Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. v. Smartcar, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedSeptember 25, 2024
Docket4:21-cv-04895
StatusUnknown

This text of Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. v. Smartcar, Inc. (Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. v. Smartcar, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. v. Smartcar, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, Case No. 21-cv-04895-JST INC., 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 DISMISS COUNTERCLAIMS II-VI v. 10 Re: ECF No. 101 SMARTCAR, INC., 11 Defendant.

12 13 Before the Court is Plaintiff-Counterclaim Defendant Volkswagen Group of America, 14 Inc.’s (“VWGoA”) motion to dismiss counterclaims asserted by Defendant-Counterclaim Plaintiff 15 Smartcar, Inc. (“Smartcar”). ECF No. 101. The Court will grant the motion. 16 I. BACKGROUND 17 A. Factual Background 18 For the purpose of resolving this motion, the Court accepts as true the allegations in 19 Smartcar’s counterclaim complaint. ECF No. 98 at 15–47; see Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 20 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). 21 1. Telematics Data 22 The operation of consumer vehicles generates telematics data, including information about 23 mileage, fuel consumption, braking and acceleration, and many other aspects of the car’s 24 performance. Counterclaim Compl.,1 ECF No. 98 at 15 ¶ 2. “Nearly every car shipped is internet 25

26 1 The Counterclaim Complaint begins on page 15 of ECF No. 98. The first fifteen pages of the document contain Smartcar’s Answer and affirmative defenses, which also consist of numbered 27 paragraphs. For simplicity’s sake, the Court cites allegations from the Countercomplaint using the 1 connected.” Id. ¶ 23. Telematics data can be useful to drivers and to a range of third parties; for 2 example, repair shops can reference it to facilitate maintenance or repairs, and insurance 3 companies can monitor it to incentivize safe driving. Id. ¶¶ 28, 45–46. 4 Automobile original equipment manufacturers (“Automobile OEMs”) control “the type of 5 data generated and stored on the vehicle.” Id. ¶ 28. “The National Highway Traffic Safety 6 Administration currently mandates that all vehicles in the United States be compliant with the 7 OBD-II specification, which means anyone equipped with the correct device can access the OBD- 8 II vehicle diagnostics data by physically accessing the port. However, not all vehicle data 9 generated by certain vehicles can be accessed with the OBD-II port.” Id. ¶ 29. In addition, many 10 Automobile OEMs now outfit vehicles with a “cellular-based telematics control unit” (“TCU”). 11 Id. ¶ 30. The TCU records and stores detailed data beyond that which the OBD-II port can 12 capture, id., and enables remote control of certain functions, such as unlocking and locking the car 13 using a smartphone, id. ¶¶ 27, 60. Although drivers theoretically could use the TCU to transmit 14 their vehicle’s data to anyone with an internet connection, TCUs are “designed to be secure and 15 prevent[] unauthorized modification to the data or unauthorized access.” Id. ¶¶ 30–31. 16 2. Smartcar 17 Defendant Smartcar was founded in 2014 as a “mobility application developer platform for 18 cars.” Id. ¶ 15. Its application programming interface (“API”) allows application developers to 19 design applications that are compatible with vehicles from various Automobile OEMs.2 20 Id. ¶¶ 33–34. The API also makes it possible for consumers to use applications that were not 21 designed for their specific vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 2, 33–34. Without such a platform, developers would 22 need to customize the code of their applications for each make of car, and consumers would only 23 be able to use applications designed for their particular cars. See id. ¶¶ 17–19. Applications that 24 use Smartcar’s API require drivers to “agree to share specific vehicle telematics data” from an 25 application pre-installed by the Automobile OEMs that allows the user to remotely access their 26 vehicle’s data and controls. Id. ¶ 19. 