The opinion of the court was delivered by
Conford, P. J. A. D.
(temporarily assigned). Pending appeal in the Superior Court, Appellate Division, this Court granted direct certification to review a holding by the Superior Court, Law Division, 148 N. J. Super. 343, that the classification of merchandise forbidden to be sold on Sunday under and pursuant to the Sunday Closing Law, N. J. S. A. 2A:171-5.8 et seq. (L. 1959, c. 119), in counties opting for the statute by referendum, is “not reasonably related to the presumed purpose of the statute and is, hence, unconstitutionally arbitrary.” 148 N. J. Super, at 360. The assumption must be that the constitutional defect discerned was the denial of equal protection of the laws, as the ruling purports to decide the question left open for factual exploration in our decision in Two Guys from Harrison, Inc. v. Furman, 32 N. J. 199 (1960) ("Two- Guys” hereinafter). That issue was denial of equal protection. See id. at 211, 222.
The Sunday Closing Law was held in Two Guys to supersede and replace the 1951 revision of earlier Sunday closing legislation which comprehensively prohibited all Sunday employment or business except for works of necessity or charity. N. J. S. '2A:171-1 et seq. The 1951 revision contained only a $1 penalty for any violation. The present statute, adopted in 1959, provided that it should be effective [351]*351only in counties which chose to adopt it by referendum, and prohibited Sunday sale of only (1) clothing or wearing apparel; (2) building and lumber supply materials; (3) furniture; (4) home, business or office furnishings; and (5) household, business or office appliances. Substantial penalties were provided for violation. The law is presently effective in ten of the twenty-one counties.
Two Guys sustained the Sunday Closing Law against attack on grounds of violation of the constitutional ban against union of State and Church in both the federal and state constitutions. 32 N. J. at 226. It found adequate secular legislative objects for Sunday closing legislation in (1) relief from uninterrupted labor for seven days a week; and (2) eliminating or reducing interference with the ambiance of Sunday as a generally accepted common day for rest, relaxation, relief from everyday tensions and recreation (hereinafter, the “rest and relaxation object”). 32 N. J. at 215-216. However, the first basis was determined not to be rationally related to the classification of the Sunday Closing Law as it was relevant to all workers, not peculiarly those engaged in selling the five categories of proscribed merchandise. Id. at 218-219. The Court went on to hold the law facially valid from the standpoint of the rest and relaxation objective, but reversed a summary judgment dismissing the constitutional attack as related to that statutory purpose, ruling that while it might indeed “be difficult for plaintiffs to maintain their heavy burden of proof * * * they may not be denied an opportunity to try.” Id. at 230.
The plaintiffs in the present case, who comprise the corporate successor of the plaintiff in the Two Guys case and certain of its employees, purport now to have adduced the proof requisite to establish the denial of equal protection not found as a matter of law in Two Guys. The trial court concluded that they were successful in that endeavor. We granted certification while the matter was pending unheard in the Appellate Division, 75 N. J. 584 (1977). We are constrained to disagree, and we reverse. We find trial error [352]*352in two broad respects: (a) with respect to the court’s conception of the nature of the judicial responsibility vis a vis that of the Legislature in this area; and (b) with regard to the adequacy of the proofs submitted by plaintiffs to negate all reasonably conceivable purposes or objects for the statutory classification.
We find no merit in the cross-appeal of plaintiffs addressed to alleged vagueness of the statute and to the asserted selective and discriminatory enforcement thereof. We agree with the trial court’s rejection of those contentions. See 148 N. J. Super, at 361-362.
I
Before examining the evidence in the case before us and the rationale of the trial court in holding it sufficient to invalidate the Sunday Closing Law, it is well to be reminded of certain cardinal principles required to be followed by the judiciary in passing upon the question as to whether a statutory classification of subject matter is invalid as a denial of the equal protection of the laws. Apart from the general presumption of constitutionality which attends every statute, the heart of .the applicable criterion was expressed in WHYY Inc. v. Glassboro, 50 N. J. 6, 13 (1967), rev’d 393 U. S. 117, 89 S. Ct. 286, 21 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1968),1 as follows:
The Legislature is presumed to have a valid classification in mind. Distinctions will be presumed to rest upon a rational basis if there be any conceivable state of facts which would afford reasonable support for them, (emphasis added).
