Vroom, Inc.; Vroom Automotive, LLC d/b/a Vroom, d/b/a Texas Direct Auto; Carstory, LLC; and Vast.com, Inc. v. Sidekick Technology, LLC

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedJanuary 6, 2026
Docket2:21-cv-06737
StatusUnknown

This text of Vroom, Inc.; Vroom Automotive, LLC d/b/a Vroom, d/b/a Texas Direct Auto; Carstory, LLC; and Vast.com, Inc. v. Sidekick Technology, LLC (Vroom, Inc.; Vroom Automotive, LLC d/b/a Vroom, d/b/a Texas Direct Auto; Carstory, LLC; and Vast.com, Inc. v. Sidekick Technology, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vroom, Inc.; Vroom Automotive, LLC d/b/a Vroom, d/b/a Texas Direct Auto; Carstory, LLC; and Vast.com, Inc. v. Sidekick Technology, LLC, (D.N.J. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

VROOM, INC.; VROOM AUTOMOTIVE, LLC d/b/a/ VROOM, d/b/a TEXAS DIRECT AUTO; CARSTORY, LLC; and No, 21-cv-6737 VAST,COM, INC.,, d/b/a/ CARSTORY. OPINION Plaintiffs,

v.

SIDEKICK TECHNOLOGY, LLC, Defendant.

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J: Before the Court is Plaintiffs Vroom, Inc.; Vroom Automotive, LLC; Carstory, LLC; and Vast.com, Inc. (collectively, “Vroom”) and Defendant Sidekick Technology, Inc.’s (“Sidekick”) “Joint Motion for an Indicative Ruling Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1 on a Joint Motion to Vacate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(by’ (the “Motion”), ECF No. 85, which the Court decides without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ P. 78.1(b). For the reasons stated herein, the Court hereby indicates that, under Rule 62.1(a)(3), if the Federal Circuit were to remand this matter, it would enter an order vacating its prior decisions declaring Sidekick’s patents ineligible. 1. BACKGROUND! When this action commenced in March 2021, Vroom and Sidekick were entangled in an intellectual property dispute about patents related to each party’s used vehicle e-commerce business (the “Patents-in-Suit”).? Vroom filed a complaint seeking declaratory judgment against Sidekick’s allegations of patent infringement. ECF No. 1. Broadly speaking, the Patents-in-Suit describe “systems, methods, and apparatuses for providing automobile market information and performing or facilitating automobile transactions.” Vroom, 609 F. Supp 307 at 310. Sidekick answered, asserting twelve counterclaims for patent infringement covering each of the Patents-in- Suit. ECF No. 14. In response, Vroom asserted several affirmative defenses to Sidekick’s

The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the underlying dispute and recounts only the facts necessary to decide the Motion. A more detailed account of the facts can be found in the Court’s earlier opinion. ECF No. 46; Vroom Ine. v. Sidekick Tech, LLC, 609 F. Supp. 3d 307 (D.N.J. 2022). ? The twelve asserted patents are U.S. Patent Nos. 8,650,093; 8,744,925: 9,123,075; 9,141,984: 9,147,216: 9,460,467; 9,626,704; 9,665,897; 10,140,655; 10,223,720; 10,223,722; and 10,796,362,

