Wade v. Abdnor
This text of 635 S.W.2d 937 (Wade v. Abdnor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinions
Appellants, Henry Wade, Criminal District Attorney of Dallas County, Texas and the State of Texas appeal from the grant of a permanent injunction prohibiting the appellants and their agents from “seeking” the disclosure of confidential mental health information with respect to appellee, John Howard Abdnor. We dissolve the injunction as it applies to appellants because the prohibition against “seeking” exceeds the authority of the provisions of the statute upon which the injunction was based. Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5561h (Vernon Supp. 1982). Accordingly, the judgment granting the injunction is reversed and rendered.
Abdnor was indicted for murder of a nurse working in the mental and emotional disorders section of Baylor University Medical Center. Abdnor had become a personal friend of the nurse while hospitalized in that section at Baylor. The relationship continued after his discharge until the time of her death. As part of appellants’ investigation of the alleged murder, interviews were conducted with various employees who had known the decedent and who could possibly provide information, with regard to the relationship between appellant and decedent which would be admissible in the criminal prosecution under the provisions of Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 19.06 (Vernon 1974).
A suit was brought on behalf of Abdnor prior to his criminal trial to enjoin Henry Wade, Baylor University Medical Center and their employees and agents, from “seeking”, “obtaining”, “permitting the disclosure” or “disclosing” any information regarding the psychiatric diagnosis, evaluation, and treatment of Abdnor. After an extensive hearing an order was entered [938]*938granting a permanent injunction from which this appeal was taken.1
The injunction could only have been based on the recently enacted psychotherapist-patient privilege granted by Article 5561h, as Texas has never before recognized any form of doctor-patient privilege. Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107 (Tex.Cr.App.1976) cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933, 97 S.Ct.2642, 53 L.Ed.2d 250 (1977). The issuance of an injunction is authorized by Sec. 5 of the Act:
A person aggrieved by a violation of this Act may petition the district court of the county in which the person resides, or in the case of a nonresident of the state, the district court of Travis County, for appropriate injunctive relief, and the petition takes precedence over all civil matters on the docket of the court except those matters to which equal precedence on the docket is granted by law. A person aggrieved by a violation of this Act may prove a cause of action for civil damages.
The privileges created by this statute, like other privileges, keep out otherwise competent information in order to protect other societal interests or relationships. C. McCormick, Law of Evidence §§ 72, 74 (2d ed. E. Clearly 1972); McCormick, The Scope of Privileges in the Law of Evidence, 16 Tex.L.Rev. 447, 447-48 (1938). The Texas Legislature has reconciled the competing interest of full disclosure in favor of protecting and fostering this confidential professional relationship. See Green, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in Texas, 18 Hous.L.Rev. 137 (1980). The enactment should, nevertheless, be strictly construed because it is a deviation from common law, Clark v. Grigson, 579 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Civ. App.—Dallas 1978), and because of the limitation it places on disclosure in judicial proceedings. Lehnhard v. Moore, 401 S.W.2d 232, 235 (Tex.1966).
[939]*939The statute prohibits only the “disclosure” of information and makes no reference nor authorization for prohibiting the “seeking” of information. Art. 5561h provides in part:
Sec. 2. (a) Communication between a patient/client and a professional is confidential and shall not be disclosed ....
(b) Records of the identity, diagnosis, evaluation, or treatment of a patient/client which are created or maintained by a professional are confidential and shall not be disclosed except .... (Emphasis supplied)
The only situations which may be enjoined are those which fall within the provisions of the statute upon which the application for an injunction is based.2 Benton v. City of Houston, 605 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ); State ex rel. Shook v. All Texas Racing Ass’n, 128 Tex. 384, 97 S.W.2d 669, 670 (1936). We hold that the plain language of the statute will not support enjoining third-parties from “seeking” information.
All reported applications of this article have involved actions against a party who has disclosed privileged information or has invoked the privilege in refusing to disclose it. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 631 S.W.2d 592 (Tex.App.—Beaumont, 1982); In the Interest of G.K.H., 623 S.W.2d 447 (Tex.App.—Texarkana, 1981); C.V. v. State, 616 S.W.2d 441, 442 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ); Jones v. State, 613 S.W.2d 570 (Tex.App.—Austin 1981, no writ); Ex parte Abell, 613 S.W.2d 255 (Tex.1981); Ex parte Watson, 606 S.W.2d 902 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (En banc); and Sales v. State, 592 S.W.2d 653 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin, 1979, no writ).
The party in possession of the confidential information, Baylor University Medical Center, was named in the injunction but chose not to appeal; therefore, our concern is only with the restraint placed on the appellants. We hold that the trial court erred in exceeding the authority granted by the provisions of 5561h in enjoining the “seeking” of information by the appellant. We reform the injunction removing any application to appellants, Henry Wade or the State of Texas.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
635 S.W.2d 937, 1982 Tex. App. LEXIS 4985, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wade-v-abdnor-texapp-1982.