The formidable nature of the burden resting on those who would establish the invalidity of a statutory classification in [353]*353an equal protection context is well delineated in N. J. Restaurant Ass’n. v. Holderman, 24 N. J. 295, 300 (1957), as quoted in Two Guys (32 N. J. at 218), as follows:
The burden of demonstrating that a statute contravenes the equal protection clause is extremely formidable, as is attested by the long trail of failure. In addition to the strong presumption of constitutionality with which all organic challenges are approached, one who assails a statute on this ground must contend with principles of unusual elasticity. It is easily stated that the classification (1) must not be palpably arbitrary or capricious, and (2) must have a rational basis in relation to the specific objective of the legislation. But the second proposition is qualified by limitations which compound the difficulties of one who assails the legislative decision. Thus it is not enough to demonstrate that the legislative objective might be more, fully achieved by another, more expansive classification, for the Legislature may recognize degrees of harm and hit the evil where it is most felt. [Citations omitted.] The Legislature may thus limit its action upon a decision to proceed cautiously, step by step, or because of practical exigencies, including administrative convenience and expense, * * * or because of “some substantial consideration of public policy or convenience or the service of the general welfare.” De Monaco v. Renton, 18 N. J. 352, 360 (1955). Hence it may “stop short of those cases in which the harm to the few concerned is thought less important than the harm to the public that would ensue if the rule laid down were, made mathematically exact.” Dominion Hotel, Inc. v. State of Arizona, supra (249 U. S. [265] at page 268, 39 S. Ct. [273] at page 274 [63 L. Ed. 597]). * * *”
Chief Justice Weintraub went on in Two Guys, supra, to say (32 N. J. at 219) :
As stated in Holderman,
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
Conford, P. J. A. D.
(temporarily assigned). Pending appeal in the Superior Court, Appellate Division, this Court granted direct certification to review a holding by the Superior Court, Law Division, 148 N. J. Super. 343, that the classification of merchandise forbidden to be sold on Sunday under and pursuant to the Sunday Closing Law, N. J. S. A. 2A:171-5.8 et seq. (L. 1959, c. 119), in counties opting for the statute by referendum, is “not reasonably related to the presumed purpose of the statute and is, hence, unconstitutionally arbitrary.” 148 N. J. Super, at 360. The assumption must be that the constitutional defect discerned was the denial of equal protection of the laws, as the ruling purports to decide the question left open for factual exploration in our decision in Two Guys from Harrison, Inc. v. Furman, 32 N. J. 199 (1960) ("Two- Guys” hereinafter). That issue was denial of equal protection. See id. at 211, 222.
The Sunday Closing Law was held in Two Guys to supersede and replace the 1951 revision of earlier Sunday closing legislation which comprehensively prohibited all Sunday employment or business except for works of necessity or charity. N. J. S. '2A:171-1 et seq. The 1951 revision contained only a $1 penalty for any violation. The present statute, adopted in 1959, provided that it should be effective [351]*351only in counties which chose to adopt it by referendum, and prohibited Sunday sale of only (1) clothing or wearing apparel; (2) building and lumber supply materials; (3) furniture; (4) home, business or office furnishings; and (5) household, business or office appliances. Substantial penalties were provided for violation. The law is presently effective in ten of the twenty-one counties.
Two Guys sustained the Sunday Closing Law against attack on grounds of violation of the constitutional ban against union of State and Church in both the federal and state constitutions. 32 N. J. at 226. It found adequate secular legislative objects for Sunday closing legislation in (1) relief from uninterrupted labor for seven days a week; and (2) eliminating or reducing interference with the ambiance of Sunday as a generally accepted common day for rest, relaxation, relief from everyday tensions and recreation (hereinafter, the “rest and relaxation object”). 32 N. J. at 215-216. However, the first basis was determined not to be rationally related to the classification of the Sunday Closing Law as it was relevant to all workers, not peculiarly those engaged in selling the five categories of proscribed merchandise. Id. at 218-219. The Court went on to hold the law facially valid from the standpoint of the rest and relaxation objective, but reversed a summary judgment dismissing the constitutional attack as related to that statutory purpose, ruling that while it might indeed “be difficult for plaintiffs to maintain their heavy burden of proof * * * they may not be denied an opportunity to try.” Id. at 230.
