Waddell v. A. Guthrie & Co.

45 F.2d 977, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 3764
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedDecember 23, 1930
DocketNo. 265
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 45 F.2d 977 (Waddell v. A. Guthrie & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Waddell v. A. Guthrie & Co., 45 F.2d 977, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 3764 (10th Cir. 1930).

Opinion

MeDERMOTT, Circuit Judge.

In this action for personal injuries, the court directed a verdict for the defendant at the close of all the evidence. Whether there was error in so doing is the only point presented on this appeal.

[978]*978The amended complaint sets out that the plaintiff was a rodman in the employ of the Bureau of Reclamation of the United States; that the defendant was eng-aged, under contract with the United States, in the construct tion of an outlet tunnel of the Echo Dam, a federal reclamation project in Utah; that plaintiff’s duties required Ms presence in the tunnel; that, while properly in the tunnel, the roof gave way and seriously injured him; that defendant was negligent in failing to timber or support the roof; that such roof was in a dangerous condition, as defendant either did or should have known.

There was little conflict in the evidence on the trial. The tunnel was 838 feet in length, 13 feet in height, and 20' feet in width; it was a water tunnel, and somewhat oval-shaped. Construction was started from both ends in March, 1928; ' it was bored through on May 30; the trimming was completed June 20; later the tunnel was lined with cement. On June 26, while plaintiff was rightfully in the tunnel, a large chunk of the side wall sloughed off from a point about 5 feet above the floor of the tunnel; the material so slougMng was a red sandstone, some fine and some coarse, and one large rock,’ about a half-cubic yard in content, about 18 inches thick, somewhat wedge-shaped. There had been a clay seam back of the rock, which was not discernible when the rock was in place; the size of this rock was such that the sounding, hereafter described, would not and did not disclose the presence of the seam.

The tunnel was constructed by drilling 7-foot holes into the face of the rock; the workmen withdrew, the holes were shot; after the fumes cleared away the workmen returned, and, when 50 or 60 feet from the face, the roof and walls of the tunnel were sounded to determine their safety; tMs sounding was done by tapping with a metal bar; if a “drumming” sound resulted, the looseness thus indicated was scaled down until the workmen believed it safe to proceed; at places, where conditions indicated, the tunnel was timbered. By this method the roof and walls were inspected seven or eight times—50 or 60 feet divided by 7, the length of the drill holes. All of the evidence disclosed that this was the customary and ordinary method of inspection used by tunnel builders, and it is not claimed that the defendant’s employees were incompetent, or that they were not equipped with efficient tools. There was no timbering at the point of the accident, and no substantial evidence that any condition indicated a need for such. There was no evidence of any inspection after the tunnel was bored tM’ough, and no evidence that such a subsequent inspection was customary, necessary, or helpful; nor was there evidence that any inspection would have disclosed the clay seam back of the large rock, wMch very apparently was the cause of the accident. The efficiency of the inspection is indicated by the fact that no other sloughing occurred anywhere in the tunnel during its entire construction, even when the cement for the lining was applied with great force by compressed air. The evidence discloses that what timbering was done proved unnecessary.

The tunnel was bored through a soft sandstone and shale formation, with irregular clay seams; a geological examination indicated that the formation was a loose one; wa^ ter appeared over the face of the tunnel in small seeps, and there was a water spring near the floor line of the tunnel, about ten feet downstream from the place of the accident. When the tunnel was bored through it was dry, excepting for this spring, and some moisture at. an enlarged chamber 140 feet upstream from the place of the accident. WMIe the effort is to blast out the rock as nearly as possible to the desired dimensions, or neat line, the effect of the blasting is irregular, and leaves projections inside the neat line which must be trimmed, and “overbreaks” or cavities outside the neat line which must be filled with cement. One of these overbreaks was in the roof at the scene of the accident.

There is no dispute about the law governing the case. The plaintiff may recover if there was negligence on the part of the defendant, and not otherwise. White v. Chicago G. W. R. Co., (C. C. A. 8) 246 F. 427; Leonard v. Miami Min. Co. (C. C. A. 4) 148 F. 827. Any conflicts in the testimony-must be resolved in favor of plaintiff; when that is done, if there is any substantial evidence of negligence, the case must be submitted to the jury; if there is no such substantial evidence, as distinguished from a mere scintilla, the court should direct a verdict. Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U. S. 90, 50 S. Ct. 231, 74 L. Ed. 720; Small Co. v. Lamborn & Co., 267 U. S. 248, 45 S. Ct. 300, 69 L. Ed. 597; Woolworth v. Davis (C. C. A. 10) 41 F.(2d) 342, 347.

There are inescapable hazards connected with the construction of tunnels, as there are in mining and in the erection of bridges and great buildings. Those engaged in such work are not insurors against ae[979]*979eident; they are obligated to take such precautions, and make such inspections, as experience has taught are necessary. The rule of law is aptly and .succinctly stated by Judge Walter H. Sanborn in Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v. Senske (C. C. A. 8) 201 F. 637, 642, as follows:

“These authorities, and a multitude more, sustain the established rule that the standard of ordinary or reasonable care is that degree of care (1) which ordinarily prudent persons, (2) engaged in the same kind of business, (3) usually exercise under similar circumstances.”

In that opinion, .the learned judge has gathered so many controlling authorities in support of his statement that further citation is needless. However, the Sixth Circuit (Judges Lurton, Severens, and Richards sitting) used language peculiarly appropriate to the ease at bar, when it is remembered that there is no evidence that any inspection would have disclosed the clay seam hack of the big rock which caused the accident. The ease is Shankweiler v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 148 F. 195, 197, and the language is:

“The box car on which the rod broke was in course of transportation, and there is no question hut that the inspection made was all that is customarily made by well-regulated and prudently conducted railroads. Against such an inspection, the defect was latent, undiseoverable. We think it would be going too far to say that, because the inspection did not disclose the defect, it was not a proper one and ordinary care required something more. * * * The court could not have properly permitted the jury to indulge in mere speculation, finding the railroad company guilty of negligence, because, although it used the ordinary method of inspection, it did not use this method suggested by one person or that method suggested by another, when there was an utter lack of testimony showing or tending to show that either had ever been used by any prudently conducted company, or, if used, would prove effectual.”

See, also, for a striking parallel, Snapp v. Steinbaugh, 187 Ind. 701,121 N. E. 81.-

The undisputed evidence in this case is that the defendant followed the customary and usual method of inspection; that it timbered wherever such inspection indicated a need therefor.

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Bluebook (online)
45 F.2d 977, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 3764, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/waddell-v-a-guthrie-co-ca10-1930.