HEFFERNAN, CHIEF JUSTICE.
This is a review of a published court of appeals decision. Vollmer v. Luety, 150 Wis. 2d 891, 443 N.W.2d 32 (Ct. App. 1989). This case involves the scope of the court of appeals statutory discretionary reversal power under sec. 752.35, Stats. This court originally accepted the defendant's petition for review in this case on March 7, 1989, and remanded the case to the court of appeals with directions to reconsider its December 22, 1988 unpublished decision in light of this court's opinion in State v. Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 424 N.W.2d 672 (1988). On remand, the court of appeals reaffirmed its earlier decision which reversed the trial court's judgment entered on the jury's verdict dismissing the plaintiffs negligence complaint. The court of appeals reversed on the grounds that the real controversy in the case had not been fully tried, pursuant to sec. 752.35, Stats. The defendant now seeks review of the court of appeals decision which concluded that it had properly applied Schu-macher in the original case.
[4]*4We affirm the decision of the court of appeals, concluding that it properly applied State v. Schumacher, because the error which the plaintiff failed to preserve for appellate consideration by a proper objection, an allegedly deficient verdict question, appears from the record to have prevented the real controversy from being fully tried, and hence, under the provisions of sec. 752.35, Stats., it was within the court of appeals' statutory discretion to reverse the judgment and to remand for a new trial.
The underlying facts of this case are as follows. Plaintiff stated in her initial complaint that defendant was negligent in his operation of a large rotary mower when cutting tall grass along a roadside and that his negligence caused the mower to eject an asphalt chunk which smashed through the plaintiffs closed car window and struck the plaintiffs arm as she drove by in her car. Plaintiff submitted the following written request for special verdict questions to the court prior to trial.
1. Was the defendant, Paul Luety negligent immediately prior to and at the time of the injury to plaintiff, Georgia Ann Vollmer, on June 25, 1983?
2. Was such negligence of Paul Luety a cause of the injuries of Georgia Ann Vollmer?
3. What sum of money will fairly and reasonably compensate Georgia Ann Vollmer for damages sustained in the accident?
Although it was plaintiffs theory of the case that defendant was negligent in operating the power mower, the special verdict question given to the jury inquired only whether the defendant was negligent in the maintenance of his premises. The special verdict questions submitted to the jury were:
[5]*51. At the time of, or prior to the accident, was the defendant, Paul Luety, negligent in his maintenance of the premises in question?
2. Was the negligence of the defendant, Paul Luety, a cause of injury to the plaintiff?
3. At the time of, or prior to the accident, was the manufacturer of the mower used by Paul Luety negligent in the construction or design of said mower?
4. Was the negligence of the manufacturer of the mower operated by Paul Luety a cause of injury to the plaintiff?
The jury answered "no" to all of these questions.
In a post-trial motion, plaintiff requested that the trial court change these answers from "no" to "yes" because the trial judge had submitted an improper verdict question to the jury. Plaintiff stated that, instead of inquiring whether the defendant was negligent in the maintenance of his premises, the jury should have been asked whether the defendant was "negligent immediately prior to and at the time of the injury to plaintiff."
Defendant filed a brief in opposition to plaintiffs post-trial motion, claiming that plaintiff failed to object on the record to the special verdict question as required by sec. 805.13(3), Stats., at the instruction and verdict conference or at any other time.
Counsel for the plaintiff concedes and the record reflects that, while he objected to the jury instructions, he failed to object to the special verdict question which inquired whether the defendant was negligent in the maintenance of his premises, instead of negligent in the operation of the mower. In oral argument before this court, counsel for the plaintiff indicated that he was not aware at the time of the conference with the trial court that the special verdict question contained the "negli[6]*6gent in the maintenance of his premises" language, and that it was an oversight on his part that he failed to notice the language of the verdict question.
The trial court denied plaintiffs post-trial motion requesting either a change in the jury verdict or a new trial. Judgment was entered in favor of the defendant and plaintiffs complaint was dismissed. Plaintiff appealed.
The court of appeals, in an unpublished per curiam decision, reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. Vollmer v. Luety, No. 88-0092, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 1988). The court of appeals concluded that, although the plaintiff failed to object to the special verdict question submitted to the jury, as required under sec. 805.13(3), Stats., it could reverse the trial court's decision under its discretionary power of reversal under sec. 752.35, Stats., citing Clark v. Leisure Vehicles, Inc., 96 Wis. 2d 607, 617, 292 N.W.2d 630, 635 (1980), because the real controversy had not been tried.