The plaintiffs in the present case, who comprise the corporate successor of the plaintiff in the Two Guys case and certain of its employees, purport now to have adduced the proof requisite to establish the denial of equal protection not found as a matter of law in Two Guys. The trial court concluded that they were successful in that endeavor. We granted certification while the matter was pending unheard in the Appellate Division, 75 N. J. 584 (1977). We are constrained to disagree, and we reverse. We find trial error [352]*352in two broad respects: (a) with respect to the court’s conception of the nature of the judicial responsibility vis a vis that of the Legislature in this area; and (b) with regard to the adequacy of the proofs submitted by plaintiffs to negate all reasonably conceivable purposes or objects for the statutory classification.
We find no merit in the cross-appeal of plaintiffs addressed to alleged vagueness of the statute and to the asserted selective and discriminatory enforcement thereof. We agree with the trial court’s rejection of those contentions. See 148 N. J. Super, at 361-362.
I
Before examining the evidence in the case before us and the rationale of the trial court in holding it sufficient to invalidate the Sunday Closing Law, it is well to be reminded of certain cardinal principles required to be followed by the judiciary in passing upon the question as to whether a statutory classification of subject matter is invalid as a denial of the equal protection of the laws. Apart from the general presumption of constitutionality which attends every statute, the heart of .the applicable criterion was expressed in WHYY Inc. v. Glassboro, 50 N. J. 6, 13 (1967), rev’d 393 U. S. 117, 89 S. Ct. 286, 21 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1968),1 as follows:
The Legislature is presumed to have a valid classification in mind. Distinctions will be presumed to rest upon a rational basis if there be any conceivable state of facts which would afford reasonable support for them, (emphasis added).
The formidable nature of the burden resting on those who would establish the invalidity of a statutory classification in [353]*353an equal protection context is well delineated in N. J. Restaurant Ass’n. v. Holderman, 24 N. J. 295, 300 (1957), as quoted in Two Guys (32 N. J. at 218), as follows:
The burden of demonstrating that a statute contravenes the equal protection clause is extremely formidable, as is attested by the long trail of failure. In addition to the strong presumption of constitutionality with which all organic challenges are approached, one who assails a statute on this ground must contend with principles of unusual elasticity. It is easily stated that the classification (1) must not be palpably arbitrary or capricious, and (2) must have a rational basis in relation to the specific objective of the legislation. But the second proposition is qualified by limitations which compound the difficulties of one who assails the legislative decision. Thus it is not enough to demonstrate that the legislative objective might be more, fully achieved by another, more expansive classification, for the Legislature may recognize degrees of harm and hit the evil where it is most felt. [Citations omitted.] The Legislature may thus limit its action upon a decision to proceed cautiously, step by step, or because of practical exigencies, including administrative convenience and expense, * * * or because of “some substantial consideration of public policy or convenience or the service of the general welfare.” De Monaco v. Renton, 18 N. J. 352, 360 (1955). Hence it may “stop short of those cases in which the harm to the few concerned is thought less important than the harm to the public that would ensue if the rule laid down were, made mathematically exact.” Dominion Hotel, Inc. v. State of Arizona, supra (249 U. S. [265] at page 268, 39 S. Ct. [273] at page 274 [63 L. Ed. 597]). * * *”
Chief Justice Weintraub went on in Two Guys, supra, to say (32 N. J. at 219) :
As stated in Holderman, a discrimination which in the nature of the subject matter would otherwise be invidious may be relieved of that character if, generally speaking, a rational basis may be found for it in terms of degrees of evil or in the practical problems inherent in the process of legislating or in enforcement.
