatory reasons,” Savignac, 754
F. Supp. 3d at 206 n.21 (quoting Bryant, 307 A.3d at 452). On that score, the Parties’ arguments
are familiar. Fionta asserts that it fired Mr. Wade because it “did not have enough work” for him.
Mot. 25. And Mr. Wade candidly admits that he “relies on the same theories and facts” as for his
discriminatory treatment claims “to establish that Fionta’s alleged legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for Mr. Wade’s termination was in fact pretext for discrimination.” Opp’n 19.
Given that many of the Parties’ arguments regarding pretext are identical to those discussed
above, the Court will not rehash that discussion here and will instead address only the new points
made by the Parties.
First, Mr. Wade observes that between February 20 and March 16, 2018, his utilization
reached 26%, which reflects that he “was performing billable work when he was assigned work.”
Opp’n 20; see Rau Decl. ¶ 29. But the portion of the record on which he relies clarifies that
Mr. Wade reached that percentage “with a lot of direct attention” from Fionta higher-ups. Rau
Decl. ¶ 29; see also Dudhat Decl. Exs. B, C, D, M, Q, T, U. The fact that Mr. Wade’s workload
remained flagging despite that direct attention supports rather than contradicts Fionta’s asserted
explanation. Although Mr. Wade may believe that the onus was on Fionta to assign him more
work, that opinion does not indicate that retaliation played a substantial part in his termination.
21 Second, Mr. Wade again argues that the one-month gap between him reporting
Mr. Darrin’s conduct and his termination would permit a jury to conclude that Fionta’s explanation
is pretextual. A causal connection between an employee’s protected activity and an adverse
employment action “may be inferred by ‘showing that the employer had knowledge of the
employee’s protected activity, and that the adverse personnel action took place shortly after the
activity.’” Pratt v. Pompeo, 318 F. Supp. 3d 34, 39 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Mitchell v. Baldrige,
759 F.2d 80, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). Here, however, a reasonable jury could not make that inference.
The record indicates that Fionta management was concerned about and trying to correct
Mr. Wade’s “light” workload even before he reported Mr. Darrin’s conduct. Dudhat Decl. Exs. C,
D. And as the Court has already explained, the record confirms that Fionta remained focused on
that problem up until it fired Mr. Wade. In the absence of other supporting evidence, the timing of
Mr. Wade’s termination, on its own, does not support an inference of retaliation. Cf. Pinney v.
Isaacman, No. 19-cv-2259, 2026 WL 622255, at *13 (D.D.C. Mar. 5, 2026) (“That [the
defendant’s] issues with [the plaintiff’s] attendance predate any protected activity cuts strongly
against the suggestion that the later actions she took based on those issues were retaliatory.”).
Third, Mr. Wade notes that after he was fired, he worked for another business that
partnered with Fionta. Opp’n 21–22. While there, a manager told Mr. Wade that he had heard some
“ramblings [sic] around something going on between [Mr. Wade] and Fionta,” and Mr. Wade
explained that he had sued Fionta. Opp’n Ex. 1 at 266:10–14. That business eventually fired
Mr. Wade. Id. at 270:6–15. But Mr. Wade does not explain why this sequence of events supports
his claim that Fionta retaliated against him for complaining about Mr. Darrin’s conduct. See
Opp’n 21–22. To the extent that Mr. Wade surmises that another business fired him because of
what happened at Fionta, that is unsupported by any evidence in the record.
22 In sum, Mr. Wade has not identified evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to
conclude that Fionta fired him in retaliation for complaining about Mr. Darrin’s conduct. And the
Court therefore must grant summary judgment to Fionta on this claim. 7
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Fionta’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
ECF No. 24.
A separate order will issue.
SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge
Date: April 2, 2026
7 Because the Court grants summary judgment on Mr. Wade’s claims, it need not address the Parties’ arguments regarding Mr. Wade’s duty to mitigate, his emotional damages, or other damages-related disputes. See Hargrove v. Medstar Wash. Hosp. Ctr., No. 23-cv-3381, 2025 WL 2255424, at *3 n.1 (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2025) (“[S]ince I will . . . grant summary judgment for defendants, I need not reach the damages issue.”).