As stated above, defendants petitioned this court for review of the court of appeals' original 1988 decision. This court granted the petition, but remanded the matter to the court of appeals for further consideration in light of this court's decision in State v. Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 424 N.W.2d 672 (1988).
Pursuant to the directive of this court, the court of appeals, in a published décision, reconsidered its original decision and concluded that it was correct. It reinstated its mandate reversing the judgment appealed from and remanded the case for a new trial. Vollmer v. Luety, 150 Wis. 2d 891, 443 N.W.2d 32 (Ct. App. 1989).
The court of appeals set forth its interpretation of Schumacher. The court of appeals explained that, although this court stated in Schumacher that the court [7]*7of appeals does not have common-law discretionary power under the "integrity of the fact-finding process" line of cases to review unobjected-to errors in the instructions or verdict questions, it did not believe that the supreme court's decisions in either State v. Schumacher or State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985), intended to limit the power of either the supreme court or the court of appeals to reverse under secs. 751.06 and 752.35, Stats., when the real controversy had not been tried, to the two evidentiary circumstances described in Wyss.1 The court of appeals cited several opinions in which the supreme court reversed a decision on the grounds that the real controversy had not been fully tried in situations other than the two evidentiary situations mentioned in Wyss, including cases where counsel failed to object to a jury instruction or verdict question. The court of appeals then turned to the statutes which grant the supreme court and the court of appeals discretionary power to reverse judgments when the real controversy has not been fully tried or when it is probable that justice has for any reason miscarried. Sec. 751.06, Stats, (discretionary reversal power of supreme court), and 752.35, Stats, (discretionary reversal power of court of appeals).2 The court of appeals reasoned that, [8]*8because the language of these two statutes is identical, the longstanding interpretation of sec. 751.06, Stats., became a controlling interpretive gloss on sec. 752.35, Stats. Accordingly, the court concluded that, under the discretionary reversal statutes, "the court of appeals, like the supreme court, has the power to conclude that the real controversy has not been tried in many situations in addition to the two described in Wyss." 150 Wis. 2d at 904.
Finally, the court of appeals considered whether secs. 751.06 and 752.35, Stats., should be construed differently in light of the different functions assigned to the supreme court and the court of appeals. Because sec. 752.35 is tailored to doing justice between the parties in an individual case, the court of appeals concluded that it was not encroaching upon the law-developing or law-declaring function of the supreme court. Id. at 906.
Defendants have once again petitioned this court for review of the court of appeals decision. This court granted the petition to consider the scope of the court of appeals' power under the provisions of sec. 752.35, Stats., to reverse judgments.
[9]*9Although plaintiff argues that the objection to the special verdict question was not waived because she objected to the jury instruction, as set forth above plaintiff concedes and the record reflects that plaintiff failed to object to the special verdict question which was submitted to the jury. This court concludes that plaintiffs objection to the jury instruction did not constitute an objection to the special verdict question submitted to the jury that would as a matter of right enable the plaintiff to review.
Because plaintiff failed to object to the special verdict question, the error, if any, is waived under sec. 805.13(3), Stats. Section 805.13(3), which governs objections to jury instructions and verdict questions, specifically provides:
(3) INSTRUCTION AND VERDICT CONFERENCE. At the close of the evidence and before arguments to the jury, the court shall conduct a conference with counsel outside the presence of the jury. At the conference, or at such earlier time as the court reasonably directs, counsel may file written motions that the court instruct the jury on the law, and submit verdict questions, as set forth in the motions. The court shall inform counsel on the record of its proposed action on the motions and of the instructions and verdict it proposes to submit. Counsel may object to the proposed instructions or verdict on the grounds of incompleteness or other error, stating the grounds for objection with particularity on the record. Failure to object at the conference constitutes a waiver of any error in the proposed instructions or verdict. [Emphasis supplied.]
In Air Wisconsin, Inc. v. North Central Airlines, Inc., 98 Wis. 2d 301, 311, 296 N.W.2d 749 (1980), this [10]*10court emphasized the importance of the rule (sec. 805.13(3), Stats.) requiring that a particularized objection be made and that the grounds for objection to both jury instructions and special verdict questions be stated on the record. This court stated, "in the absence of a specific objection which brings into focus the nature of the alleged error, a party has not preserved its objections for review." Unlike Air Wisconsin, where counsel objected, but failed to set forth the grounds for the objection on the record, in this case counsel failed to object to the special verdict question at all, until the jury was ready to announce its verdict.