:¡? sH & sfc
The reason why a Legislature may strike at an evil where it finds it without first surveying the entire scene in which it may exist even in equal degree is an inescapable concession to the practicalities of a complex social and economic order. The legislative process would be hamstrung if the Legislature had to explore every nook and corner before it acted.
[354]*354Subsequent to the decision in Two Guys the United States Supreme Court sustained the validity of Sunday closing statutes in Maryland and Pennsylvania, both containing numerous and varied exemptions, against attack on various grounds including denial of equal protection. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley, 366 U. S. 582, 81 S. Ct. 1135, 6 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1961). In McGowan the Court -said:
* * Although no precise formula has been developed, the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect soma groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
366 U. S. at 425-426, 81 S. Ct. at 1105.
The Court held that the Legislature “could reasonably find" a rational basis for each of the exemptions, whether in fact, local tradition or custom. Id. at 426-428, 81 S. Gt: 1101.
In his classic concurring opinion in the McGowan case, Justice Frankfurter said:
* * * The applicable principles are that a state statute, may not be struck down as offensive of equal protection in its schemes of classification unless it is obviously arbitrary, and that, except in the ease of a statute whose discriminations are so patently without reason that no conceivable situation of fact could be found to justify them, the claimant who challenges the statute bears the burden of affirmative demonstration that in the actual state of facts which surround its operation, its classifications lack rationality. 366 U. S. at 459, 535, 81 S. Ct. at 1153, 1194.
Courts have a paramount obligation not to invalidate legislation merely because they disapprove its public policy. [355]*355To yield to the impulse to do so is to subvert the sensitive interrelationship between the three branches of government which is at the heart of our form of democracy. In this regard, one cannot overemphasize the admonition of the Chief Justice in Two Guys, when he said:
It is worth repeating that the Judiciary is not concerned with the good sense of a statute. Policy matters are the exclusive responsibility of the legislative branch of government. A judge, as a private citizen, may express his opinion at the polls, as every member of this court had the opportunity to do when chapter 119 was on the ballot. But the issue now before us is wholly one of the power of the Legislature to act, and upon that inquiry a judge would usurp authority if his personal view of policy intruded upon his deliberations.
32 N. J. at 229.
So much established introductorily, we turn to the matter of the rationality of the classification of the Sunday Closing Law. The first relevant inquiry is as to the object or objects of the law. As noted above, Two Guys declared the pertinent object to be that of reducing or eliminating interference with Sunday as a common day of rest and relaxation. The trial court considered the constitutional issue as merely whether unrestricted Sunday shopping by those who wish to do so “will * * * appreciably impinge upon the opportunity of others to spend their Sunday in such other -[than shopping] leisure-time pursuits as they may prefer” (emphasis added). 148 N. J. Super, at 352. In view of this unduly narrow perspective it will be well to review the full spectrum of what Sunday means to the generality of the populace, as conceived in Two Guys to have been properly within the legislative contemplation in proscribing Sunday activity.
*• ,». « fact js that Sunday has acquired a special character differentiating it from the other days of the week and this without reference to religious connotation. Today Sunday is many things to many people. It is a day upon which the vast majority of citizens seek respite from the pressures and demands of ordinary routines. To some, it is a day for religious devotion alone. To others, whether [356]*356or not members of faiths commanding religious observance, it is a secular holiday, a day for play, hobbies, recreation or relaxation. To still others, it is a combination of all of these. It is a day for family and friendly reunions. Most people want Sunday for themselves to do as they feel they should, each to prepare himself in his own way to meet the demands of Monday morning.
Thus the public health and welfare are implicated when the hustle and bustle mount and intrude unreasonably upon opportunities for rest, leisure and diversion. The inroad may he in terms of direct interference as, for example, when commercial activities add to highway traffic to the discomfort of the Sunday driver or otherwise impinge upon a scene conducive to rest, diversion and recreation. The inroad may be indirect but equally real as when those who want to be free on Sunday find the economic aims of their employer compel them to work to hold their jobs, or when the economic impact upon employers requires them and their staffs to remain at the grindstone. 32 N. J. at 215-216.
