United States v. Baxter

9 Ct. Cust. 99, 1919 WL 21356, 1919 CCPA LEXIS 18
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedApril 1, 1919
DocketNo. 1931; No. 1932
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 9 Ct. Cust. 99 (United States v. Baxter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Baxter, 9 Ct. Cust. 99, 1919 WL 21356, 1919 CCPA LEXIS 18 (ccpa 1919).

Opinion

Montgomery, Presiding Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

These two cases were heard together in this court. The record is the same in both cases except that in case number 1932 the poles were invoiced as cedar telegraph poles, whereas in the other case they were not specifically so designated. As a matter of fact the merchandise imported consisted either of poles or piles, certain items being invoiced as cedar poles and other items as cedar piles. In. these entries, the cedar piles were returned by the appraiser free of duty. The poles were assessed for duty under paragraph 170 of the act of 1913, reading as follows:

Paving posts, railroad ties, and telephone, trolley, electric-light,‘ and telegraph poles of cedar or other woods, 10 per centum ad valorem.

[101]*101They are claimed to be free of-duty under paragraph 647 as “logs, timber, round, unmanufactured,” or under paragraph 648 as “cedar * * * in the log, rough, or hewn only * * * or not further advanced than cut into lengths suitable for sticks for umbrellas, parasols, sunshades, whips, fishing rods, or walking canes.”

The board held the importations free of duty under paragraph 647.

In the absence of any specific provisions for telephone, trolley, electric-fight, and telegraph poles, there would be little difficulty in saying that the provisions of either paragraph 647 or 648 are sufficiently comprehensive to include round timber of any length and dimensions. But there can be no doubt, on the other hand, that the provision for the poles of the character designated is more specific than these broad general terms in the free fist. So the case must really turn upon the question of whether these poles as imported fall within the group of poles provided for in paragraph 170.

It was held by the board that the poles were not sufficiently advanced to fix them as devoted to the particular use, and that therefore they had not been brought within paragraph 170. We doubt if it was intended by the board to hold that before a pole could be said to fall within paragraph 170 it must be shown to be devoted to some one of the particular uses designated by the paragraph. At any rate, we think such was not a prerequisite to fixing the classification. The record shows that telephone poles and telegraph poles are not distinguishable, and trolley poles and electric-fight poles are likewise interchangeable. And perhaps any one of all four of the designated poles — telephone, trolley, electric-fight, and telegraph poles — might in some cases be used for any one of the purposes implied by the designation of the paragraph.

So we think in this case the question-presented is whether these poles had, when imported (excluding those such as were invoiced and treated as piles) reached such a stage of development that they were' appropriately called and treated as either telephone, trolley, electric, fight, or telegraph poles within the congressional intent.

A witness was asked the question by the importers’ counsel:

Q. If you were to inspect a quantity of poles in the condition in which you import them, could you tell by inspection whether they were to be used as telephone poles, or trolley poles, or electric-light poles, or telegraph poles, or as piles, or as fence posts, or for cribwork, or bridge work? — A. No.

This question indicates that the theory upon which the case was presented was that the particular specific use as between the various uses provided for in the dutiable paragraph must be susceptible of being shown, but the question itself was manifestly unfair, as no one could tell whether a telegraph or telephone pole might or might not be used for a pile, or for being cut up into fence posts, or for the other uses referred to in the question.

[102]*102The question really is whether the poles imported were suitable for the uses indicated in the paragraph and had been so far advanced as to be devoted to those uses.

As bearing on this question, the invoicing of the poles as telegraph poles is significant. This applies as to only one importer, it is true, but it has a bearing upon the understanding of the trade.

But more than this, the distinction between telegraph poles and piles is significant, as it shows that they are of different dimensions. One of the importers was asked:

Q. Do you buy your poles on specification? — A. Yes,, sir.
Q. Do you buy piling on specification? — A. Yes.
Q. Do the same specifications apply to piling as to poles? — A. Yes, in many instances; there are departures from that.
Q. Isn’t it a fact that your specifications for piling call for a short pole and a wider pole than the same length pole for other purposes?- — A. Usually they do when in lengths short of 30 feet.
Q. Isn’t it a fact that in your specifications for piling you provide for a certain length and butt measurement? — A. At times the butt measurement will come the same as cedar poles, and at times the same top measurement.
Q. My question relates to the form of your specifications. Is it not a fact that in furnishing specifications for piling you refer to the length and the butt measurement, whereas in your specifications for poles you refer to the length and the top measurement? — A. The top measurement only; no.
Q. Among other things? — A. Among other things; yes.

The testimony of this same witness further discloses that 80 per cent of the poles which he imports were used for some one of the uses covered by paragraph 170, and that 20 per cent were used for piling. It was also testified that some were used to be cut up in fence posts, and being asked—

Q. Is it more profitable in a fence post?

He replied:

A. Only when we get a rush order for fence posts.
Q. Just an emergency case? — A. Yes.

And when asked, “What lengths do you use for piling purposes,” replied:

A. All lengths from 20 up to 45 feet. Some few longer than that; but the average piles will run from 20 to 45 feet.
Q. Do occasions ever arise for bridge or crib work or piling where a still longer pole is required? — A. Very seldom we put a longer cedar pole than that in.
Q. Are those poles known as piles? — A. Yes.
Q. Dealt in as piles? — A. Yes.
Q. Is that term applied to them to a very large extent in the trades? — A. I do not just understand the nature of the question.
Q. Is that term, the term “pilings,” applied^ to them generally in your experience? — A. Yes.

This witness, it is true, further stated in answer to a question by his counsel:

Q. What is the form of a pile? How does it differ from a telephone or telegraph or elect ic-li . pole before the pole has been so finished as to be suited for the uses [103]*103mentioned? — A. It differs fronqa trolley pole or what you would call a cedar pole for carrying trolley lines or other electric lines.

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Bluebook (online)
9 Ct. Cust. 99, 1919 WL 21356, 1919 CCPA LEXIS 18, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-baxter-ccpa-1919.