Wabash Ry. Co. v. Compton

172 F. 17, 96 C.C.A. 603, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 4876
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedJuly 26, 1909
DocketNo. 1,899
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 172 F. 17 (Wabash Ry. Co. v. Compton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wabash Ry. Co. v. Compton, 172 F. 17, 96 C.C.A. 603, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 4876 (6th Cir. 1909).

Opinion

KNAPPEN, District Judge

(after stating the facts as above). The master who conducted the accounting under consideration was selected for that position “on account of his special fitness and experience in matters of accounting and the matters herein involved.” The record, including his report, shows that he performed the difficult task with ability and with painstaking care and fidelity. The opinion of the judge "who passed upon the exceptions submitted in the Circuit Court shows that careful consideration was there given to the exceptions presented. So far as such exceptions are before this court, their subject-matter has passed the scrutiny of and been overruled by both the master and. the presiding judge below. The matters sought to be reviewed here involve largely a determination of questions of fact, depending to a considerable extent upon the credit to be attached to the various witnesses seen and heard by the master. Under these circumstances, not only is the correctness of the decree in question presumed, but this court would not be justified in overturning the decision of these two courts upon anything less than a demonstration of plain mistake. Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U. S. 136, 8 Sup. Ct. 894, 33 L. Ed. 664; Crawford v. Neal, 144 U. S. 585, 596, 12 Sup. Ct. 759, 36 L. Ed. 552; Furrer v. Ferris, 145 U. S. 132, 12 Sup. Ct. 821, 36 L. Ed. 649; Davis v. Schwartz, 155 U. S. 631, 15 Sup. Ct. 237, 39 L. Ed. 289; Ohio Valley Bank v. Mack, 163 Fed. 155. 158, 89 C. C. A. 605.

There is no controversy here as to the amount of Compton’s lien, nor as to the amount unpaid upon the underlying mortgages, except as that amount is affected by the application of the results of the accounting with reference to net earnings and the various charges and credits provided for by the decree. The exceptions argued here will he separately considered.

1. The most important of the exceptions urged here relates to the inclusion by the master, in the net earnings apportioned to the Ohio division, of the sum of $1,113,601, as an addition on account of constructive mileage as against actual mileage. To a proper understanding of the question raised by this exception, a brief statement of the conditions attending the accounting is necessary. The main line of the Wabash system (hiring the period covered by the accounting extended from Toledo, Ohio, to St. Louis, Mo. (437 miles); from St. Louis to Kansas City (277 miles); from Toledo to Hannibal, Mo. (461 miles) ; and from Hannibal to Kansas City (199 miles). The distance from Toledo to the Ohio state line is but 76 miles. This so-called “Ohio division” ivas not in fact a division during' the period covered by the accounting. It was simply operated as a part of the main line from Toledo to Kansas City, by way of St. Louis and Hannibal. In 1897, shortly after the appointment of the master, the railway hooks relating to the operation of the system up to that time were accidentally destroyed by fire. Neither before nor since the fire has any separate account been kept by the railroad company of the 76 miles known as the “Ohio division.” The master began taking testimony in January, 1898. Obviously, the only definite information of value must come from the railroad company. After the taking of wstimony had proceeded about four years, the master prepared^ at [22]*22the request of counsel, a preliminary or tentative report giving his then impressions as to the general principles upon which accounting should be had as it then stood. A few months later, in reply to requests of counsel for explanation regarding parts of the preliminary report, a fuller report was prepared. Both reports were submitted to counsel for each party.

The railroad company presented to the master its statement of account of the net earnings of the 76 miles in question, according to the basis which the railroad company claimed should be adopted. This statement showed a credit of net earnings to the 76 miles in Ohio from March 23, 1889, to June 30, 1903, of $2,569,754.72, being the result of deducting from gross earnings, apportioned at $7,571,997.18, operating expenses apportioned at $5,002,242.46; the latter embracing the general classifications of maintenance of way and structures, maintenance of equipment, conducting transportation, and general expenses. In making up the gross earnings applicable to the 76 miles in question, the railroad company, after treating as local all earnings from one station to another in the Ohio division, apportioned freight and passenger earnings between points east of the Mississippi river and points in the Ohio division oh an actual mileage basis. Mail earnings on each route extending over the Ohio division and express earnings east of the river were treated in the same way; but, as to freight earnings between points west of the river and points on the Ohio division, the same were first divided by giving to the part west of the river an arbitrary share larger, and usually from two to four times, than the actual mileage prorate, and then dividing the part so apportioned to the line east of the river (after deducting a substantial bridge charge) upon the basis of actual mileage. The testimony indicates that the passenger business to or from points west of the river was apportioned upon an actual mileage basis, after deducting a bridge charge. The freight earnings during the entire period covered by the accounting were greater than the combined mail, express, and passenger earnings, and much of the time at least three-fifths of the aggregate earnings of all kinds.

The master was of the opinion that the apportionment of earnings so made to the 76 miles of road in Ohio, upon an actual mileage basis, was unjust to that division for these reasons: First, that the railroad company, in violation of its duties as trustee, had taken steps in its own interest to divert traffic from the Ohio division over other routes secured by the Wabash Company, so that, according to its reports as made up while the traffic on the line generally had greatly increased, that on the 76 miles in question had not increased; the master stating in his report that it is “too plain for argument that since the' rights of Compton accrued (and the railway company must be chargeable with knowledge of these rights from the time they accrued) by the use of the Eel River Detroit line, the Grand Trunk alliance, and more recently the Montpelier line and in various other ways, the natural traffic belonging to this line has been diverted.” Second, that the arbitrary apportionment of constructive mileage to the portion of the road west of the river was wholly unjustified, at least to the extent to which it was practiced. Third, that in arriving at net earnings of [23]*23the Ohio division the railroad company had charged to operating expenses large amounts of betterments of every kind, and that the same policy had been followed with respect to rolling stock and engine renewals, to the serious prejudice of the Ohio division. And, fourth, that the Ohio division, by reason oí its expensive and valuable terminals, was entitled to a greater proportion of earnings than indicated by the actual mileage.

Upon the question whether the apportionment of earnings to the 76 miles of road in Ohio was just to that division, or whether, on the other hand, an apportionment on a basis of a larger constructive mileage was justified, a large amount of testimony was taken.

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Bluebook (online)
172 F. 17, 96 C.C.A. 603, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 4876, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wabash-ry-co-v-compton-ca6-1909.