Vohs v. Miller

323 F. Supp. 2d 965, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12259, 2004 WL 1490177
CourtDistrict Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedJuly 1, 2004
DocketCIV. 03-3528RHKAJB
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 323 F. Supp. 2d 965 (Vohs v. Miller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vohs v. Miller, 323 F. Supp. 2d 965, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12259, 2004 WL 1490177 (mnd 2004).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KYLE, District Judge.

Introduction

In one of several related matters arising out of the massive bankruptcy of Minneapolis-based broker-dealer MJK Clearing, Inc. (“MJK”), 1 Plaintiff Karl Vohs, an indi *967 vidual investor, has brought a putative class action against the directors and officers of MJK’s parent company, Stockwalk Group, Inc. (“Stockwalk”), alleging that their statements touting Stoekwalk’s. performance violated federal and state securities and anti-fraud laws. 2 Defendants Eldon Miller, Todd Miller, David Johnson, and Jeffrey Houdek (collectively, “moving Defendants”) have brought a motion to dismiss. 3 Because the Amended Complaint fails to generate the strong inference of scienter required by federal law, and because the state law claims are preempted, the Court will grant that motion.

Background

Headquartered in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Stockwalk was — until 2002 — a publicly-traded company providing traditional and online securities brokerage services, investment banking, and clearing services. (Am.ComplY 16.) Jt was created to capitalize on a trend toward the trading of securities on the Internet. (Id.) Among its activities, Stockwalk had an extensive securities lending business,, which it ran out of MJK, its clearing subsidiary. In an ordinary securities lending transaction, one party, usually a broker-dealer, loans securities to another party, usually another broker-dealer, in exchange for cash collateral that slightly exceeds the value of the securities. This cash collateral is “marked to the market,” so that, as the price for a particular stock rises and falls, cash is delivered to or returned from the lender. From March 1999 through September 2001, securities lending became an increasingly important source of revenue for Stockwalk. (Id. ¶ 28.)

The securities lending department at MJK was run by Thomas Brooks. (Id. ¶ 16.) While reporting directly to moving Defendants, he engaged in a series of exceptionally improvident transactions involving thinly traded securities. For example, from November 2000 to June 2001, MJK borrowed and then re-loaned $192 million worth of Genesislntermedia (“GENI”) securities. (Id. ¶ 23.) Similarly, in May 2001, MJK advanced cash collateral exceeding $50 million to borrow and then re-loan the bonds of Imperial Credit Industries, Inc. (Id. ¶ 24.) In both instances, the securities were borrowed from Native Nations Securities, Inc. (“Native Nations”), an inadequately-capitalized broker-dealer operating out of New Jersey. (Id. ¶ 23.) As this loan activity — and the subsequent defaults — increased, Brooks attempted to hide the scale of his losses by filing false Loanet and FOCUS Reports. 4 (Id. ¶ 31.)

*968 On May 8, 2001, the accounting firm of Ernst & Young issued a report to Stock-walk’s audit committee. In that report, Ernst & Young noted that the securities lending group was not doing enough to document its risk assessment process:

To mitigate the credit or counterparty risk associated with the securities lending business, the securities lending group reviews counterparty financial information (i.e., Regulatory FOCUS reports or financial statements) annually. However, formal documentation of the annual credit reviews, including management’s conclusions, rationale for such conclusions and the underlying financial information, was not maintained in all cases. The rapid growth of the securities lending business over the past two fiscal years coupled with the economic slowdown increases the overall credit risk to the Company. We recommend management enhance the counterparty evaluation process to provide for more robust documentation and retention standards.

(Zebot Aff. Ex. I; see also Am. Compl. ¶ 36). 5

Despite burgeoning cash-flow problems in the summer of 2001, Stockwalk’s public pronouncements remained upbeat. On May 8, 2001, Stoekwalk issued a press release quoting Eldon Miller:

“We have curbed our losses and have made strides toward profitability,” said Miller. “The integration of Miller Johnson Kuehn, Inc. with our acquisitions, R.J. Steichen and Company and John G. Kinnard, Inc., has given us the chance to vigorously streamline our operations and implement significant cost savings measures ... which will help drive more of the company’s revenues to the bottom line. We have built Miller Johnson Stei-chen Kinnard, Inc. (MJSK), to be a lean organization positioned to effectively benefit from economics of scale, expanded distribution and enhanced market presence.”

(Id. ¶ 33.) On August 6, 2001, Miller said: “I am very optimistic about the future of our business, and believe we have taken the necessary steps to strategically structure our operation to enhance our earning capabilities.” (Id.)

In early August 2001, Stoekwalk sent shareholders its Report on Form 10-K. In the report, the company stated:

• “All three of our broker-dealer subsidiaries are in compliance with all net capital requirements.”
• “[T]he clearing business provides for many growth opportunities and thus will continue to expand this part of our operation in the future.”
• “When we engage in stock lending, we collect cash deposits from brokers and pay down higher interest bearing lines of credit.”
• Stoekwalk had been audited “in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in the United States.”

(Id. ¶ 48.)

In September 2001, the value of the thinly traded securities borrowed and re-loaned by MJK dropped precipitously. (Moilanen Aff. Ex. C at 4.) As it was obligated to do, MJK returned cash collateral to various broker-dealers in exchange for the now-worthless securities. (Id.) It was unable, however, to recoup the cash collateral it had extended to Native Nations. (Id.) The Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”) placed MJK into liquidation on September 27, 2001. (Am.Compl^ 31.) By February 2002, *969 MJK’s meltdown was more than Stockwalk could financially bear, and it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The failure of MJK, with losses between $80-$200 million, proved to be the largest in the thirty-year history of SIPC. (Moilanen Aff. Ex. C at 4.)

After MJK’s collapse, SIPC commissioned a report from Fiske Risk Management outlining flaws in MJK’s risk assessment processes:

According to the Trustee’s complaint [in Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. MJK Clearing, Inc., Adv. Proc No.

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Bluebook (online)
323 F. Supp. 2d 965, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12259, 2004 WL 1490177, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vohs-v-miller-mnd-2004.