27 1 Smartcar’s business has flourished in “the last nine years,” and it has become “the leading 2 developer platform for mobility businesses.” Id. ¶¶ 18, 24. Users of its API span several sectors, 3 including insurance providers, car sharing businesses, state agencies, electric utility providers, 4 independent repair shops, and ride hailing companies. Id. ¶ 20. Smartcar has built integrations 5 with “thirty-seven car brands in North America and in Europe” and “has over 10,000 registered 6 application developers.” Id. ¶ 22; see also id. ¶ 93 (applications developed on Smartcar’s API are 7 compatible “with a majority of the over forty-two Automobile OEM brands in the United States”). 8 “Several Fortune 500 companies have adopted Smartcar’s technology and its API . . . .” Id. ¶ 22. 9 3. VWGoA 10 Like other Automobile OEMs, VWGoA uses TCUs with security features restricting 11 “interoperability,” that is, limiting data access to the Automobile OEM and approved third parties. 12 Id. ¶ 31; see id. ¶ 39. Drivers who lease or purchase VWGoA vehicles (“VWGoA Owners”) have 13 the option to purchase connectivity services, such as Car-Net, Audi connect, and myAudi 14 (collectively, “VWGoA Services”), that allow them to connect to and control their vehicles using 15 their smartphones and computers. See id. ¶ 27. “[B]ecause of the security features built into” the 16 TCUs, VWGoA requires VWGoA Owners subscribing to the VWGoA Services to sign user 17 agreements restricting their right to resell the data that their vehicle generates or distribute it for 18 commercial purposes without VWGoA’s approval. Id. ¶ 39; see id. ¶¶ 40–43. The data-sharing 19 restriction is an express condition in the user services agreement. Id.; see id. ¶ 153. 20 4. Data-Sharing Restriction 21 Because VWGoA Owners cannot share their data under the terms of the VWGoA 22 Services, they cannot use applications that were developed with Smartcar’s API. See, e.g., 23 id. ¶ 41. They can only use applications from VWGoA or third-party developers that VWGoA 24 approves. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 27, 31–32; see also id. ¶ 172 (VWGoA provides access to “its own 25 service providers and dealers”). VWGoA has not approved Smartcar as a partner. See id. ¶ 57. 26 Limiting VWGoA Owners’ use of their data to “personal, non-commercial use,” means 27 they must “accept unwanted services (i.e., VWGoA’s Services)” to access their data, which 1 repair services and data services. Id. ¶¶ 56–58. Although VWGoA has not sought to enforce 2 these agreements against VWGoA Owners who use password storage vaults or give their family 3 members their password, they have sought to enforce the agreement against Smartcar. Id. ¶ 57. 4 5. Anticompetitive Effects of Restriction 5 Smartcar alleges that the terms of the VWGoA Services user agreement “unlawfully tie the 6 data (both the data itself and access to the data) from [VWGoA] Owners to the use of VWGoA’s 7 Services.” Id. ¶ 151. It identifies the tying product as “data access,” id. ¶ 122, or “the vehicle data 8 and/or data access,” id. ¶¶ 136, 154, and the tied product as the “data processing/storage services 9 aspect of VWGoA Services,” id. ¶ 122, or “VWGoA’s Services,” id. ¶¶ 136, 154. It alleges that 10 the “tying markets” consist of “either the telematics data market and/or telematics data access 11 market,” id. ¶¶ 134, 152, while the “tied markets” are “the data processing (e.g. application 12 developers), data storage (e.g. cloud and/or personal storage), and other usage data market (other 13 services using such data),” id. ¶ 134. 14 Smartcar next alleges that VWGoA has monopoly power in several different markets as a 15 result of the data-sharing restriction. It monopolizes the markets for data from VWGoA vehicles, 16 see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 60, 86, 165, 168, and for access to VWGoA vehicle data, id. ¶¶ 165, 168. It also 17 monopolizes the “telematics data market” and “telemetry data access market” at large. Id. ¶¶ 149, 18 166; see also id. ¶ 150 (alleging that the “telematics data market” consists of “just VWGoA and no 19 one else”).

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Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. v. Smartcar, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/volkswagen-group-of-america-inc-v-smartcar-inc-cand-2024.