This court has continuously emphasized the importance of making proper objections as a prerequisite to assert, as a matter of right, an alleged error on appeal. Section 805.13(3), Stats., is but a particularized application of the general rule that only those issues raised at trial can be raised on appeal. In Wells v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 274 Wis. 505, 518, 80 N.W.2d 380 (1957), Justice Currie, writing for this court, stated, "[w]e deem the correct rule to be that no error of the court should be reviewable as a matter of right on appeal without first" properly preserving the error in the trial court. Likewise, in Cappon v. O'Day, 165 Wis. 486, 162 N.W. 655 (1917), Justice Rosenberry stated, ”[o]ne of the rules of well nigh universal application established by courts in the administration of the law is that questions not raised and properly presented for review in the trial court will not be reviewed on appeal."
There are many justifications for this rule. See Martineau, Modern Appellate Practice: Federal and State Civil Appeals (1983), sec. 3.2. First, it is the role of an appellate court to correct errors made by the trial court, not to rule on matters never considered by the trial [11]*11court. Second, requiring objections at trial allows the trial judge an opportunity to correct or to avoid errors, thereby resulting in efficient judicial administration and eliminating the need for an appeal. This is precisely the failure that occurred in this case. Because counsel failed to object to the special verdict question, the trial judge did not have an opportunity to correct the error and submit a proper verdict question to the jury. Third, if attorneys are not required to raise issues at the trial court level, there is less of an incentive for attorneys to diligently prepare their cases for trial. In fact, some attorneys might be induced to build in an error to ensure access to the appellate court, notwithstanding their deficient performance at trial. Finally, this court will not consider an issue for the first time on appeal because it may result in hardship to one of the parties and deprives the appellate court of the benefit of informed thinking of the trial judge. Terpstra v. Soiltest, Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 585, 593, 218 N.W.2d 129 (1974).
It is for these reasons that this court has emphasized that it will exercise its power of discretionary reversal and review only in exceptional cases. Wells v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., supra; State v. Cuyler, 110 Wis. 2d 133, 141, 327 N.W.2d 662 (1983). This was the primary policy concern of the Schumacher court in setting restrictions on the court of appeals' common-law authority to exercise its discretionary power of reversal notwithstanding the waiver of the error by trial counsel.
Although this court was concerned with preservation of the waiver rule in Schumacher, this court also recognized the importance of thé inherent power of this court to review waived error, separate and apart from the power granted to this court and the court of appeals by [12]*12statute. As this court stated many years ago in Cappon, 165 Wis. at 491:
But to this rule [the waiver rule] there are many exceptions . . .. No question of the power of this court is involved. Whether this court should review a question raised here for the first time depends upon the facts and circumstances disclosed by the particular record. It undoubtedly has the power, but ordinarily will not exercise it. The question is one of administration, not of power.
Likewise in State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 536, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985), the court explained that "this court, even prior to the broad discretionary grant of power to consider issues specifically conferred by the 1977 constitutional revision, had the option of considering issues if it appeared to the court to be in the interests of good judicial administration to do so."
Consistent with our decision in Schumacher, we once again attempt to achieve a balanced and workable rule of judicial administration by taking into consideration this court's broad inherent power to reach issues not preserved by the parties, the ability of the court of appeals to achieve justice in individual cases under its statutory discretionary reversal power, and this court's desire to preserve the general rule that failure to object to error at the trial court level results in waiver of that error.
The court of appeals exercised its discretion and reversed the judgment of the trial court despite the waiver in this case because it concluded that the real controversy had not been fully tried. Thus, the issue presented to this court is whether the court of appeals erred by exercising discretionary reversal power under sec. 752.35, Stats., on the grounds that the real controversy was not fully tried.
[13]*13We conclude that the court of appeals has discretionary authority under sec. 752.35, Stats., to reverse the judgment of the circuit court in this case, despite the failure of plaintiff to preserve the objection for appeal. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court and remanding for further proceedings.
This court has on many an occasion attempted to delineate the authority of the court of appeals and of this court to exercise its discretionary power to reverse judgments where the alleged error was not objected to or otherwise preserved at trial.
