W. X. Huber Co. v. United States

5 Cust. Ct. 59, 1940 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2105
United States Customs Court·Decided August 16, 1940·No. C. D. 370·Published·Cited by 5 cases

Opinion

Cline, Judge:

In these suits against the United States the plaintiff seeks to recover the duty assessed by the collector of customs at the port of Los Angeles on certain water chestnuts which the appraiser reported were spoiled at the time of his official examination, Protest 833961-G contains additional claims relating to beans and bean sauce, but the claims as to such merchandise were abandoned at the trial and are hereby overruled.

The specific claim in protest 833961-G is that the duty on the water chestnuts should be assessed at 50 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 774 of the Tariff Act of 1930 “on actual weight of good merchandise.” The original claim in protest 834189-G is substantially the same, but the following amendment was filed with the court, before trial:

Now comes Philip stein, Attorney for the above named plaintiff, and ini accordance with Section 518, Tariff Act of 1930, moves this Honorable Court for an order directing that the protest above referred to be amended as follows:
[60]*6060% of said chestnuts were decayed, damaged, destroyed and abandoned to the United States, as provided in Section 506 (1) of the Tariff Act of 1930.
And claim for allowance, or refund of all duties paid on said 60% of chestnuts is separately, alternatively and jointly made under the provisions of Sections 492, 506, and 563 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The Collector assessed duty on too great a quantity. Duty should not have been assessed upon more than 40% of the merchandise.

The cases are now before the court on rehearing. Three cases were consolidated for hearing at the original trial and a decision thereon, unfavorable to the plaintiff’s contention, was rendered on December 13, 1938. W. X. Huber Co. v. United States, 1 Cust. Ct. 289, C. D. 67. A timely application for rehearing was granted in all of the cases, but, at the rehearing, testimony was introduced in but two of the three ■cases, namely 833961-G and 834189-G. Protest 834118-G which was included in the original decision is not now before us.

The testimony with respect to protests 833961-G and 834189-G is summarized in the court’s decision as follows:

The only witness called at the trial was the United States customs examiner who examined the merchandise in the shipments. He testified that when he made his examination he found that 60 per centum of ten cases of water chestnuts in item 12 on page 1 of the invoice covered by protest 833961-G were spoiled and that all of the water chestnuts in two items of 10 cases each on the same invoice, item 13 on page 2 and item 14 on page 3, were spoiled. He testified further that the 20 cases of water chesnuts in item 1 on the first page of the invoice covered by protest 834189-G were 60 per centum spoiled. In testifying as to the condition of the vegetables which he said were “spoiled,” he stated that “At the time we examined it, it was just a spoiled, rotten mess” and “Unfit for anything.” The invoices contain notations in red ink, indicating that the merchandise was spoiled to the extent shown by the testimony.

In deciding the case against the plaintiff's contention, the court made the following statements in its decision:

No proof was offered showing that the worthless merchandise was condemned by the Board of Health or that it was abandoned to the Government under the provisions of section 506. In fact, the collector of customs reports that the customs regulations prescribed under the provisions of section 506 were not complied with. On this state of the record, the provisions of section 506 (1) of the Tariff Act of 1930 are not applicable and the protests are overruled as to the claim for relief thereunder.
In the case of H. Schnell & Co. v. United States, T. D. 47073, it was held that “The language used in section 506 does not indicate any intention on the part of Congress that the remedy therein prescribed shall be exclusive of any other remedy provided by law.” Therefore, the relief described in United States v. Shallus, 2 Ct. Cust. Appls. 332, T. D. 32074, as indicated by the following excerpt from that decision, is still permitted:
It is equally well established, as a fundamental principle of substantive law, that a cargo or part thereof so far destroyed as to become of no commercial value at the time the importation is brought within the customs district is not, as to the destroyed portion, deemed an “importation of merchandise” within the tariff law's of the United States, and therefore no duty accrues thereupon or can be collected therefor. Lawder v. Stone (187 U. S. 281); Stone v. Shallus (143 Fed. Rep. 486); United States v. Habicht (1 Ct. Cust. Appls. 53); Marriott v. Brune (9 How. 619).
[61] The principles announced in the decision above cited are embodied in article 818 of the Customs Regulations of 1931, but the regulations place the burden on the importers to segregate the useless merchandise from the balance of the shipment, which is not shown to have been done in the instant case. * * *.
Counsel for defendant calls attention in his brief to a statement on the summary sheet attached to the invoice in protest 833961-G indicating that the merchandise was released on May 26, 1934, although no similar statement appears on the summary sheet attached to the invoice in protest 834189-G. Counsel argues that the statement showing the date the merchandies was released proves that the importer received all the merchandise and that the record is barren of any evidence which would tend to prove that the goods did not enter the commerce of the United States. The case of Boston Brokerage Co. v. United States, 22 C. C. P. A. 461, T. D. 47454, is cited by the defendant in support of the contention that the duty was properly assessed. . In that case the court held that certain dried figs, which had been condemned by the board of health but which had been disposed of by the importer and had entered into the commerce of the country, were properly assessed with duty. The court said:
* * * it would be inequitable and presumably not within the intention of Congress to refrain from assessing duty upon goods which should have been destroyed or exported, but which in fact had entered into the commerce of the United States.

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