Thus, applying the teaching of the equal protection cases cited above, if there is any reasonably conceivable basis upon which the Legislature could have deemed the Sunday sale of the five categories of articles to have interfered to some degree with the public enjoyment of Sunday in one or more of the aspects of rest and relaxation described in the foregoing excerpt from Two Guys, the Oonrt must sustain the law. It is the legislative function, not that of the court, to weigh the anticipated benefits to the pnblic against the detriments to would-be Sunday shoppers and merchants. Only if the anticipated benefits could be affirmatively established to be so illusory as to stamp the legislative classification as arbitrary nr capricious would a court be justified in striking it as lacking in equal protection or as denying dne process.
Before subjecting the invalidating rationale of the trial court to analysis, certain facts which are obvious in relation to possible legislative motivations and implicit justificatory considerations for the classification of economic activities proscribed on Sunday by the current statute should be noted. Practically all manufacturing, processing and wholesaling activity, as well as the hulk of the service industries, ceases on Sunday. While this may have originated in religions belief, [357]*357in modern times it has become largely a custom rooted in social and economic considerations.2 Such closure extends to small as well as large businesses. There was therefore no pressing need to include in the Sunday Closing Law when enacted in 1959 prohibitions extending to such activities. As of 1959 and since, as we may assume the Legislature was aware, there was also large-scale voluntary closure of retail sales activity on Sunday. Notable exceptions thereto are some food establishments, restaurants, gasoline stations and drug stores. A rational basis for exempting these from Sunday closure on grounds of necessity or relationship to Sunday as a day of relaxation is obvious. Considerations of relevance to convenience for Sunday recreation seekers would also rationally justify excluding from the ban the wide variety of goods and articles sold for use in recreational activities. See McGowan v. Maryland, supra, 366 U. S. at 427-428, 81 S. Ct. 1101.
As to the limitation in the 1959 statute of furniture, furnishings, building materials, clothing and appliances as the only types of items forbidden to be sold on Sunday, we note that Two Guys recognized that there was a major eruption of retail activity on the highways during the 1950’s, 32 N. J. at 209, see also McGowan v. Maryland, supra, 366 U. S. at 541, 81 S. Ct. 1101 (concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J.) as to .similar phenomena in Pennsylvania, and it is clear to us that the Legislature could reasonably have felt that the kinds of merchandise mentioned were typically those whose Sunday sale was beginning to constitute a substantial threat to the Sunday rest and relaxation of the population at large. The Legislature was, of course, constitutionally free to address and deal with this particular impediment to Sunday rest and relaxation without extending a prohibition [358]*358to every other area of possible need. Two Guys, 32 N. J. at 218-219.
The trial court in the instant case did not undertake to establish that the classification in the Sunday Closing Law, in the sense of contrast between articles permitted and articles forbidden to be sold, was devoid of any rational relationship to its validated purposes on any conceivable basis the Legislature might have entertained therefor. It did not even address that proposition. Rather, the court proceeded on the bald assumption that if there were any such rational basis for the classification the court could invalidate the law if its purported salutary effect was outweighed by the resulting inconvenience to Sunday shoppers. Thus the court said:
[Pjlaintiff must show either that the classification is not at all related to the aim of affording the general public with relief from the stress of everyday pursuits or, if it bears some relation to that aim, its impact is not sufficiently significant in that regard to outweigh the public’s inconvenience necessarily resultant from the ban imposed by the challenged legislation.
148 N. J. Super, at 351.3
The foregoing statement was erroneous as a matter of law. If the classification bore “some relation” to the legislative objective of relief from interference with Sunday rest and relaxation, it was immune from invalidation through judicial admeasurement of a supposed preponderant inconvenience to would-be Sunday shoppers. As indicated herein-above, the weighing of relative benefits and detriments in [359]*359police power regulation is for the Legislature exclusively. In its ratio decidendi, however, the court appears to have partly rested on the factual conclusion that the proof adduced by plaintiffs’ expert witnesses sufficed to demonstrate that the law failed in fact to serve the legislative object and purpose at all (“the classification scheme * * * has been demonstrated to have failed to legitimately advance the welfare of the general public * * 148 N. J. Super, at 351). We find ourselves in distinct disagreement.