The discretionary power to reverse judgments and to review waived error arises from both the common law and from statute. State v. Penigar, 139 Wis. 2d 569, 577, 408 N.W.2d 28 (1987). In Schumacher this court addressed the power of the court of appeals under the common law "integrity of the fact-finding" test under State v. Shah, 134 Wis. 2d 246, 254, 397 N.W.2d 492 (1986), to reverse a judgment, despite defendant's failure at trial to object to the jury instruction. We concluded that, while the court of appeals had the discretionary power of reversal stated under sec. 752.35, Stats., it did not have the common-law power to review waived error — allocated to this court by its decisional process in the "integrity of the fact-finding" line of cases, culminating in State v. Shah. 134 Wis. 2d at 254. We concluded that, while both the court of appeals and the supreme court have the identical discretionary power to reverse judgments based on waived error under secs. 752.35 and 751.06, respectively, only the supreme court has the power to review waived error under the common-law rule known as the "integrity of the fact-finding" exception. We held that the court of appeals had exceeded its [14]*14authority by relying on this common-law rule. Because the court of appeals relied on this common-law exception to the general rule that unobjected-to error is waived, we did not have the occasion in Schumacher to delineate the discretionary reversal power of the court of appeals granted to it pursuant to sec. 752.35. Instead, we exercised our own common-law power to review the waived error, and determined that the unobjected-to jury instruction was not improper and, in effect, affirmed the circuit court's decision.
When we review waived error, as in Schumacher, we are not institutionally concerned with achieving justice in the particular case. The court of appeals performs that function admirably and there is no reason to believe that this court can do better in that respect. When we review error we do so not merely to correct error or to examine alleged error; instead we do so because the alleged error in issue has some substantial significance in our institutional law-making responsibility as set forth in the statute and constitution3 and as reflected in our rules for accepting cases on petition for review. Institutionally, we are more concerned with developing and clarifying the law. This court has relied on the "integrity of the fact-finding" test on numerous occasions in order to review an unobjected-to error and reach the conclusion that there was no error. Under this common-law power we may in our discretion review an error that was technically waived and affirm. See State v. Baldwin, 101 Wis. 2d 441, 445-46, 304 N.W.2d 742 (1981); Manson v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 413, 417 n.2, 304 N.W.2d 729 (1981); State v. Cheers, 102 Wis. 2d 367, 306 N.W.2d 676 (1981); State v. Shah, 134 Wis. 2d 246, 397 N.W.2d 492 (1986). [15]*15Because of the different roles of the supreme court and the court of appeals, we concluded in Schumacher that only this court has the power to review waived error under the common-law rule known as the "integrity of the fact-finding process" test.
We emphasized, however, that the discretionary power of reversal, granted to both the court of appeals and this court by statute, as opposed to the discretionary power of review granted to this court by the common law, is compatible with doing justice in an individual case, which is primarily the duty of the court of appeals. 144 Wis. 2d at 408. We recognized that "under our two-tiered appellate system, the court of appeals is destined to be the court of last resort for most cases." Id. Accordingly, we concluded that, "it would be inappropriate for that court to have no discretion with respect to claimed error in instruction." Id.4 It should have the substantial discretion granted under sec. 752.35, Stats., as that statute is liberally construed.
[16]*16We now turn to the court of appeals' power to reverse judgments, despite waiver of any error, under sec. 752.35, Stats. The court of appeals in Vollmer concluded that neither the Wyss court nor the Schumacher court intended that secs. 751.06 and 752.35, limit situations in which the real controversy has not been fully tried to the two evidentiary circumstances described in Wyss. Vollmer v. Luety, 150 Wis. 2d at 897. We agree.
As explained above and as recognized by the court of appeals in Vollmer, Schumacher set forth the limitations on the court of appeals' discretionary review power granted by one common-law exception to the waiver rule, but did not address the court of appeals' discretionary reversal power granted to it by statute.
In State v. Wyss, in the context of the facts there at issue, this court discussed the court of appeals' power to reverse a judgment under sec. 752.35, Stats. The Wyss court explained that there were two grounds for reversing a judgment and ordering a new trial under secs. 752.35 and 751.06. The court stated that a new trial may be ordered on either of two grounds: (1) whenever the real controversy has not been fully tried or (2) whenever it is probable that justice has for any reason miscarried. 124 Wis. 2d at 735. We stated that, under the first category, when the real controversy has not been fully tried, an appellate court may exercise its power of discretionary reversal without finding the probability of a different result on retrial. Under the second category, however, an appellate court must first find a substantial probability of a different result on retrial before exercising its discretionary reversal power.