counterclaims, inchiding that the Patents-in-Suit were each directed to ineligible subject matter under 25 U.S.C. § 101. ECF No. 26, This Court granted Vroom’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that Sidekick’s Patents-in-Suit are ineligible for patenting. ECF No. 46 (the “Fume 28, 2022 Opinion and Order”), The Court denied reconsideration of the June 28, 2022 Opinion and Order. ECF No. 57 (the “October 18, 2022 Opinion and Order,” together, the “2022 Opinions”). Sidekick filed an appeal with the Federal Circuit in January 2023 (the “Appeal”), which remains pending as of the date of this Opinion, ECF No. 61. The Motion states that Vroom shed its used vehicle business in a Chapter 11 case filed in bankruptcy court. Mot, 3. No longer competitors, Vroom and Sidekick agreed to settle their dispute (the “Settlement Agreement”), Jd The 2022 Opinions appear to be barriers to the Settlement Agreement, however, The patties have represented that “absent vacatur of this Court’s judgment and related opinions and orders, Sidekick must continue to pursue its appeal in order to defend its intellectual property rights,” and “[a]bsent vacatur, the parties are unable to settle and the appeal (and potential remand) must go forward.” Jd. at 4. Il. LEGAL STANDARD a. Rule 62,1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1 is a “procedural device that permits the District Court to issue an ‘indicative’ decision on a motion for relief, notwithstanding a pending appeal.” Mandalapu v. Temple Univ, Hosp., Inc., 796 F. App’x 152, 153 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). It states, in relevant part: Ifa timely motion is made for relief that the court lacks authority to grant because of an appeal that has been docketed and is pending, the court may .., state either that it would grant the motion if the court of appeals remands for that purpose or that the motion raises a substantial issue, Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a). In other words, Rule 62.1 is a vehicle by which a district court can grant relief from an order that, due to a pending appeal, it normally lacks jurisdiction to consider. See Kull vy, Kutztown Univ. of Pa., 543 F. App’x 244, 248 (3d Cir. 2013); Doe v, United States, 842 F. App’x 719, 722 (3d Cir. 2021) (noting that district courts lack jurisdiction to grant Rule 60(b) relief during the pendency of a timely appeal), A court should deny a Rule 62.1 motion if, upon remand, it would not grant the relief being sought, see Ralph Lauren Corp. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., No, 20-cv-10167, 2023 WL 5769419, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 7, 2023), or ifthe underlying motion is untimely. See Peterson v. Chetirkin, No. 21-cv-8716, 2023 WL 2784390, at *5 (D.N.F. Apr. 5, 2023), Courts in this Circuit have granted Rule 62.1 motions where modification or vacatur of a judgment was necessary for parties to effectuate a settlement agreement. See Janssen Prods., L.P. Lupin Ltd., No. 10-cv-5954, 2016 WL 3392291, at *3 (D.N.J. June 15, 2016); Braintree Lab’ys Ine. v, Lupin Atlantis Hidgs. SA, No. 11-cv-1341, 2016 WL 8814360, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 20, 2016). Other courts have granted vacatur in similar postures. See MLB Props., Inc. v. Pacific Trading Cards, Inc., 150 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1998) (granting vacatur when the patties were “locked in a dispute that they could end on a commercial basis satisfactory to both” and vacatur was “a

necessary condition of settlement”); Adayes v. City of Hammond, Ind, 631 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1098 (N.D. Ind. 2008) (“[T]he amicable settlement agreement, the joint nature of the request for vacatur... and the lack of any significant public concern [are] exceptional circumstances favoring vacatur”) (citation modified). b. Rule 60(b) Rule 60(b) grants courts broad discretion to vacate a final judgment, The Rule includes a catch-all provision that allows a court to grant relief for reasons not enumerated in Rule 60(b)(1)- (5). Fed. R. Civ. P 60(b)(6) (authorizing vacatur for “any other reason that justifies relief’); Taylor v. Comm’r of Pa, Dept. of Corr., 150 F.4th 188, 192 (3d Cir. 2025).? The Third Circuit has added a requirement that a party seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) must “demonstrate the existence of extraordinary circumstances that justify reopening the judgment.” Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 255 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation modified). This is, as courts have described, a heavy burden. Wilder vy, DMR Consulting Grp., Inc., 345 F. App’x 735, 736 n.1 (3d Cir, 2009), Unlike motions seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(1)-(3), there is no set time limit in filing a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Cardona v. Lewisburg, 600 F. App’x 821, 822 n.1 Gd Cir. 2015) (observing that “a motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is not limited by any strictly defined time period”) (citation modified). WI. DISCUSSION As the parties indicate, the Third Circuit has not opined on whether “exceptional circumstances” are required for a district court to vacate an order where there is a pending appeal. Mot. 5; see U.S. Bancorp Morig.

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Vroom, Inc.; Vroom Automotive, LLC d/b/a Vroom, d/b/a Texas Direct Auto; Carstory, LLC; and Vast.com, Inc. v. Sidekick Technology, LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vroom-inc-vroom-automotive-llc-dba-vroom-dba-texas-direct-auto-njd-2026.