The plaintiffs’ witnesses were Dr. Yehudi Cohen, an anthropologist, Warren Travers, a traffic engineer and consultant, and Dean Boorman, a land-use planner.
As to Dr. Cohen, his testimony is virtually worthless for bias because of his avowed hostility to the policy of Sunday closing legislation, whatever the classification. The sum and substance of his testimony is that Sunday shopping is a recreational activity for women and families prevention of which to any degree is socially undesirable. Giving this witness’ evidence full face value, it in nowise tends to establish that the prohibition of Sunday sales of the prohibited categories of goods is not effective to reduce interference with the ambiance of Sunday as a day of rest and relaxation in any of the aspects recognized as fit for legitimate legislative concern in Two Guys. See 32 N. J. at 216, 228-229. The subjective value judgments of this witness as to the subject matter represent considerations totally for the appraisal of the Legislature, not the courts.
Travers perceived the issue to be one as to whether Sunday openings for sale of the proscribed items would increase the volume of traffic on certain main highways or routes that are used by travelers in pursuit of recreation. On the basis of a highly selective set of statistics, he found they would not. Passing for the moment the question of the reliability of the studies underlying the stated conclusion, the proposition falls far short of negating the numerous other rationally perceivable bases for the legislative determination. Travel for recreation is only one, and relatively minor at that, Sunday [360]*360pursuit of the populace. There are many others. As pointed out by Two Guys in language quoted above, the Legislature may prohibit Sunday commercial activity when it causes “hustle and bustle [to] mount and intrude unreasonably upon opportunities for rest, leisure and diversion.” 32 N. J. at 216. The inroad may consist of the increase of commercial traffic to the discomfort not only of the Sunday driver bent on recreation but of those who may be visiting or travelling for any of the other relaxing purposes for which one may be driving on the streets and highways on Sunday. The journeys and activities of Sunday shoppers and merchants may also “otherwise impinge upon a scene conducive to rest, diversion and recreation.” Id. at 216. Thus, people strolling, cycling, jogging, or sitting in their yards or on their porches on Sunday in or near areas where stores or shopping centers are located may find the “scene” less conducive to their enjoyment of the day by the sights and sounds — the general hustle-bustle —■ attendant upon traffic and other accompaniments of retail selling. Travers’ statistics and conclusions do not bear upon the legitimate legislative concern with any of these other reasonably conceivable effects of continued unrestricted sale of the proscribed articles.
The fact that there is inevitably a given amount of interference with Sunday rest and relaxation attendant upon permitted Sunday commercial activity (e. g., sales of food, drugs, etc.), travel from “open” to “closed” counties and from out of state to “closed” counties, and the like, as pointed out by Travers, cannot derogate from the inescapable logic that for every would-be Sunday venturer on the highways whose only purpose is to purchase or shop for one or more of the proscribed items the effect of the law is highly likely to eliminate that trip. Fothing in Travers’ testimony could establish the irrationality of a legislative supposition that enough of such trips are obviated by the Sunday Closing Law as to substantially further the assumed legislative objective in one or more of the respects noted above. In this regard it is significant that plaintiffs’ proofs established that in “open” [361]*361counties its stores’ Sunday sales were generally higher than on any other day of the week.
Even in respect to the purported Travers’ theme —> little or no impact on recreational driving from a hypothetical Sunday opening — the supporting data are inconclusive because limited to state highways (and only a minimal sampling of those). Ignored, consequently, is the potential effect, from lifting the prohibition on sale of the proscribed types of goods, of increased Sunday motoring on local streets or roads in or near urban or suburban business districts and neighborhoods.
The testimony of the witness Boorman was imbued with the same narrow focus as that of Travers: 4. e., “to evaluate whether the allowance of the full opening of stores in the counties in New Jersey where the sale of certain items is prohibited on Sunday would add traffic to the highways to an extent which would interfere with recreational travel.” It is therefore subject to the same conclusions of inadequacy in constitutional terms as Travers’ testimony. Moreover, Boor-man assumed an increase in such traffic if the law were repealed, and this in itself tends to support the legislative judgment. His conclusions that such an increase would not be too great or unduly burdensome to those seeking to enjoy Sunday are, again, obviously matters for legislative not judicial consideration.
