Wabash Railroad v. United States

127 F. Supp. 613, 130 Ct. Cl. 645, 1955 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 55
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJanuary 11, 1955
DocketNo. 47176
StatusPublished

This text of 127 F. Supp. 613 (Wabash Railroad v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wabash Railroad v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 613, 130 Ct. Cl. 645, 1955 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 55 (cc 1955).

Opinion

Jones, Chief Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The sole issue in this case is whether certain shipments of material over the plaintiff’s line of railway and connecting lines should be paid for at regular commercial rates rather than on the basis of land-grant freight rates.

At issue are 1,839 carload shipments. The major portion of these shipments was from various points in the United States to be delivered to Oak Ordnance Plant, Uliopolis, Illinois.

Thirty-two carloads were shipped to the Sangamon Ordnance Plant, Uliopolis, Illinois.

[647]*647Fifteen, carloads were delivered to C. H. Atkinson Paving Company, Chillicothe, Missouri.

There were some additional shipments, but they are not involved here.

All the shipments were delivered by plaintiff at destination. On some of the shipments plaintiff was paid by defendant at land-grant rates. As to others payment by defendant was originally made to plaintiff on the basis of the full commercial rate but upon subsequent audit by the General Accounting Office pursuant to section 322 of the Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 955, alleged overpay-ments were determined and plaintiff was notified that land-grant rates applied to each shipment. The difference between the land-grant and commercial rates was recouped partly by a refund by plaintiff under protest, and partly by deductions on bills subsequently presented by plaintiff for payment of charges on other shipments not here involved.

It is conceded that the shipments were for military use. Section 321 (a) of the Transportation Act, supra, provides for the applicable commercial rates except that such rates should not apply to the transportation of military or naval property of the United States moving for military or naval use.

The parties have stipulated that the issue to be finally determined is whether these carload shipments were property of the United States within the meaning of section 321 (a) of the Transportation Act of 1940 at the time such shipments moved over the line of plaintiff’s railroad and the connecting railways. They further stipulated that if the shipments were property of the United States then plaintiff has been lawfully paid on the basis of land-grant freight rates; otherwise, the commercial rates apply. The issue thus turns upon whether these various carload shipments were the property of the United States at the time of the shipment, within the meaning of the Transportation Act.

With respect to the shipments made to Oak Ordnance Plant and Sangamon Ordnance Plant, the cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts for the construction thereof each permitted title to the materials purchased thereunder to vest in the United States when acceptance of title was authorized or [648]*648approved by the officer in charge. This right was set out in Article VIII of the contract for Oak Ordnance Plant and in a substantially identical provision of the contract for Sangamon Ordnance Plant. That article read as follows:

ARTICLE VIH — TITLE TO WORK
1. Title to all materials, tools, machinery, equipment and supplies for which the A-E-M shall be entitled to reimbursement under Article XI shall vest in the Government at such point or points as the Contracting Officer may designate in writing, provided that the right of final inspection and acceptance or rejection of such materials, tools, machinery, equipment and supplies at such place or places as he may designate in writing is reserved to the Contracting Officer; provided further that, upon such final inspection, the A-E-M shall be given written notice of acceptance or rejection as the case may be. In the event of rejection, the A-E-M shall be responsible for the removal of the rejected property within a reasonable time.

In executing this power to designate the point of transfer of title, the contracting officer in charge caused the contractor to insert a clause in its purchase orders to its suppliers to the effect that title should pass to the purchaser at the point of origin. Plaintiff contends that by “purchaser” was meant the cost-plus-fixed-fee contractor. Defendant urges that “purchaser” was intended to mean the United States.

The contracts for the supplying of materials to be used in the construction of the Oak Ordnance Plant were awarded to the vendors submitting the lowest bids. Under instructions of the contracting officer, Maj. Glenn E. Hof to, Area Engineer, the Architect-Engineer-Management (A. E. M.) contractors solicited bids on both an f. o. b. shipping point and f. o. b. destination price basis. Major Hofto secured information with respect to applicable land-grant rates and land-grant routings, and, in execution of his power to designate the point of transfer of title, by written instructions in the form of a memorandum or letter, directed the A. E. M. to have the following statement or statements of similar import inserted in and made a part of the purchase orders which are involved in this action:

[649]*649Title to materials and supplies purchased hereunder shall pass to the purchaser at [the point of origin,] provided that all materials and supplies purchased are subject to inspection at Illiopolis, Illinois by the Contracting Officer who executed and is defined in the Contract No. W1103-eng-3600, within a reasonable time, and the purchaser reserves the right to reject any materials or supplies which do not pass such inspection. _ In the event of rejection [the vendor] shall be responsible for the removal of rejected property within a reasonable time. On shipments made before receipt of routing instructions from the Area Engineer, _ ship on commercial ladings inserting thereon notation “To be exchanged for Government Bills of Lading at destination.” Meantime, route via Illinois Central care Illinois Terminal to Illiopolis.

All the shipments to the Oak Ordnance Plant consisted of materials which were purchased on an f. o. b. shipping point basis.

On the reverse side of the purchase orders which were prepared by the employees of the cost-plus-fixed-fee contractors and approved by Major Hofto, was a printed statement that the order was placed for the benefit of and was assignable to the United States Government. It was further stated that if and when such assignment was made to and accepted by the United States Government, the seller agreed that as a part of the consideration of the order it would and thereby did release the buyer from all liability incurred by buyer for goods delivered and work done prior to such assignment, as well as subsequent thereto. It was further stated that the seller’s sole right to payment in accordance with the order after date of any such assignment, would be against the United States Government.

Whether plaintiff can recover in this action is dependent upon the interpretation that is to be given to the word “purchaser” as used in the provisions regarding the purchase of the property.

When the invitation to bid, the orders themselves, and the various documents set out in findings 13, 14 and 15 are construed as a whole, we have no doubt that the Government is entitled to the land-grant rates. The purpose of Major Hofto in issuing the written memorandum set out in finding [650]*65015 was to effect the saving which would result to the Government by the transportation of the materials at land-grant rates.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
127 F. Supp. 613, 130 Ct. Cl. 645, 1955 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 55, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wabash-railroad-v-united-states-cc-1955.