In Wyss, we concluded that the court of appeals erred as a matter of law because it exercised its discretionary reversal power under the second category of sec. 752.35, Stats. — the miscarriage-of-justice test — without [17]*17first finding that there was a substantial probability of a different result on retrial. Accordingly, the Wyss court had no occasion to consider the court of appeals' discretionary-reversal power under the first category — the real controversy not fully tried — of sec. 752.35, Stats. We therefore agree with the court of appeals that "[f]or that reason, the circumstances under which either the supreme court or the court of appeals may reverse on making such a determination was not before the Wyss court." Vollmer v. Luety, 150 Wis. 2d at 898 (Ct. App.).
It is the application of that first category under sec. 752.35, Stats. — whether the real controversy has been fully tried — to a jury verdict question which is before this court today.
We also agree with the court of appeals that, because of the factual posture of the case, the Wyss court confined its discussion of circumstances in which the real controversy had not been fully tried to the two evi-dentiary situations stated above. Furthermore, consistent with the court of appeals' opinion, we conclude that, because secs. 751.06 and 752.35, Stats., are identical, the legislature did not intend for the court of appeals' power to reverse under sec. 752.35 to be less than that of the supreme court under sec. 751.06. As this court repeatedly explained in Schumacher, it is the common law "integrity of the fact-finding" exception — which grants the supreme court the power to review waived error — that is unavailable to the court of appeals.
Both the supreme court and the court of appeals have the discretionary power to reverse judgments where unobjected-to error results in either the real controversy not having been fully tried or for any reason justice is miscarried under secs. 751.06 and 752.35, Stats. See supra at n.2. The language used in these two statutes is [18]*18for our purposes identical. In State v. Schumacher, this court traced the legislative history of secs. 751.06 and 752.35 and made several statements which reflect this court's view that, with respect to the discretionary power to reverse under secs. 751.06 and 752.35 the powers of the supreme court and the court of appeals are coterminous.
Prior to January 1, 1976, the effective date of sec. 805.13(3), Stats., the common law of this state was that a failure to object to instructions amounted to a waiver of any right to raise the issue of erroneous instruction on appeal. [Citation omitted.] However, there were several judicially created exceptions to this common law waiver rule, which allowed for discretionary review by this court. In addition, after 1913, there was a statutory exception which allowed for discretionary reversal, a statutory exception which exists today.
Turning first to the statutory exception allowing discretionary reversal, sec. 2405m, Stats. 1913, allowed a discretionary reversal when it either appeared from the record that the real issue in controversy had not been fully tried, or when it was probable that justice had, for any reason miscarried. [Footnote omitted.] This statute eventually became the current section 751.06, Stats. [Footnote omitted.] When the court of appeals was instituted in 1978, a substantially similar power of discretionary reversal was extended to that court under sec. 752.35, Stats. [Footnote omitted and emphasis added.]
Over the course of this statute's life, this court has often been called upon to interpret the scope of the discretionary-reversal power granted to both this court and to the court of appeals. [Emphasis added.]
144 Wis. 2d at 398-400.
[19]*19Based on the legislative history and judicial interpretations of secs. 751.06 and 752.35, Stats., it is appropriate to conclude that the power of reversal under these statutes is identical. Accordingly, cases of this court which interpret the supreme court's power to reverse judgments, notwithstanding waived error, under sec. 751.06 are equally applicable as interpretations of the court of appeals' power to reverse judgments under sec. 752.35.
In reviewing the cases in which we have interpreted the scope of our discretionary power to reverse judgments under sec. 751.06, Stats., we conclude that the court of appeals, like this court, has broad power of discretionary reversal. This broad statutory authority provides the court of appeals with power to achieve justice in its discretion in the individual case. The first category of cases arises when the real controversy has not been fully tried. Under this first category, it is unnecessary for an appellate court to first conclude that the outcome would be different on retrial. The second class of cases is where for any reason the court concludes that there has been a miscarriage of justice. Under this second category of the statutes, an appellate court must first make a finding of substantial probability of a different result on retrial.
This court has relied on this first category of the statute to reverse judgments in many situations, not limited to the two evidentiary situations mentioned in Wyss. We have concluded that the real controversy was not fully tried, and reversed judgments where important evidence was erroneously excluded, thereby depriving the jury of the opportunity to hear important testimony that bore on an important issue in the case. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 735, citing State v. Cuyler, 110 Wis. 2d 133, 142-43, 327 N.W.2d 662 (1983); Garcia v. State, 73 Wis. [20]*202d 651, 245 N.W.2d 654 (1976). Likewise, this court has reversed judgments, after concluding that the real controversy was not fully tried, because the jury had before it evidence which should have been excluded by the trial judge. Logan v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 128, 137, 168 N.W.2d 171 (1969); State v. Penigar, 139 Wis. 2d 569, 578, 408 N.W.2d 28 (1987).