The testimony of Travers and Boorman, as well as the opinion of the trial court, also disregards a reasonably conceivable legislative concern with the potentiality that widespread Sunday opening of stores like the plaintiffs’ selling the proscribed items could well, by competitive pressure, force the Sunday opening of the considerable number of other stores selling the same kinds of articles which now elect to stay closed on Sunday. This could “snowball” into very substantial incursions upon Sunday rest and relaxation both on highways and in central city and suburban business areas and their environs. See Gundaker Central Motors v. Gassert, 23 N. J. 71, 82 (1956) appeal dism. 354 U. S. 933, 77 S. Ct. [362]*3621397, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1533 (1957); McGowan v. Maryland, supra (366 U. S. at 541, 81 S. Ct. 1101, concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
Finally, plaintiffs overlook the potential legislative concern with giving employees of stores selling the five categories of goods access to the common Sunday rest and relaxation enjoyed by the community at large. See McGowan v. Maryland, supra, 366 U. S. at 538, 81 S. Ct. 1101 (concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J.). This consideration is distinguishable from that of concern for relief from uninterrupted labor for more than six days, held in Two Guys to be arbitrary if limited to the five categories of goods. 32 N. J. at 218-219. If the Legislature felt that because of general voluntary closing on Sunday (except for necessary occupations) stores selling the five categories of goods were typically those seeking to he open on Sunday, then it could reasonably have been motivated, along with the other considerations already discussed herein, to make the common Sunday rest and relaxation benefits enjoyed by the public at large available also to employees of such stores.
The parties have cited decisions in other states variously invalidating and sustaining Sunday closing statutory classifications. These largely depend on the particular exemption schemes and background facts implicated. They are of limited influence in this case as the basic approach of this Court to the validity of our own statute was fixed in Two Guys, and we prefer to adhere to the guidelines set forth therein, as we have done in this determination.
Intervenor, Menswear Retailers of New Jersey, Inc., has invited us to consider overruling Two Guys to the extent that that decision held the Sunday Closing Law to have repealed by implication the prior comprehensive Sunday prohibitory legislation as set forth in the 1951 revision. Reliance is had upon the Supreme Court decisions in Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley, supra, and McGowan v. Maryland, supra. Although those decisions upheld the validity of later and narrower Sunday prohibitory statutes against [363]*363the background of broader, more comprehensive earlier closing laws, in neither case was the question of implied repeal of the earlier by the later statute an issue. Indeed, the Court in the McGinley case noted that the stated issue was unsettled as a matter of Pennsylvania law. 366 U. S. at 588, 589, 81 S. Ct. 1135.
We find no reason to reconsider the holding of Two Guys in the respect noted.
Eor the reasons hereinabove set forth, we conclude plaintiffs have not established the invalidity of the Sunday Closing Law on equal protection or any other grounds.4
II
Plaintiffs have cross-appealed5 on the grounds: (a) the categorization of goods saleable and non-saleable under the statute is unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous; and (b) the pending prosecutions of plaintiffs sought to be enjoined by the complaint herein should be vitiated because of selective enforcement and because the statute is invalid as incapable of uniform enforcement. The trial court found these contentions to lack merit. 148 N. J. Super, at 361-362.
We agree with the trial court that our decision in State v. Monteleone, 36 N. J. 93, 99 (1961), is dispositive of the first ground of the cross-appeal. The first phase of the second ground of appeal is rejected for the reasons set forth in the trial court’s opinion. 148 N. J. Super, at 361-362. See also Abrahams v. Civ. Serv. Comm., 65 N. J. 61, 74-75 (1974). As to the second phase of that ground, we find it not supportable on the record of this case, taken in entirety, [364]*364and in the light of the heavy presumption of validity of a legislative enactment of substantial duration. Schaad v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association, 72 N. J. 237, 265 (1977).
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the Law Division with directions to dismiss the complaint.