W. N. Proctor Co. v. United States

26 Cust. Ct. 4, 1950 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 700
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedDecember 27, 1950
DocketC. D. 1289
StatusPublished

This text of 26 Cust. Ct. 4 (W. N. Proctor Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
W. N. Proctor Co. v. United States, 26 Cust. Ct. 4, 1950 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 700 (cusc 1950).

Opinions

Cole, Judge:

A shipment of 25 bales of greasy wool from Buenos Aires, Argentina, described on the invoice as “United States Official Standard, Mestiza, 56/58’s, skirted, clothing, practically free from vegetable matter. Shrinkage 54%.,” was entered at Boston, Mass., where it was classified under paragraph 1102 (b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U. S. C. § 1001, par. 1102 (b)),1 as wool in the grease, not specially provided for, and assessed with duty at 34 cents per pound of clean content.

Plaintiff’s principal claim is that the merchandise is classifiable under paragraph 1101 (a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the trade agreement with Argentina, 77 Treas. Dec. 138, T. D. 50504,2 either under the eo nomine provision for Cordova wool, in the grease or washed, carrying a duty assessment of 13 cents per pound of clean content, or as “sorted, or matchings” therefrom, dutiable at 14 cents per pound of clean content.

[5]*5An alternative claim is made, contending that the collector’s action, is violative of section 315 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Customs Administrative Act of 1938 (19 U. S. C. § 1315),3 in that the assessment under paragraph 1102 (b), supra, invoked a higher rate of duty than had been applicable on this wool under an established and uniform practice.

The trial of this case consumed considerable time and resulted in a voluminous record consisting of testimony, exhibits, and lengthy briefs, including two from attorneys appearing as amici curiae.

The issue involved is strictly a question of fact. No legal questions have been raised, even as to rulings of the trial court during the taking of testimony. It becomes necessary, therefore, in weighing the evidence and placing the respective contributions — most of which have come from well-qualified witnesses — into scales to which they are properly assignable to determine which outweighs the other. In reaching our conclusion, we find it necessary to detail at some length most of the record.

Only a small portion of the testimony taken herein was introduced before the division. Most of the proof was offered before the writer of this opinion at Boston (where the case was finally submitted),

Table referred to in footnote: 2

[6]*6sitting as a single judge on circuit, baying been assigned to bear or to bear and determine said litigation, by tbe chief judge pursuant to authority vested in him under the statute governing this court, 28 U. S. C. (1946 ed., Supp. Ill) § 254. Tbe views of tbe writer of this opinion, set forth in Geo. S. Bush & Co., Inc., et al. v. United States, 22 Cust. Ct. 158, C. D. 1175, questioning the jurisdiction of tbe division to decide a case somewhat similar to these proceedings, continue as tbe minority expression of the division. Under tbe practice and procedure of tbe court and tbe rules applicable thereto, much litigation before tbe court is dependent upon my participation in a decision of tbe same. Adhering to views expressed in tbe Bush case, supra, but for tbe purpose of expediting tbe work of tbe court, tbe writer is preparing this opinion and participating in tbe decision and tbe judgment accompanying tbe same, with full realization that a member or members of tbe division, if adopting tbe views determining classification of the merchandise as embodied herein, do so with complete disapproval of tbe position taken in this paragraph by tbe writer of this opinion.

We now proceed to analyze and weigh all tbe evidence. Plaintiff introduced samples of different kinds of wool, i. e., the merchandise in question, plaintiff’s collective exhibits 2-A and 2-B, and plaintiff’s exhibit 3; a representative sample of Cordova wool, plaintiff’s illustrative exhibit A; and two sheepskins with Cordova wool thereon, plaintiff’s illustrative exhibits T and U. All of tbe 16 witnesses who appeared herein — 8 for each side — accepted and recognized tbe said exhibits as representative of the respective commodities, and they were referred to by each witness in illustrating or explaining various phases of tbe testimony. To avoid repetition of exhibit numbers and somewhat simplify the present discussion, the above-mentioned exhibits shall be referred to hereinafter as follows: Plaintiff’s collective exhibits 2-A and 2-B and plaintiff’s exhibit 3, “the wool in question”; plaintiff’s illustrative exhibit A, “the Cordova wool”; plaintiff’s illustrative exhibits T and U, “the Cordova wool on skins.”

John G. Wright, a wool importing broker, acting on behalf of and as representative for the South American exporter (Masurel & Cía.) of the shipment in question, completed the sale thereof to the importer, Harry N. Bloomfield Co. The merchandise was identified as “Mestiza wool, 56-58 quality,” originating in Cordova.

Referring specifically to plaintiff’s collective exhibits 2-A and 2-B, the witness testified he negotiated the sale of that wool to John It. Reilly & Co., identifying the cable sent to his principal in Buenos Aires (being the same company that shipped the present merchandise) and the reply thereto, explaining that the exchange of cables, plaintiff’s collective illustrative exhibit L, was the direct result of the purchaser’s, Reilly’s, statement that “he would buy this lot of wool [7]*7if Masuxel said it came from Cordova and was so invoiced.” The South American exporter’s compliance with the request is certainly not positive proof that the shipment is Cordova wool under the statute, said amended paragraph 1101 (a), if such is intended thereby.

The witness visited South America only once and then, in 1947, when he was in Buenos Aires for “less than three weeks.” During that time, he was at the barracas in the central market every morning for a couple of weeks and observed grading, sorting, and packing of several kinds of wool for shipment to the United States. He was never in the Province of Cordova, but it is his understanding, based on hearsay, that Cordova wool comes from Cordova sheep in the Province of Cordova, recognition of such wool being based on the marking “Cordova” appearing on bales as they arrived at the barracas while he was there.

Cordova wool was described as “brashy wool, without very much felting properties. It is rather stiff and hairy, and contains kemp, a good many black hairs, and has not got the life or the spinning qualities which we get in a blooded wool, either of Merino or of English blood.” It has a wide range in grades, extending “from 36-40’s to maybe 58’s.” The finer edge runs as high as 60 per centum of the fleece. Two explanations were given of the term “Mestiza,” known to the witness since 1912 or 1914. First, the witness stated that “Mestiza” means “mixed blood and mixed quality of wool”- in its connotation to Cordova. Later, and the concluding statement of his testimony is that the term is applied to the finer portion of Cor-dova wool, and “Criolla” to the coarser portion of such wool.

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Related

United States v. Baxter
9 Ct. Cust. 99 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1919)
Geo. S. Bush & Co. v. United States
22 Cust. Ct. 158 (U.S. Customs Court, 1949)

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Bluebook (online)
26 Cust. Ct. 4, 1950 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 700, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/w-n-proctor-co-v-united-states-cusc-1950.