In addition to situations involving the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence, this court has reversed judgments where, under the first test of sec. 751.06, Stats., an error in the jury instructions or verdict questions occurred, but was waived. In Air Wisconsin, this court concluded that the issue of liability was not "fully or properly tried," because an erroneous instruction was given on a significant issue. Air Wisconsin, 98 Wis. 2d at 318. The court could not conclude that the outcome would be different on retrial. See also In the Interest of C.E.W., 124 Wis. 2d 47, 368 N.W.2d 47 (1985). Likewise, in Clark v. Leisure Vehicles, Inc., 96 Wis. 2d 607, 292 N.W.2d 630 (1980), and Gyldenvand v. Schroeder, 90 Wis. 2d 690, 280 N.W.2d 235 (1979), this court reversed the judgments where the waived error was in the verdict question. In Clark, this court relied on sec. 751.06 to reverse the judgment without indicating upon which test or which line of cases it was relying.
In a number of other cases, this court has reversed a judgment notwithstanding failure to object on the grounds that the real controversy was not fully tried in situations where, either due to error of the trial judge or counsel, a significant legal issue was not properly tried to the court. See, Fletcher v. Eagle River Memorial Hospital, Inc., 156 Wis. 2d 165, 456 N.W.2d 788 (1990); Hernan Plumbing v. Anchor Savings & Loan, 104 Wis. 2d 532, 537-38, 312 N.W.2d 745 (1981); First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Notte, 97 Wis. 2d 207, 225-26, 293 [21]*21N.W.2d 530 (1980); Merco Distributing Corp. v. O & R Engines, Inc., 71 Wis. 2d 792, 797-98, 239 N.W.2d 97 (1976). This court has reversed judgments under sec. 751.06, Stats., where the record was deemed incomplete or insufficient. Bostonian Homes, Inc. v. Struck, 44 Wis. 2d 553, 559-60, 171 N.W.2d 320 (1969); Walter v. Four Wheel Drive Auto Co., 213 Wis. 559, 572, 252 N.W. 346 (1934). This court has reversed a judgment where conduct during the course of trial prevented the jury from fairly considering a crucial issue before the court. Lorenz v. Wolff, 45 Wis. 2d 407, 173 N.W.2d 129 (1970). This court has exercised its power under the discretionary reversal statute and ordered a new trial where the evidence was confusing to the jury. Prideaux v. Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co., 246 Wis. 390, 394-95, 17 N.W.2d 350 (1945). Finally, this court has exercised its discretionary reversal power on the grounds that the real controversy was not fully tried where the "record of the whole case shows such an abundance of misunderstanding, cross-purposes, and frustration that dismissal would leave us with a strong belief that the issues had not been fully tried nor justice done.'' Erickson v. Westfield Milling & Electric Light Co., 263 Wis. 580, 589, 58 N.W.2d 437 (1953). While this is not an exclusive list of every situation where this court has exercised its discretionary reversal power under sec. 751.06 or its predecessors, it illustrates that the court of appeals has the same broad discretion under sec. 752.35, Stats., as does this court under sec. 751.06. This broad discretion enables it to achieve justice in individual cases, which is consistent with its role as an error-correcting court.5
[22]*22Because this court has relied on the first test of sec. 751.06, Stats., to reverse a judgment notwithstanding counsel's failure to object to an erroneous verdict question, the court of appeals is authorized to do so under its equivalent discretionary reversal power under sec. 752.35, Stats. Accordingly, it was proper for the court of appeals to reverse the judgment in this case because it concluded that the erroneous special verdict question led the jurors to focus their attention on the defendant's negligence in maintaining the premises, when the crux of plaintiffs case was that the defendant was negligent in his operation of the power mower. The court of appeals correctly concluded that the real controversy had not been fully tried.
In a case where an instruction obfuscates the real issue or arguably caused the real issue not to be tried, reversal would be available in the discretion of the court of appeals under sec. 752.35, Stats.
The court of appeals decision, which reversed the judgment of the trial court, is affirmed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the mandate of the court of appeals.
By the Court. — Decision affirmed.