Vuvu v. Blanche
This text of Vuvu v. Blanche (Vuvu v. Blanche) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 21 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DANIEL MBADILA VUVU; ALICE No. 25-5620 NSIMBA MANZAMBI; D. M. M.; I. M. Agency Nos. M.; E. M. M., A246-562-747 A246-562-748 Petitioners, A246-562-749 A246-562-750 v. A246-562-751 TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 19, 2026** Seattle, Washington
Before: TALLMAN, OWENS, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Petitioner Daniel Mbadila Vuvu (“Vuvu”), an Angolan national, petitions for
review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing
his appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his applications for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. We
have jurisdiction to review the petition pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). We
deny the petition.
1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility
determination. Under the REAL ID Act, credibility determinations are based on
the “totality of the circumstances,” and may rely on inconsistencies without regard
to whether they go to the “heart of the . . . claim.” Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133,
1135–36 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). Here,
the IJ identified multiple inconsistencies, including (1) conflicting statements
regarding Vuvu’s place of birth, (2) discrepancies in his account of an alleged
beating—such as whether his assailants were police or military, and the type of
vehicle involved—and (3) shifting testimony regarding the duration of his
involvement in his political party. Indeed, Vuvu admitted that he provided false
information about his place of birth. And the IJ reasonably rejected his
explanations for these discrepancies. See Li v. Garland, 13 F.4th 954, 961 (9th
Cir. 2021) (emphasizing that IJs are not required to accept petitioners’ explanations
for discrepancies in the record).
2 25-5620 Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s conclusion that Vuvu failed
to provide sufficient corroborating evidence to meet his burden of proof. The IJ
reasonably afforded limited weight to letters from interested witnesses not subject
to cross-examination and found that documentary evidence did not independently
establish his claims.
Because the record does not compel a contrary conclusion, we uphold the
adverse credibility determination.
2. Vuvu’s due process challenge based on interpretation deficiencies also
fails. “The Fifth Amendment guarantees due process in deportation proceedings.”
Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th. Cir. 2000). To establish a due process
violation, a petitioner must demonstrate that “(1) the proceeding was so
fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his
case . . . and (2) the alien demonstrates prejudice, which means that the outcome of
the proceeding may have been affected by the alleged violation.” Ibarra-Flores v.
Gonzalez, 439 F.3d 614, 620–21 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). The record does reflect some interpretation difficulties. Yet the
IJ addressed those issues through repetition and clarification. The proceedings do
not reflect a breakdown in communication preventing Vuvu from presenting his
claims.
3 25-5620 Nor has Vuvu demonstrated prejudice. He does not explain how improved
interpretation would have altered the inconsistencies underlying the adverse
credibility determination or otherwise shown how “a better translation would have
made any difference in the hearing’s outcome.” Singh v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1139,
1144 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Guan v. Barr, 925 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 2019)
(holding that where a petitioner cannot articulate how alleged interpretation issues
“affected his testimony” or the fairness of his hearing, no due process violation
exists).
3. The agency did not err in concluding that Vuvu filed a frivolous asylum
application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6). An asylum application is frivolous if a
material element is deliberately fabricated, provided that the agency satisfies the
required procedural safeguards. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.20; Fernandes v. Holder, 619
F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2010).
The IJ correctly found that Vuvu knowingly provided false information
regarding his place of birth. Vuvu admitted this during the proceedings. The
agency reasonably concluded that this misrepresentation was material, as an
applicant’s identity and nationality—both of which may be informed by
birthplace—are central to asylum eligibility and may affect lines of inquiry
relevant to relief. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003)
(noting that identity is a “key” element of an asylum application).
4 25-5620 Further, the record reflects that the agency complied with the required
procedural safeguards. Fernandes, 619 F.3d at 1076. First, Vuvu received notice
of the consequences of filing a frivolous asylum application, including through the
warnings accompanying his applications and warnings provided during the
proceedings. See Cheema v. Holder, 693 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding
that a written warning on an asylum application “adequately notifies the applicant
of [] the consequences of knowingly filing a frivolous application for asylum”).
Second, the IJ made an explicit finding that Vuvu knowingly and deliberately
fabricated a material element of his application and explained the reasons for that
finding in detail. Third, the finding was supported by a preponderance of the
evidence, including through Vuvu’s overt admission that he knowingly provided
false information about his birthplace. Fourth, the IJ afforded Vuvu an adequate
opportunity to explain the discrepancy. Accordingly, the frivolousness
determination was proper.
PETITION DENIED.
5 25-5620
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Vuvu v. Blanche, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vuvu-v-blanche-ca9-2026.